Pitch tunneling offers a cruel little hope in the bottom of the seventh: the hitter might see one pitch and swing at another. On October 15, 2026, Aaron Ashby needs every advantage he can find.
The Milwaukee Brewers lead the Los Angeles Dodgers 5-4 in Game 4 of the National League Championship Series. Andy Pages has doubled and moved to third on a sacrifice bunt. The tying run stands 90 feet from home, and Shohei Ohtani walks into the batter’s box with one out.
Ohtani has already launched a three-run homer. Milwaukee needs two outs to escape, but the Dodgers have the top of their lineup waiting. One ball through the infield could change everything.
Ashby faces an uncomfortable choice. Challenge Ohtani with a hard sinker, or trust one of the breaking pitches that helped carry him through the season?
Whatever he chooses, Ohtani has seen the scouting reports. He knows Ashby’s repertoire. The left-hander’s job is to make that knowledge useless for the next few tenths of a second.
The answer begins with a tiny stretch of air between the mound and home plate.
The 23.8 Feet That Can Fool a Major League Hitter
A baseball traveling toward home plate doesn’t give hitters much time to think. At 98 mph, the ball covers 60 feet in roughly four-tenths of a second. The batter must recognize the pitch, decide whether to swing, and get the barrel into position before it arrives.
Pitch tunneling exploits the most vulnerable part of that process.
Imagine a fastball and slider leaving a pitcher’s hand from nearly the same spot. Both follow similar paths toward the plate. The hitter sees fastball, starts loading his swing, and prepares to attack the expected location.
Then the slider breaks beneath his barrel.
His decision may already be irreversible. A pitcher doesn’t need to disguise the ball forever. He only needs to keep the hitter guessing until changing course becomes nearly impossible.
In January 2017, Baseball Prospectus researchers Jeff Long, Jonathan Judge, and Harry Pavlidis helped put numbers behind that deception. Their work introduced pitch-tunnel measurements that examined how closely different pitches traveled before reaching the hitter’s estimated decision point.
The original model used a reference point approximately 23.8 feet from home plate. The researchers later refined their approach to better account for differences in pitch velocity and timing.
That distance wasn’t a universal decision deadline. Different hitters recognize pitches at different moments, and a 100-mph fastball changes the timing compared with an 80-mph curveball.
Still, the framework helped analysts measure something pitchers had understood for generations: a hitter’s first impression of a pitch can determine the outcome.
Back in Los Angeles, that principle gives Ashby a possible advantage against Ohtani. The Dodgers slugger knows the left-hander throws a sinker, slider, curveball, and changeup. Recognizing which pitch has actually left his hand presents a different problem.
Why a Huge Breaking Ball Can Be Easier to Hit
Fans and broadcasters obsess over enormous, sweeping breaking balls. Television replays make them look unhittable, especially when a pitch starts near the middle of the plate and finishes well outside.
But a sweeping slider loses much of its advantage if the hitter recognizes it immediately.
Consider two sliders with identical velocity. One starts moving sideways almost as soon as it leaves the pitcher’s hand. The other stays on a fastball-like trajectory before separating later in its flight.
The first might produce a spectacular tracking graphic. The second could force a much tougher decision.
Effective pitch tunneling requires more than impressive movement. Pitchers must consider release consistency, early flight paths, velocity differences, and where their offerings finish.
Hitters also look for spin. A batter might recognize a breaking ball from the way its seams rotate, even when the pitch initially follows a fastball’s path.
That’s why pitching coaches study entire arsenals rather than celebrating one isolated offering.
The question isn’t whether a slider looks nasty on video. It’s whether the hitter can identify it before his swing decision.
October Gives Relievers No Time to Recover
Regular-season blowups fade over a six-month grind. In October, one bad pitch can end your year.
Seattle learned that lesson against Houston in Game 1 of the 2022 American League Division Series. With the Mariners protecting a two-run lead in the ninth, manager Scott Servais summoned Robbie Ray to face Yordan Alvarez.
Ray wanted to attack Alvarez inside with a two-seam fastball. Instead, his second pitch leaked over the plate.
Alvarez crushed it for a three-run, walk-off homer.
Statcast measured the ball’s exit velocity at 116.4 mph. Seattle lost 8-7 after leading for most of the afternoon.
That swing wasn’t a documented failure of pitch tunneling. It showed why deception cannot rescue a poorly located pitch against a dangerous hitter.
The pressure has only intensified as managers ask relievers to handle more of October’s most important innings.
In an October 22, 2024 analysis, MLB.com writer Mike Petriello found that relievers had thrown more than 52% of postseason pitches entering that year’s World Series. Back in 2013, their share stood at 34%.
Managers weren’t merely asking bullpens to finish games. They were asking their strongest arms to confront dangerous hitters, sometimes well before the ninth inning.
That creates an uncomfortable problem for pitchers with limited arsenals.
A starter might throw five different pitches. Some relievers survive primarily on two, which means opposing hitters know exactly what to prepare for.
When a reliever has only two dependable offerings, he needs to make them difficult to distinguish out of the hand.
One of the clearest examples came during Cleveland’s remarkable 2016 postseason run.
Andrew Miller Changed the Way October Bullpens Operated
Ten years before Ashby’s emergence, another left-hander showed what happens when a manager stops saving his best reliever for the ninth.
It was Game 1 of the 2016 ALCS against Toronto. Cleveland clung to a 2-0 lead with one out in the seventh, and manager Terry Francona called for Andrew Miller.
The Blue Jays knew what was coming.
Miller threw his slider roughly 60% of the time that season.
During his 1⅔-inning appearance, Miller faced six batters and retired five. Every out came on a strikeout, and every finishing pitch was a slider.
He threw sliders on 61% of his pitches that night, according to MLB’s October 15 Statcast analysis.
Five Strikeouts and a Lineup That Couldn’t Adjust
The eighth inning captured Miller’s value.
Josh Donaldson opened with a single. Edwin Encarnación, José Bautista, and Russell Martin followed, giving Toronto three dangerous opportunities to tie the game.
Miller struck out all three.
His mid-90s fastball forced hitters to respect velocity. Meanwhile, his mid-80s slider created an entirely different movement pattern to handle.
Miller’s unusual delivery also complicated pitch recognition. His slider carried exceptional spin, and he commanded it well enough to throw the pitch repeatedly without surrendering the advantage.
The outing didn’t establish a specific pitch-tunneling measurement. Miller could dominate through movement, location, and spin without requiring perfect overlap between his two offerings.
What mattered was the result. Cleveland trusted him against Toronto’s toughest hitters rather than waiting until the ninth.
Francona had found a way to protect leads before they reached his closer.
By 2026, Milwaukee had developed its own version of a multi-inning weapon, with a much broader collection of pitches.
Aaron Ashby’s Arsenal Gives Hitters Four Different Problems
By October 2026, Aaron Ashby had developed into Milwaukee’s most versatile high-leverage relief option.
He wasn’t built like the traditional closer who throws one inning and disappears. Ashby had started games earlier in his career, giving him the stamina and broader repertoire to handle multiple frames.
His regular-season numbers explained why the Brewers trusted him.
In an October 10 MLB.com analysis, Brent Maguire examined Milwaukee’s bullpen trio of Ashby, Trevor Megill, and Abner Uribe. Ashby had thrown 89⅓ innings during the season, including 87 in relief, the second-highest relief workload in baseball.
He finished with a 3.12 ERA and 116 strikeouts.
Then came the pitches.
A 97.7 MPH Sinker Sets the Trap
Ashby’s primary weapon was a sinker averaging 97.7 mph.
That velocity alone presents a problem. Hitters must prepare for a fastball approaching triple digits, while the sinker’s movement can steer contact toward the ground.
Ashby generated a 56.3% ground-ball rate in 2026. He also threw the sinker about half the time, establishing a foundation for the rest of his arsenal.
But the secondary pitches made his approach far more interesting.
Maguire’s analysis, supported by Statcast measurements, identified three remarkable regular-season swing-and-miss rates.
Ashby’s slider generated a 56.6% whiff rate, ranking third among individual pitch types that drew at least 50 swings. His curveball reached 52.4%, while the changeup produced 48.9%.
Those numbers describe swing-and-miss ability, not a direct measurement of tunneling.
What makes the arsenal fascinating is the variety of decisions it creates.
A hitter preparing for 97.7 mph must also account for a slower curveball, a fading changeup, and a slider moving along another path.
For Ohtani, standing in with Pages at third, those aren’t abstract percentages. Each offering presents a different swing decision, and every incorrect guess gives Ashby another opportunity to escape.
How the Sinker Makes the Breaking Pitches More Dangerous
Picture Ashby setting up a hitter with a hard sinker.
The pitch forces the batter to respect velocity and prepares him to attack another baseball traveling through a similar early window.
Next comes the slider.
If Ashby keeps its release and initial path close enough to the sinker’s, the hitter must distinguish two very different outcomes before committing.
The same principle can apply to his changeup. A slower pitch that resembles the sinker early can disrupt timing without producing a dramatic chase swing.
In an October 19 analysis, MLB.com’s Jared Greenspan highlighted how Ashby’s changeup resembles his two-seamer out of the hand. That visual relationship helps explain why the pitch can deceive hitters despite arriving at a lower velocity.
Curveballs create a different challenge. Their greater velocity and movement separation can make some combinations easier to identify, but carefully chosen sequences can still exploit the hitter’s expectations.
Pitch tunneling doesn’t mean every pitch in an arsenal must look identical. It means using compatible shapes and sequences to delay recognition whenever possible.
For Ashby, that matters because he doesn’t depend on a single breaking ball.
Four legitimate offerings give him multiple ways to respond when a hitter begins anticipating one particular pitch.
Now comes the part no tracking system can handle for him.
The Dodgers have runners to bring home. Milwaukee has a lead to protect. And Ashby has to make his next pitches count.
The Seventh Inning That Sent Milwaukee to the World Series
Back at Dodger Stadium, the situation remains painfully simple.
Milwaukee leads 5-4. Andy Pages stands on third. Ohtani has another opportunity to change the series.
The Dodgers’ superstar already knows what Ashby throws. He’s also one of baseball’s most dangerous hitters when he identifies a pitch he can drive.
Ashby wins the confrontation.
Ohtani strikes out swinging.
Mookie Betts then grounds out, leaving Pages stranded at third and preserving Milwaukee’s one-run lead.
The danger should be over. Instead, Los Angeles creates another opportunity almost immediately.
With one out in the eighth, Will Smith attacks a 99.8-mph sinker and sends it toward right field. The ball drops for a double, then gets away from Sal Frelick near the corner.
Smith reaches third.
For the second consecutive inning, the Dodgers have the tying run 90 feet from home.
Kyle Tucker steps in. A fly ball deep enough to score Smith could erase Milwaukee’s lead, but Tucker sends a shallow fly toward center. Garrett Mitchell makes the catch.
Smith stays put.
Two outs.
Now it’s Teoscar Hernández, with one swing standing between the Brewers and another inning of survival.
Ashby gets ahead in the count. At 1-2, he has room to work, but the margin for a mistake remains terrifyingly small.
He delivers an 84.7-mph curveball.
Hernández swings through it.
Strike three.
The inning ends with Smith stranded at third, and Milwaukee’s dugout can finally release some of the tension. MLB’s official pitch tracking confirms the curveball ended the threat.
The Brewers still need three outs.
David Hamilton supplies a little breathing room in the ninth, sending a solo homer over the fence to push Milwaukee’s advantage to 6-4.
Murphy keeps Ashby on the mound.
The left-hander works through the Dodgers’ final inning until Enrique Hernández comes up with two outs. Ashby throws an 85-mph curveball, and Hernández drives it toward the outfield.
The ball leaves his bat at 107.9 mph.
For a moment, the season is still alive for Los Angeles.
Then Jackson Chourio tracks it down in left field, securing the ball in his outstretched glove.
Game over.
Three scoreless innings. Two hits. Three strikeouts. No walks. A 39-pitch save.
Milwaukee wins 6-4, completes the NLCS sweep, and advances to its first World Series since 1982. MLB’s official game record credits Ashby with 34.7 percentage points of win probability added.
That’s the kind of appearance that changes how a manager thinks about his bullpen.
The performance doesn’t prove that a particular pitch tunnel caused Ohtani’s strikeout. Ashby’s success reflects several strengths, including velocity, secondary-pitch quality, location, sequencing, and stamina.
Measuring his actual tunneling effectiveness would require comparing individual pitch trajectories.
But the larger value of his arsenal is difficult to miss. Los Angeles repeatedly put the tying run in scoring position, and Ashby kept finding a way out.
Why Pitch Sequencing Matters as Much as Pitch Movement
A reliever can own two outstanding pitches and still become predictable.
If he throws a slider every time he reaches two strikes, hitters eventually begin looking for it.
The solution isn’t simply to throw more pitches. He must create doubt about when each offering will appear.
That makes the catcher an essential partner.
William Contreras, Milwaukee’s catcher, needs to understand which pitches Ashby can command and which combinations challenge specific hitters.
A sinker establishing the inside corner might prepare the hitter for another fast pitch. Later, a breaking ball can attack the expectation created by that earlier location.
The sequence works only if the pitcher executes.
A slider that starts too far outside may never tempt a swing. One that stays over the middle could turn into a souvenir.
Pitchers and catchers cannot simply trust a beautiful overlay on a scouting-room screen. They need pitch shapes and locations that force hitters into difficult choices.
This becomes even more complicated during a short postseason series.
Hitters face the same relievers repeatedly. Between games, they review video and study how those pitchers attack certain counts.
Petriello’s 2024 analysis explored this familiarity effect. Historical data suggested that repeat exposure can help hitters, although postseason results varied considerably between seasons.
That leaves managers with another decision.
Should they keep using their strongest reliever against familiar hitters, or introduce a different arm with a fresh look?
For the pitcher, pitch tunneling offers one way to fight that growing familiarity. A hitter might recognize the repertoire yet still struggle to identify the next pitch quickly enough.
Ashby’s three-inning save captures both sides of that challenge. He had to remain effective while recording nine outs, giving the opposing lineup additional opportunities to study his deliveries.
The pressure isn’t simply about throwing strikes anymore. It’s about preventing hitters from turning familiarity into certainty.
The Next October Advantage May Be Hiding in Plain Sight
On October 19, MLB’s Jared Greenspan examined Ashby’s extraordinary postseason run and compared him with some of baseball’s great multi-inning relief weapons.
Through six appearances, Ashby had thrown 12⅓ scoreless innings, allowing only four hits and three walks while striking out 11.
His workload invited comparisons with Andrew Miller, Goose Gossage, and the old-school firemen who entered whenever the game demanded them.
The timing couldn’t be better for Milwaukee.
With the World Series approaching, the Brewers have a reliever capable of protecting a lead, handling multiple innings, and confronting dangerous hitters without relying on one predictable weapon.
His success also points toward a broader development in pitching.
Teams already know how to measure velocity, spin, movement, and release characteristics. The next challenge involves understanding how those measurements interact from one pitch to the next.
Coaches can compare a sinker’s early trajectory with a slider’s. Analysts can identify combinations that remain similar near the hitter’s decision point. Pitchers can then refine their arsenals to create more convincing visual traps.
Still, no tracking system can reproduce the emotional strain of October.
A pitcher’s delivery must hold together while the crowd roars and the tying run waits at third. His catcher needs to select the right weapon, and the ball must finish where the plan demands.
That’s the part technology cannot solve by itself.
Pitch tunneling can help a middle reliever survive those moments, but it doesn’t guarantee anything. A mistake over the plate remains a mistake, no matter how convincing the previous pitch looked.
Ashby’s October run offers a glimpse of where relief pitching is headed. Power matters, but pitchers who can disguise several dangerous offerings may hold an even greater advantage.
The next postseason breakthrough might not involve a new pitch or another mile per hour.
It might come from making two familiar pitches look alike for a fraction of a second longer.
And when the tying run stands 90 feet away, that fraction of a second can separate a championship opportunity from a season-ending swing.
READ ALSO: The October velocity tax makes back-to-back bullpen outings a pennant gamble
FAQs
What is pitch tunneling in baseball?
Pitch tunneling makes different pitches look similar early in their flight. Hitters may recognize the difference only after they’ve committed to swinging.
Why is pitch tunneling important for MLB relievers?
Relievers often rely on just a few pitches. Tunneling helps disguise those offerings and makes life harder for hitters who know what’s coming.
How did Aaron Ashby help the Brewers reach the 2026 World Series?
Ashby threw three scoreless innings in NLCS Game 4 against the Dodgers. His nine-out save helped Milwaukee complete the sweep.
Why was Andrew Miller so effective in the 2016 playoffs?
Miller combined a powerful fastball with a devastating slider. His delivery, command, and movement helped him dominate hitters in crucial innings.
Does pitch tunneling guarantee more strikeouts?
No. Pitchers still need command and smart sequencing. Even a well-disguised pitch can get crushed if it finishes over the plate.
