League Championship Series bullpen strategy can come down to the sound of one baseball leaving a bat. On October 20, 2025, that sound swallowed Rogers Centre. George Springer turned on a seventh-inning sinker from Seattle reliever Eduard Bazardo, launching a three-run homer into the left-field seats. Toronto’s dugout erupted. The Mariners watched a 3-1 lead disappear, along with their chance to reach the World Series for the first time.
Just minutes earlier, Seattle manager Dan Wilson had faced the decision every skipper dreads in October. His best reliever, Andrés Muñoz, remained available. So did setup man Matt Brash. Wilson chose Bazardo, a dependable arm who had delivered a 2.52 ERA during the regular season. Two pitches later, the Blue Jays led 4-3.
The decision didn’t erase Bazardo’s excellent season. It exposed the brutal arithmetic of playoff baseball. A manager must win tonight without destroying his chances tomorrow. Sometimes that means asking a closer for six outs. Other nights, it means letting a struggling pitcher absorb a beating. How do managers spread their best arms across seven games? More importantly, how do they do it without losing the game right in front of them?
The bullpen chess match starts before Game 1
A manager’s bullpen plan begins with the calendar, long before the first call to the pen. Seven-game championship series give teams two scheduled breaks: one after Game 2 and another after Game 5. Those travel days can become valuable weapons. Consider a closer who throws 25 pitches in Game 2. He doesn’t have to worry about pitching again the following afternoon. The travel day provides recovery time, giving his manager greater freedom to stretch him beyond his normal workload.
Games 3, 4, and 5 present a different problem. Three consecutive nights of baseball can burn through a relief corps quickly, especially when starters fail to work deep. In that stretch, a manager might hesitate to use his best setup man with a comfortable lead. He knows the next two games could demand more difficult assignments.
The numbers offer guidance, but the score keeps rewriting the plan. A starter who exits after three innings can turn a manageable evening into a frantic search for 18 outs. That’s where League Championship Series bullpen strategy gets uncomfortable. Winning the first game means little if every reliable arm needs recovery during the second.
Why managers build multiple pitching plans
Before each game, pitching coaches typically map out several possible routes through the final innings. They consider the starter’s expected workload, the opposing lineup, and which relievers have recovered from previous appearances. A four-run lead after six innings might call for a middle reliever. A one-run advantage with two men aboard could demand the closer immediately.
The manager also needs an emergency plan. Extra innings, injuries, and early pitching changes can destroy the neatest pregame schedule. Los Angeles faced that exact pressure during the 2024 National League Championship Series. With a thin starting rotation, Dave Roberts couldn’t afford to treat every game like a separate contest. His solution required patience, restraint, and the willingness to lose a battle without surrendering the series.
Jack Flaherty gave the Dodgers something more valuable than a Game 1 win
On October 13, 2024, Jack Flaherty stepped onto the Dodger Stadium mound for Game 1 against the New York Mets. The crowd included family members and familiar faces from his childhood in Southern California. Flaherty gave them a performance worth remembering. The right-hander allowed just two hits across seven scoreless innings, struck out six, and helped Los Angeles cruise to a 9-0 victory. His final line looked impressive. For Roberts, the more valuable number was seven.
Flaherty’s deep outing allowed the Dodgers to avoid using their premium late-inning relievers before a planned bullpen game in Game 2. Daniel Hudson and Ben Casparius handled the final two innings. Meanwhile, Roberts kept Blake Treinen, Michael Kopech, and Evan Phillips out of the game. Their availability mattered because Los Angeles lacked a conventional fourth starter. One dominant outing had effectively purchased breathing room for another game.
The hidden value of a starter reaching the seventh
Starting pitchers protect more than leads. They protect future pitching choices. When a starter completes seven innings, a manager might need only two relievers to finish the job. If that starter leaves after three, the same manager suddenly needs six innings from a group built primarily for shorter appearances.
The difference can ripple through an entire series. For the Dodgers, Landon Knack and Brent Honeywell offered length when Roberts needed multiple innings. Kopech and Treinen served different purposes, attacking dangerous hitters during higher-pressure situations.
Using Knack or Honeywell to cover the middle innings could preserve Kopech for a tighter game. Burning Kopech while trailing by six might leave Roberts short-handed the following night. That distinction sits at the heart of effective League Championship Series bullpen strategy. Managers don’t simply rank their pitchers from best to worst. They decide which arms can handle particular situations without damaging the next game’s options.
Sometimes the smartest bullpen move means accepting a loss
Five days after Flaherty’s Game 1 masterpiece, the Mets knocked him around. In Game 5, New York jumped on the Dodgers early. Pete Alonso hammered a three-run homer in the first inning, and Flaherty never recovered. The Mets built a commanding lead while Los Angeles searched for pitching answers.
Roberts had a choice. He could chase the comeback with his best relievers, or save them for a potential clincher at Dodger Stadium. He chose the second option.
Brent Honeywell took the innings nobody wanted
Brent Honeywell entered in the fourth inning and covered 4 2/3 innings, surrendering four runs as the Mets won 12-6. It wasn’t pretty. New York continued scoring, and the Dodgers never mounted a serious enough comeback to change Roberts’ priorities.
But Honeywell accomplished something the box score couldn’t fully explain. He spared the Dodgers’ strongest bullpen arms from a taxing night. Rather than use Treinen, Kopech, or Phillips to chase a distant lead, Roberts let Honeywell absorb the workload.
The decision also created a sharp contrast between the two dugouts. Facing elimination, Mets manager Carlos Mendoza leaned heavily on Ryne Stanek and Edwin Díaz. New York needed to survive Game 5 before worrying about Game 6. Los Angeles could afford to think differently. At the time, the Dodgers held a 3-1 series lead. Even after losing Game 5, they would return home with another opportunity to clinch. Roberts knew his bullpen had to carry Game 6. Asking exhausted relievers to handle that assignment would make an already difficult plan even harder.
The payoff arrived in Game 6
Two nights later, Kopech opened Game 6 at Dodger Stadium. He didn’t need to work six innings. Roberts never expected him to. Instead, the Dodgers divided the game among seven pitchers, asking each to complete a manageable assignment.
New York kept threatening. The Mets collected 11 hits and stranded 13 runners, forcing Los Angeles to pitch through several uncomfortable situations. Still, the Dodgers survived those threats and won 10-5, securing their place in the World Series.
The sequence captured the less glamorous side of League Championship Series bullpen strategy. Roberts had resisted using his strongest relievers in a Game 5 blowout, then deployed them when the stakes demanded it. Honeywell’s exhausting relief appearance had made that flexibility possible. The contrast matters. Managing seven games doesn’t mean trying to win each one at any cost. Sometimes it means recognizing when tonight’s comeback chances no longer justify tomorrow’s pitching losses.
The closer’s job changes when the season is on the line
Traditional managers cling to familiar assignments. The setup man handles the eighth. The closer gets the ninth. October doesn’t always cooperate. Imagine facing Aaron Judge with two runners aboard in the seventh inning. Your team leads by one, and the next mistake could flip the game. Would you save your best pitcher for the ninth, hoping the lead survives that long?
That dilemma forces managers to think beyond conventional save situations. The most dangerous inning isn’t necessarily the last one. It might arrive when the opponent’s best hitters come up with runners in scoring position. Modern bullpen leverage reflects that reality. A bases-loaded confrontation in the seventh can carry more weight than three relatively straightforward outs in the ninth.
Jeff Hoffman showed what an extended closer can accomplish
Toronto manager John Schneider confronted his own version of that calculation during Game 6 of the 2025 ALCS. The Blue Jays led Seattle 6-2 entering the eighth. Victory would force a deciding Game 7, but the Mariners still had dangerous hitters waiting.
Rather than preserve Jeff Hoffman for the ninth, Schneider asked his closer to handle six outs. Hoffman answered. The right-hander retired Cal Raleigh, Jorge Polanco, and Josh Naylor in the eighth, removing three dangerous hitters from Seattle’s remaining comeback opportunities. He returned for the ninth and finished the victory. His final line included two scoreless innings and four strikeouts.
Schneider had secured the result he needed, but another challenge followed. Toronto would play Game 7 the next night. Hoffman had just handled a workload that exceeded his normal one-inning assignment. The coaching staff now had to consider how much he could provide again.
Hours later, attention would turn from the celebration to recovery. This was League Championship Series bullpen strategy at its sharpest. Schneider spent more of Hoffman’s workload than usual because failing to win Game 6 would make preserving him meaningless.
The work nobody sees can drain a bullpen
Look down the bullpen bench during a close playoff game. One pitcher has his glove tucked under his arm. Another stands near the mound, waiting for the phone. When that phone rings, everything changes. A reliever begins throwing. He increases his effort, sharpens his breaking ball, and prepares to enter against the heart of the lineup. Then his teammate records the final out. The pitcher sits down without appearing in the game.
Baseball people call those unused warm-up sessions dry humps. They can complicate recovery because the box score records nothing about them. A reliever might throw 20 warm-up pitches at high effort before sitting down. Another could repeat that routine in the next inning. Neither appearance shows up in his official pitch count.
Pitch counts don’t reveal the whole workload
Managers and pitching coaches track more than the pitches a reliever throws against hitters. They also consider bullpen warm-ups, recent appearances, velocity, command, and the pitcher’s own physical feedback. A reliever who threw 15 game pitches might still carry considerable fatigue if he warmed up repeatedly.
On the other hand, another arm might recover quickly after a clean, low-stress inning. The distinction becomes crucial during the three consecutive games in the middle of a championship series. A pitcher who works Monday and Tuesday may insist he’s available Wednesday. His manager still must decide whether another appearance creates unnecessary risk.
That conversation isn’t always comfortable. Relievers want the ball. Their competitive instincts rarely encourage caution, particularly when their teammates stand a few victories from the World Series. Despite the pressure, managers need honest feedback from the pitching staff. A reliever whose fastball has lost life or whose breaking ball has flattened may struggle even when he claims to feel ready. The worst time to discover that problem is with two runners aboard and the opposing cleanup hitter approaching the plate.
Matchups matter more than the name on the bullpen door
A manager once could summon a left-handed specialist for one difficult left-handed hitter, then replace him immediately. MLB’s three-batter minimum changed that routine. Relievers generally must face at least three hitters or finish the half-inning before leaving, barring an injury or illness exception.
That makes the next two hitters almost as important as the first. Suppose a manager wants a left-hander against a dangerous left-handed slugger. The next two hitters bat right-handed and handle left-handed breaking balls well. The apparently obvious move suddenly carries considerable risk.
Today’s scouting reports go deeper than left versus right
Pitching coaches study how individual hitters react to specific pitches and locations. They want to know whether a slugger chases sweepers beyond the outside corner. They examine whether a reliever’s four-seamer still carries its usual vertical ride or has started flattening out.
Statcast gives teams another layer of information. Pitch movement, velocity trends, and contact quality can help identify matchups that traditional batting splits miss. But scouting reports don’t throw strikes. A reliever might own an ideal breaking ball for a particular hitter and still hang one over the middle of the plate. One mistake can destroy hours of preparation. That’s why League Championship Series bullpen strategy requires managers to study sequences rather than isolated matchups.
Before summoning a pitcher, the manager should know which three hitters he’ll likely face, what each does well, and whether that pitcher can survive the entire stretch. The best matchup on paper means little if the reliever cannot execute it.
Game 7 turns every bullpen rule into a judgment call
All the planning, workload management, and matchup analysis eventually lead to one final problem. What happens when there is no tomorrow? In Game 7, the calendar stops protecting pitchers. Starters can move into relief, closers can appear earlier than usual, and managers can abandon carefully arranged roles. That makes Seattle’s 2025 collapse especially revealing.
Wilson entered the deciding game with multiple choices. George Kirby started, then Bryan Woo took over in relief. Together, they limited Toronto to one run across six innings. Seattle led 3-1 entering the seventh, just nine outs from its first pennant.
Then Woo walked Addison Barger and surrendered a single to Isiah Kiner-Falefa. Andrés Giménez followed with a sacrifice bunt, moving both runners into scoring position. One out. Two runners. Springer approaching. This was the moment Seattle’s entire season had been building toward.
Why Dan Wilson trusted Eduard Bazardo
Wilson chose Bazardo over Muñoz and Brash, a decision that sparked immediate debate. The selection wasn’t baseless. Bazardo had posted a 2.52 ERA in 78 2/3 regular-season innings and allowed just one run over five ALCS innings entering Game 7. He had earned the manager’s trust.
But Springer offered a different challenge. The veteran had hit 32 regular-season home runs and carried extensive postseason experience. Bazardo’s second sinker stayed too close to the hitting zone. Springer drove it 381 feet, sending Toronto ahead 4-3. The swing changed the entire series.
Wilson eventually summoned Muñoz in the eighth. By then, Seattle trailed. The timing created an unavoidable question: Should the Mariners have attacked Springer’s at-bat with their best available reliever?
There was another wrinkle. Brash had thrown 21 pitches in Game 6, while Muñoz hadn’t pitched the previous night. Seattle also had to consider the hitters following Springer and whether an intentional walk could create a better matchup. No decision came without risk.
Still, Game 7 gave Wilson no future contest to protect. The Mariners needed to stop Toronto’s biggest threat right there. The moment exposed the difference between following a season-long pitching hierarchy and responding to the precise situation unfolding on the field. A reliable reliever can be the right choice over hundreds of regular-season innings. That doesn’t automatically make him the ideal option for the highest-pressure confrontation in October.
Seven games leave no room for perfect plans
League Championship Series bullpen strategy asks managers to solve a problem that keeps changing its own rules. A rested closer looks valuable before Game 1. By Game 4, that same pitcher might be nursing a heavy workload while the team’s starter struggles to escape the third inning. The manager must adjust without letting one bad night dictate every decision that follows.
Roberts showed how restraint can protect a pitching staff. His 2024 Dodgers accepted a difficult Game 5 loss while Honeywell absorbed innings, then turned to seven pitchers to clinch the NLCS. Schneider showed the opposite side in 2025. Facing elimination, he extended Hoffman for two innings because Toronto needed those six outs immediately.
Neither decision came from a rigid formula. Both reflected the score, available pitchers, and consequences of failure. The most difficult choices arrive when the correct answer remains uncertain. A manager can study every matchup, examine every pitcher’s workload, and still pick a reliever who gives up the deciding home run. October doesn’t grade the preparation. It records the result. That reality makes the final innings so unforgiving.
Before long, the bullpen phone rings again. A pitcher begins warming up, a coach checks the lineup, and the manager considers whether the arm he needs now will still be available tomorrow. In Game 7, even that final calculation disappears. The starter might return on short rest. A closer could enter in the sixth. Nobody can afford to protect a lead that may never reach the ninth inning.
Seattle’s 2025 season ended with Muñoz watching the decisive damage unfold before he entered. Toronto moved on because Springer punished the pitcher Wilson trusted. The box score records one swing and one losing pitcher. It cannot capture every calculation that preceded them. That’s the real tension behind League Championship Series bullpen strategy. The manager must recognize when the most important moment has arrived, even if it comes two innings earlier than expected.
And when October’s biggest hitter walks to the plate with runners aboard, the question becomes brutally simple. Are you saving your best pitcher for the ninth inning, or saving your season right now? Clarify the 2024 Dodgers exampleExplain the bullpen contrast earlier
READ MORE: The Math and Madness of the Late-Inning Intentional Walk in Modern Baseball
FAQs
How do managers plan their bullpens for a seven-game championship series?
Managers track pitcher workloads, matchups, and recovery time. They balance winning tonight with keeping their best relievers available for the next game.
Why are travel days important for MLB playoff bullpens?
Travel days give relievers recovery time between games. Managers can use their strongest arms more aggressively before a scheduled break.
Why do MLB managers sometimes use closers before the ninth inning?
The biggest threat doesn’t always arrive in the ninth. Managers may bring in their closer earlier to face dangerous hitters with runners aboard.
Why did the Dodgers rely on Brent Honeywell in Game 5 of the 2024 NLCS?
Dave Roberts let Honeywell cover multiple innings during a loss to the Mets. That preserved stronger relievers for the Dodgers’ Game 6 victory.
Why was Seattle’s bullpen decision controversial in Game 7 of the 2025 ALCS?
Dan Wilson chose Eduard Bazardo to face George Springer instead of Andrés Muñoz or Matt Brash. Springer hit the three-run homer that sent Toronto ahead.
