The velocity tax of back-to-back relief appearances flashed 94.2 mph on a fastball Giancarlo Stanton drove 404 feet into the Cleveland night. The pitch came from Cade Smith, one of baseball’s most dependable relievers, during Game 4 of the 2024 American League Championship Series.
Smith had embarrassed the Yankees’ biggest hitters just 24 hours earlier. Now, with two runners aboard, Stanton faced a 1-2 count. On the fourth pitch of the at-bat, he crushed Smith’s fastball into the left-center-field seats.
The radar gun told an uncomfortable story.
Smith normally averaged 96 mph. That night, his heater barely reached 94.4. The Yankees had found a crack in Cleveland’s bullpen, and Stanton made sure everyone noticed.
Two Octobers later, Smith is back in the same situation. The Guardians are battling Tampa Bay for the 2026 American League pennant, with another compressed schedule testing their bullpen.
Managers face a familiar question every postseason: When does trusting your best reliever become the biggest gamble of the night?
October doesn’t wait for tired arms
A reliever can dominate on Thursday and look ordinary Friday. His mechanics might appear unchanged. The catcher sets up in the same spot, and the pitcher attacks with the same fastball.
Only the ball arrives a little slower.
That difference matters most when hitters expect premium velocity. A pitcher who survives with 98 mph heat can lose his margin for error when the fastball slips toward 95.
The extra reaction time might seem insignificant to anyone outside a major league batter’s box. For a hitter tracking a four-seamer, those fractions of a second can influence whether he swings through it or drives it into the gap.
Suddenly, a pitcher who attacked the upper strike zone the previous night starts working around the corners.
He falls behind 2-0. The hitter stops chasing. One misplaced fastball brings the tying run home.
Power pitchers feel October’s velocity tax particularly hard because their entire approach depends on making hitters uncomfortable.
But every reliever pays differently.
Some maintain their velocity through repeated appearances. Others lose a little speed after one demanding inning, even when they insist their arm feels fine.
Managers must know the difference between a pitcher who says he can go and one who still has his best stuff.
That concern has a measurable basis.
In their 2018 study, Out of gas: quantifying fatigue in MLB relievers, Duke University statisticians Kyle Burris and Jacob Coleman investigated how demanding outings affect a pitcher’s fastball in subsequent games.
Their findings, published in the Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, put numbers behind something pitching coaches had long suspected: The more pitches a reliever throws, the harder it can become to recover his usual velocity.
Once relievers exceeded 15 pitches in an appearance, their model predicted small velocity declines in subsequent games. Beyond 20 pitches, the expected drop grew more pronounced.
Rest made a measurable difference. Burris and Coleman estimated that each additional recovery day reduced the remaining velocity effect by roughly half.
Think about what that means during a championship series.
A manager might ask his closer for 26 pitches to escape an eighth-inning jam. The following night, the same pitcher could return with slightly less life on his fastball.
There isn’t a universal cutoff. Some relievers recover quickly and maintain their stuff through consecutive outings. Others struggle after comparatively modest workloads.
The numbers also overlook part of the physical toll.
A reliever might warm up, sit down, and start throwing again two innings later. Those extra throws never appear beside his name in the box score.
The arm remembers them anyway.
That hidden workload complicates every decision about bullpen fatigue, particularly when elimination games demand the same pitchers night after night.
Cade Smith’s missing two miles per hour
Smith’s 2024 rookie season gave Cleveland every reason to trust him.
He finished with a 1.91 ERA, 103 strikeouts, and 75⅓ innings across 74 appearances, according to Baseball Savant. His four-seam fastball ranked among baseball’s most effective pitches.
The Guardians treated him accordingly.
Smith appeared in all five games of Cleveland’s Division Series against Detroit. He then worked through another demanding stretch against the Yankees.
On October 17, Smith retired Juan Soto, Aaron Judge, and Stanton on ten pitches. All ten were strikes. Cleveland eventually won that game 7-5 in extra innings.
A day later, manager Stephen Vogt called on him again.
This time, Soto walked. Judge followed with a single, and Jazz Chisholm Jr. advanced both runners with a sacrifice bunt.
Stanton stepped into the box with one out.
Smith started with two strikes, getting ahead 0-2. After missing with a ball, he challenged Stanton with another four-seamer.
The fourth pitch traveled 94.2 mph. Stanton sent it 404 feet.
The home run pushed New York’s lead to 6-2. Although Cleveland eventually tied the game, the Yankees escaped with an 8-6 victory.
Smith’s fastball averaged 94.0 mph during his outing, two miles per hour below his combined regular-season and postseason average entering the game.
Vogt acknowledged that Smith appeared tired. The reliever rejected fatigue as an excuse and focused on his execution.
That disagreement matters.
The radar gun confirmed that Smith had lost velocity. It couldn’t prove why. Stanton also deserves credit for attacking a difficult two-strike pitch from an elite reliever.
Yet still, the sequence captured October’s most uncomfortable bullpen reality.
A manager can make a sensible pitching change and discover that his most dependable reliever isn’t throwing the same baseball he threw yesterday.
When the fastball loses its edge
Missing two miles per hour doesn’t automatically turn a dominant reliever into an ineffective pitcher.
Location, movement, and pitch selection still matter.
But losing speed can change how every other pitch works.
The fastball sets the trap
Smith relies heavily on his four-seam fastball, supported by a splitter and sweeper.
When his fastball reaches the upper 90s, hitters must prepare for it almost immediately.
His secondary pitches exploit that urgency.
A hitter anticipating another four-seamer might commit too early to a splitter that drops beneath his barrel. The sweeper presents another problem, moving laterally away from the expected contact point.
The speed difference between pitches contributes to that deception.
If Smith’s fastball drops without a corresponding change in his secondary offerings, the timing challenge can become easier to manage.
However, the relationship isn’t automatic. A slower fastball might retain enough movement and location to remain effective.
The danger grows when declining velocity comes with shaky command.
A four-seamer that usually finishes above the barrel might stay at the belt. A splitter intended below the zone could remain high enough for contact.
Those mistakes leave hitters with better pitches to attack.
When command goes first
Pitching coaches study more than maximum fastball speed.
They look for changes in release point, movement, arm action, and the ability to repeat delivery mechanics.
A pitcher might hold his usual velocity while struggling to locate his pitches.
Another may lose a mile per hour but continue hitting the catcher’s glove.
That’s why fastball command and pitch sequencing matter as much as the radar reading.
Consider Smith’s confrontation with Stanton.
The Yankees slugger didn’t need six or seven pitches to exhaust the reliever. He attacked the fourth pitch after Smith had already gained a favorable count.
One poorly executed offering was enough.
The lesson isn’t that every tired reliever will surrender a home run. It’s that fatigue can narrow a pitcher’s margin for error, leaving little protection against hitters who punish mistakes.
Cleveland faces it again in 2026
Two years after Stanton punished Smith, Cleveland is once again depending on him deep into October.
The pitcher has become even more valuable.
Smith earned his first All-Star selection in 2026 and finished the regular season with 41 saves and a 1.95 ERA.
His October performances have reinforced that reputation.
During Game 3 against Tampa Bay on October 15, Vogt summoned Smith with Cleveland protecting a 3-2 lead.
The Rays had the potential tying run at third base.
Smith faced Yandy Díaz in a ten-pitch battle, finally striking him out to end the eighth inning.
He returned for the ninth and retired three more hitters, completing a four-out save on 18 pitches, including 13 strikes.
His final recorded pitch against Victor Mesa Jr. registered 98.5 mph. The fastball still had plenty of life.
But the Guardians cannot assume that performance guarantees identical results after another demanding appearance.
They’ve already experienced what happens when Smith’s velocity slips.
The rainout’s hidden cost
The 2026 ALCS schedule delivered an unexpected complication.
Heavy rain postponed Game 4 from Friday, October 16, to Saturday, October 17.
Initially, the extra day helped both teams recover.
Then MLB removed Sunday’s scheduled off-day to accommodate the postponed game.
The adjustment created a stretch of four consecutive potential game days.
Tampa Bay took advantage of Game 4, defeating Cleveland 7-3 to level the series at two games apiece.
Nick Martinez gave the Rays 5⅓ innings of one-run baseball. Jonathan Aranda supplied three hits, while Yandy Díaz added a late two-run homer.
Cleveland’s pitching decisions told another story.
Vogt opened with Shawn Armstrong and used a bullpen-heavy approach. He kept Smith, Hunter Gaddis, and Erik Sabrowski out of the game.
That decision preserved three trusted relievers for Game 5, although Cleveland still needed to absorb Saturday’s loss.
Now the Guardians enter the remaining games with the same challenge that haunted their 2024 run.
How aggressively should they use Smith if Sunday’s game stays close?
One extra inning could protect Cleveland’s lead. It could also make Monday’s bullpen choices harder.
Tampa Bay’s gamble
Rays manager Kevin Cash faces similar calculations.
Tampa Bay used Freddy Peralta in relief during Game 4 after the right-hander had started Game 2 earlier in the series.
Peralta wasn’t pitching on consecutive days. His appearance showed something broader about postseason workload: Teams will change a pitcher’s normal role when the stakes demand it.
A starter working out of the bullpen must adjust his preparation, warm-up routine, and recovery schedule.
That doesn’t automatically make the assignment dangerous, but it changes the physical demands.
Tampa Bay’s gamble reflects the pressure of a seven-game series.
Cash can’t save every pitcher for tomorrow when today’s loss might leave his team facing elimination.
Still, every additional outing changes the options available for the next game.
The challenge involves cumulative pitching workload, not simply the number of consecutive dates beside a reliever’s name.
Milwaukee found another way
Cleveland and Tampa Bay aren’t the only teams confronting October’s velocity tax. Every extra pitch carries a potential recovery cost, whether a closer works consecutive nights or a long reliever handles multiple innings.
Milwaukee faced that same calculation with Aaron Ashby. The difference was how the Brewers managed his workload.
Instead of repeatedly asking their left-hander for high-stress innings without recovery time, they balanced heavy assignments with opportunities to rest.
That approach paid off during Milwaukee’s four-game sweep of the Los Angeles Dodgers, which sent the Brewers to their first World Series since 1982.
Ashby played a major role.
In Game 1 on October 11, he threw 26 pitches across two scoreless innings.
He returned the following day for another 1⅔ scoreless innings, needing 21 pitches.
That’s 47 pitches across consecutive appearances, precisely the kind of workload Burris and Coleman’s research suggests deserves attention.
Milwaukee then gave Ashby two days without a game appearance before calling on him again.
Those recovery days mattered to the workload calculation, even if no single statistic can tell us exactly how much velocity they helped preserve.
On October 15, the Brewers needed nine more outs to finish their sweep.
Ashby delivered them.
Ashby’s 39-pitch finish
Milwaukee carried a 5-4 lead into the seventh inning of Game 4.
Ashby entered and immediately faced trouble.
Andy Pages opened with a double and advanced to third on a sacrifice bunt. With the tying run 90 feet away, Shohei Ohtani stepped to the plate.
Ashby struck him out on three pitches.
Mookie Betts followed with a groundout, leaving Pages stranded.
Another threat arrived in the eighth.
Will Smith doubled and advanced to third after an outfield error. Ashby responded by retiring Kyle Tucker and striking out Teoscar Hernández.
He then completed a perfect ninth.
His official Game 4 line was three innings, 39 pitches, two hits, zero runs, zero walks, and three strikeouts.
Both Dodgers runners who reached third against him stayed there. Ashby inherited no runners when he entered to begin the seventh.
Milwaukee won 6-4 and completed its sweep.
Ashby’s performance didn’t disprove the fatigue research.
It showed something more useful for managers: A heavy workload doesn’t necessarily prevent a pitcher from delivering another effective outing, particularly when the schedule offers time to recover.
The Brewers also had the advantage of ending their series quickly.
That four-game sweep gave their pitching staff a longer recovery window before the World Series, scheduled to begin October 23.
Cleveland and Tampa Bay don’t yet have that luxury.
The hardest call might be leaving a star seated
October managers rarely lose sleep over whether their best relievers can handle pressure.
They already know those pitchers want the ball.
The harder question concerns what happens when the arm no longer delivers its familiar stuff.
Smith’s 2024 collapse against Stanton remains a cautionary example, though fatigue alone cannot explain it.
His 2026 performances tell a different story. The fastball still jumps, the strikeouts keep coming, and Cleveland trusts him with the game’s most dangerous moments.
Yet the velocity tax of back-to-back relief appearances becomes a bigger concern when a series reaches its final stretch.
A manager who asks for four outs tonight might need three more tomorrow.
The decision becomes even harder when the alternatives haven’t earned the same trust.
Tonight or tomorrow?
Baseball’s growing collection of Statcast measurements gives teams more information about pitcher fatigue than previous generations possessed.
Coaches can monitor changes in fastball velocity, pitch movement, release characteristics, and workload throughout a series.
They can compare those measurements against each pitcher’s established performance rather than rely on a single radar-gun reading.
The technology helps. It doesn’t make the decision for them.
A reliever who throws 97 mph instead of 99 might still dominate. Another could maintain his normal velocity while struggling with command.
Managers must account for both possibilities.
October’s best bullpen strategy therefore requires a willingness to challenge familiar habits.
Sometimes the right move involves asking a closer for an extra inning. Other situations demand trusting a less established pitcher, even with the season at stake.
Milwaukee’s Ashby showed what an effective arm can accomplish across multiple innings. Cleveland’s 2024 experience showed how quickly a trusted fastball can lose its edge.
Those examples don’t offer one universal formula.
They expose the central tension of postseason bullpen management.
Every high-leverage appearance solves one problem while potentially creating another.
A manager can protect an arm and lose the game. He can use his best reliever again and discover that a once-overpowering fastball now sits in a hitter’s wheelhouse.
The choice often comes down to a few miles per hour, one dangerous matchup, and the confidence to recognize when a pitcher’s best stuff has disappeared.
And when the bullpen phone rings with the pennant on the line, the hardest question remains: Is the arm your manager trusts most still the arm that gives you the best chance to win?
READ MORE: Advancing the Runner: Evaluating How Often the White Sox Successfully Move Men Over
FAQs
Why do MLB relievers sometimes lose velocity on consecutive days?
Heavy pitch counts and limited recovery can reduce fastball speed. Fatigue affects pitchers differently, so some maintain their velocity while others lose a little heat.
How many pitches are too many for a relief pitcher?
There’s no fixed limit. Burris and Coleman’s research found small expected velocity declines after outings exceeding 15 pitches, with greater effects beyond 20.
Why did Cade Smith lose velocity against Giancarlo Stanton in 2024?
Smith’s fastball averaged 94 mph instead of his usual 96. Heavy workload may have contributed, but the velocity drop alone cannot prove fatigue caused it.
How did Aaron Ashby help the Brewers win the 2026 NLCS?
Ashby recorded the final nine outs of Game 4, throwing three scoreless innings as Milwaukee completed its sweep of the Dodgers.
Why is bullpen rest so important during the MLB playoffs?
Playoff games demand repeated high-pressure outings. Rest helps relievers recover, maintain their pitching quality, and give managers more reliable options late in games.
