Playoff bullpen management came down to David Ortiz’s bat and Andrew Miller’s slider long before Cleveland needed a ninth-inning save. On October 6, 2016, Terry Francona summoned Miller with a 4–3 lead and two outs in the fifth against Boston. Half the game remained. Francona wanted his strongest relief arm involved immediately.
The entrance brought no instant relief. Brock Holt doubled, Mookie Betts walked, and Ortiz stepped in with runners at first and second. Miller struck him out swinging.
One misplaced slider could have changed the argument. Instead, Cleveland escaped with its lead intact. Francona had accepted the consequences of going early before he knew whether the move would work.
That distinction matters in October. Managers should use their best reliever before the ninth when the immediate matchup offers a greater opportunity to protect the game than the assignment they expect later. They also need somebody capable of handling what follows.
The difficult part involves recognizing that moment before the damage. By the time Ortiz connects, the manager has lost the chance to choose who faces him.
Find the inning that can change everything
The save rule cannot tell a manager which confrontation deserves his best pitcher. A three-run lead with nobody aboard in the ninth presents a different problem from protecting one run with two runners in scoring position.
Leverage index measures potential swings in win probability; 1.0 represents a neutral situation. Some plate appearances carry much larger consequences than others.
Imagine Yordan Alvarez batting with runners at second and third, one out, and his team trailing by a run in the seventh. A strikeout leaves both runners where they stand. A deep fly ties the game. One clean swing can surrender the lead altogether.
A manager who saves his best strikeout pitcher must trust somebody else with those consequences.
The remaining lineup matters, along with the quality of the alternatives. If an excellent setup pitcher matches up well against Alvarez, keeping the closer available can make sense. When the replacement struggles to miss bats, waiting carries a steeper price.
The central calculation in playoff bullpen management concerns that difference. How much does using the best arm improve the chance of escaping now, and what does his absence cost later?
Miller’s early entrance came with a second assignment
Francona’s decision extended beyond removing Trevor Bauer. The starter had thrown 78 pitches through 4⅔ innings, leaving the bullpen substantial work before the final out. Miller supplied two scoreless innings on 40 pitches. Cody Allen then needed 40 pitches of his own to record the final five outs of Cleveland’s 5–4 victory.
Francona committed two trusted pitchers to demanding appearances because he wanted to secure the game in front of him. Sending Miller out early meant accepting a longer finish from Allen.
A manager without that second trusted arm faces a harder choice. Removing the strongest reliever from the late innings can expose a weaker pitcher to the same dangerous hitters when the lineup turns over again.
Sometimes the remaining batting order offers relief. Another pitcher can begin with empty bases, face the bottom of the order, or exploit a favorable matchup. The manager must see that route before opening the bullpen gate.
Forty pitches from two relievers cannot become an automatic nightly prescription. Francona’s success depended on accepting a specific workload for a specific game.
Hader showed how one extra out can matter
An early entrance does not always demand a Miller-sized commitment.
In Game 2 of the 2022 NLDS, Josh Hader recorded a four-out save in San Diego’s 5–3 victory over Los Angeles. With the go-ahead run batting in the eighth, he retired pinch-hitter Austin Barnes on a fly ball.
The choice can involve asking the closer for one additional out rather than two full innings. That smaller extension gives a manager another way to address danger without handing over half the game.
Four outs still require preparation. Entering with runners aboard changes the assignment, and finishing an inning introduces a break before the pitcher returns. A difficult first confrontation can also consume far more pitches than expected.
If the reliever struggles to command his fastball or labors through repeated long at-bats, the original plan needs another look. Going early should never become an excuse to ignore what the pitcher shows once he arrives.
Baltimore never reached the assignment it saved
Two nights before Francona summoned Miller against Boston, Buck Showalter confronted the other side of the decision in Toronto.
On October 4, 2016, Baltimore’s Wild Card game reached the bottom of the 11th tied 2–2. Zack Britton remained in the bullpen. Showalter chose Ubaldo Jiménez, who entered with one out and nobody aboard.
Devon Travis singled. Josh Donaldson followed with another single. Edwin Encarnación then launched the three-run homer that ended Baltimore’s season.
Britton had converted all 47 save opportunities with a 0.54 ERA during the regular season. He would later receive that year’s American League Reliever of the Year award. Baltimore’s strongest reliever never threw a pitch while its season disappeared.
Nobody can establish that Britton would have retired those hitters. His brilliance offered an advantage, not a guarantee. Showalter nevertheless preserved an assignment that depended on somebody else surviving the current one.
That lesson reaches beyond playoff bullpen management before the ninth. In a road tie during the ninth or extra innings, allowing the next run ends the game. Baltimore needed to keep Toronto scoreless before it could take a lead worth protecting.
Choose the pitches that fit the danger
The lineup card should tell a manager more than whether a left-handed hitter approaches.
Under the three-batter minimum, a pitcher generally must face three hitters or finish the half-inning, except for injury or illness. One attractive matchup can therefore lead into two difficult ones.
A left-handed reliever might dominate the slugger standing on deck but struggle against the right-handed power behind him. Another pitcher’s fastball and breaking ball might offer a stronger answer across the entire stretch.
The immediate need matters, too. With a runner at third and fewer than two outs, missing bats can prevent a productive out. With a runner at first, a ground-ball pitcher offers the possibility of ending the threat with one pitch.
Coaches should identify those assignments before the crisis arrives. They need to know which hitters demand their best available arm and which relievers can handle the surrounding matchups.
Readiness can change the answer. A pitcher’s season-long reputation cannot settle whether he has his usual command tonight or can handle another appearance after recent work. Nor should six efficient pitches automatically authorize another inning. The staff must assess the pitcher, not merely admire the pitch count.
Decide what matters before the telephone rings
Before the first pitch, the manager should identify the stretch of the opposing order most likely to demand his strongest reliever. He also needs a workable finish if that stretch arrives in the seventh.
That preparation gives the bullpen coach something concrete to act on. The closer can begin preparing before a walk and a double force an emergency call. Another trusted arm can understand that the ninth might belong to him.
The plan should leave room for the game to change. A starter commanding his pitches deserves consideration. An exhausted closer may offer less than a fresh setup pitcher with an excellent matchup. In an early-series game, tomorrow’s pitching needs also carry weight.
Facing elimination removes the value of saving an available pitcher for another game. It does not remove the need to judge what he can physically deliver.
The strongest playoff bullpen management combines urgency with that restraint. Managers should go early when their best reliever offers a meaningful advantage against an immediate threat that outweighs the likely cost afterward.
Sometimes that means Miller in the fifth. Other nights call for four outs from the closer, or three outs exactly where everybody expected them.
Miller got his chance against Ortiz. Britton watched Encarnación end Baltimore’s season. When the next dangerous hitter steps in, the manager must decide whose arm he trusts with October. Make the call before the swing. Give your best reliever a game he can still save.
READ MORE: Could Japan’s Best Baseball Team Compete in MLB?
FAQs
Q1. When should a playoff manager use his best reliever before the ninth?
A. Use him when the immediate threat outweighs the likely later assignment. The manager also needs a plan for the remaining outs.
Q2. Why did Terry Francona use Andrew Miller in the fifth inning?
A. Cleveland held a 4–3 lead against Boston in 2016 ALDS Game 1. Francona wanted his strongest relief arm involved before the game slipped away.
Q3. What is a four-out save?
A. A reliever records the final four outs while meeting the save requirements. Josh Hader did that for San Diego in Game 2 of the 2022 NLDS.
Q4. Did Zack Britton pitch in the 2016 Wild Card Game?
A. No. Britton stayed in the bullpen as Toronto beat Baltimore on Edwin Encarnación’s 11th-inning homer.
Q5. How does the three-batter minimum affect bullpen decisions?
A. A pitcher generally must face three hitters or finish the half-inning. Managers must consider the hitters following the first matchup.
