Running out of the shotgun changes the mechanics of one of football’s oldest tricks: making eleven defenders believe a handoff is coming when the quarterback intends to throw. During Green Bay’s Week 3 victory over Denver in September 2019, Aaron Rodgers lined up under center with Aaron Jones behind fullback Danny Vitale. The formation screamed power football. Broncos linebacker Josey Jewell prepared to meet the run, expecting Vitale to lead Jones through the line. Rodgers took the snap and sold the handoff.
Jewell stepped toward the developing run. Vitale slipped past him instead, breaking into open space behind the linebackers. Rodgers found his fullback for a 27-yard completion, pushing Green Bay to the Denver 1-yard line. Sports Illustrated’s October 2019 breakdown highlighted how that carefully disguised I-formation play caught Jewell reacting to the wrong threat. One false step had opened the passing lane.
Now move Rodgers five yards behind the center, put Jones beside him, and ask the offense to recreate that downhill illusion. The geometry changes. So does the defender’s view of the football. A sideways shotgun mesh fundamentally changes the downhill illusion linebackers are trained to read. Instead of watching a running back charge behind a turning quarterback, linebackers see a lateral exchange with different blocking angles and timing. The old-school fake no longer presents the same picture.
The 2018 Rams reveal why that traditional geometry worked so well. The 2024 Packers demonstrate how shotgun offenses can manufacture deception through different mechanics. Between those two approaches, NFL play-action data exposes the real cost of changing where a quarterback takes the snap.
The shotgun changes what linebackers see
Traditional play action thrives on a simple principle. Make the opening of a pass look exactly like a run. Under center, the quarterback turns toward the running back and extends the football into the runner’s path. His shoulders rotate away from the defense, briefly hiding the ball. The back attacks his rushing landmark, forcing linebackers to honor the possibility of a handoff. For a linebacker, those opening steps offer little certainty.
Running out of the shotgun creates a different challenge. The quarterback starts several yards behind the center, usually with a running back aligned beside him. Defenders can often track the exchange more clearly because the runner approaches from a lateral angle. The placement of the mesh point matters. It determines where the quarterback and runner meet, how long defenders can track the football, and whether the fake resembles an actual rushing play.
A disciplined linebacker such as Fred Warner reads more than the quarterback’s hands. He watches offensive linemen, running back angles, and the space each blocker attempts to create. When those clues disagree, the deception becomes easier to diagnose. The running back’s alignment can also narrow the possibilities. Some shotgun runs naturally attack one side of the formation, allowing defenders to anticipate the likely path before the snap.
However, shotgun offenses can counter those tendencies through motion, counter runs, and quarterback keeps. The formation doesn’t eliminate deception. It demands a rushing threat that matches the fake.
How Sean McVay made the under-center fake dangerous
The 2018 Los Angeles Rams offered a masterclass in making defenders respect two threats from the same formation. Head coach Sean McVay placed quarterback Jared Goff under center, with Todd Gurley stationed deep in the backfield. Gurley attacked defenses with outside zone, cutting behind blockers who moved laterally before climbing into the second level.
The Rams frequently encountered light defensive boxes, including nickel personnel and spread defensive fronts. Those alignments left fewer bodies near the line, giving Gurley room to attack. NFL.com’s November 2018 analysis revealed a striking formation tendency. Through eight games, 161 of Gurley’s first 169 carries came with Goff under center. The same report found Gurley faced six or fewer defenders in the box on 48.5 percent of his carries, while eight-man boxes appeared on just 9.5 percent. The numbers captured an offense that could threaten the ground game without inviting constant defensive crowding.
Why the linebacker’s first step mattered
Picture a Rams outside-zone play developing toward the sideline. Gurley presses the running lane, forcing linebackers to flow with the blocking. On the next snap, Goff opens with nearly identical footwork. The line shows familiar zone action, and Gurley attacks his landmark. A linebacker slides toward the apparent run, expecting the ball to follow. Instead, Goff keeps it.
A receiver crosses behind the linebacker’s vacated area, while another threatens deeper coverage. The defense must recover the ground it surrendered to the fake. That’s the beauty of a well-sequenced NFL play-action passing game. The offense doesn’t need to fool every defender. It needs to move the right defender just far enough.
McVay’s advantage came from making the rushing threat and passing threat share almost identical beginnings. Defenders could recognize the formation without knowing whether Gurley would carry the ball. The shotgun would have changed that familiar sequence. Goff’s footwork, Gurley’s track, and the timing of the fake would require adjustments.
That mechanical distinction helps explain why coaches often prefer under-center play action. It also provides a useful starting point for understanding the formation-based statistical gap ESPN’s Bill Barnwell documented in 2026.
The EPA numbers expose the shotgun trade-off
In September 2026, ESPN analyst Bill Barnwell examined the NFL’s growing interest in under-center formations. During Week 1 of the 2026 season, offenses used play action on more than 75 percent of under-center pass dropbacks. Shotgun and pistol formations featured play-action fakes on just 9.5 percent of dropbacks. That difference revealed how dramatically formation influenced play-calling decisions.
Barnwell also examined passing efficiency across formations since 2021. Under-center pass dropbacks generated 0.11 expected points added per play, compared with 0.04 EPA per play from shotgun or pistol. Crucially, those figures cover all pass dropbacks from each alignment, not exclusively play-action passes. ESPN found that much of the advantage came from teams using play action far more frequently under center. Without play-action fakes, passing efficiency was broadly similar across those alignments.
The raw numbers therefore support a narrower conclusion than the headline disparity might suggest. Under-center offenses benefited from their heavy use of play action, but the data doesn’t prove that shotgun geometry alone caused the gap. Defensive personnel also complicates the comparison.
In its February 2026 Super Bowl analysis, Pro Football Focus reported that play-action dropbacks across the previous decade produced 0.12 EPA per play, compared with 0.04 without a fake. However, offenses using play action frequently faced base defenses and heavier boxes, creating favorable passing matchups before the quarterback sold the run. Against base defenses, play-action passes also carried a higher sack rate: 5.8 percent versus 4.6 percent without the fake.
The deeper routes created more opportunities for explosive gains, but longer-developing plays exposed quarterbacks to additional pressure. The numbers reveal the central bargain. Traditional play action can create valuable hesitation, but the fake must justify the time it consumes. As Green Bay demonstrated, the shotgun can still deliver that hesitation.
Green Bay proved shotgun play action can still fool defenses
One of the strongest arguments against dismissing shotgun play action came from Matt LaFleur’s 2024 Packers. A June 2025 analysis by Acme Packing Company examined Green Bay’s play-action passing numbers using Sports Info Solutions data. The Packers recorded 54 under-center play-action pass attempts and 43 shotgun attempts. Surprisingly, their shotgun play-action game proved slightly more efficient in that sample.
The study excluded run-pass options, preserving the distinction between designed play-action passes and plays that allow quarterbacks to choose a handoff or throw. Green Bay’s December 2024 matchup with Detroit supplied a compelling explanation for that success.
Tucker Kraft’s 21-yard catch exposed Detroit’s expectations
The Packers repeatedly lined up in 21 personnel, using two running backs, one tight end, and two wide receivers. Josh Jacobs and Chris Brooks worked from a split-shotgun backfield. Jacobs motioned behind Jordan Love, while guard Elgton Jenkins pulled across the formation to establish the counter-running action. Earlier in the game, Green Bay gained seven yards on one variation and one yard on another.
Detroit’s linebackers had seen the concept. They recognized the blocking pattern and attacked the apparent rushing lane. Late in the third quarter, LaFleur returned to the same basic picture. Jacobs moved across the backfield, Jenkins pulled again, and the linebackers stepped downhill. This time, Tucker Kraft didn’t stay in to block. He released across the middle.
Christian Watson pushed vertically, drawing coverage away from the crossing route. Detroit’s safety dropped toward the deeper passing threat, while the linebackers reacted to the familiar run action. Kraft crossed into open grass. Love delivered the football, and Kraft secured a 21-yard gain despite a difficult catch and an approaching defender.
Acme Packing Company’s December 7, 2024 film breakdown documented the sequence, including Detroit’s defensive rotation and the uncovered crossing route. The play succeeded because the Packers had already established a credible rushing threat. The motion, pulling guard, and backfield action gave Detroit legitimate reasons to expect another run.
Running out of the shotgun hadn’t weakened Green Bay’s disguise because the fake belonged to its actual rushing scheme. The Packers weren’t imitating an I-formation handoff. They were exploiting defensive expectations created by their own shotgun running game.
Why defenders no longer chase every run fake
NFL defenses have spent years learning how to handle the conflicts that play action creates. Modern linebackers must recognize blocking schemes while tracking receivers crossing behind them. Safeties rotate after the snap, and edge defenders often prioritize containing the quarterback over aggressively chasing the running back. A perfectly executed fake no longer guarantees an empty passing lane.
Quarterbacks also face a dangerous compromise when working under center. Turning away from the defense helps hide the football, but it temporarily removes the passer’s view of coverage movement. A safety can rotate into the middle while the quarterback completes his fake. A slot defender can attack from the edge before the passer turns toward his receivers.
That’s where shotgun offers a clear counterweight. The quarterback generally keeps his eyes downfield while receiving the snap and working through the exchange. He can identify pressure earlier and adjust to post-snap movement without completing a full turn. For passers operating behind vulnerable offensive lines, that immediate vision can prove invaluable.
Still, the defense has its own advantage. A linebacker who recognizes the running concept can gain coverage depth without wasting steps toward the line. Motion, counter blocking, and quarterback keeps help offenses disrupt those reads. Each introduces another possibility that defenders must account for before abandoning their run responsibilities.
Shotgun play action succeeds when several credible threats compete for the defender’s attention. Without those threats, the fake becomes little more than wasted movement before a conventional pass.
The future belongs to offenses that make every fake believable
The NFL’s renewed interest in under-center formations suggests coaches increasingly value the options those alignments provide. Barnwell’s September 2026 ESPN analysis found that under-center snaps accounted for 42.5 percent of offensive plays in Week 1, compared with 29 percent during the 2023 season. That shift reflects more than nostalgia. Coaches want deeper rushing menus, convincing play-action mechanics, and the ability to attack defenses that prioritize stopping explosive passes.
For an under-center offense, that might mean hammering the defense with downhill duo. On the next snap, the quarterback shows the same opening steps while a tight end slips behind the linebackers. The pass hides behind a run the defense already respects.
Shotgun offenses can achieve similar results through counter action, split-zone movement, pistol alignments, and quarterback keeps. The challenge isn’t finding a fake that looks impressive on a practice field. It’s building one that makes sense alongside the plays defenders have already seen.
Green Bay demonstrated that formula against Detroit. Earlier runs established an expectation, and LaFleur attacked the empty space when the Lions reacted accordingly. Running out of the shotgun limits traditional play action most severely when coaches try to reproduce under-center mechanics without accounting for the different backfield angles.
That brings the argument back to Rodgers against Denver in 2019. Jewell didn’t lose Vitale because the Packers invented an elaborate passing concept. He lost him because Aaron Jones looked like a legitimate rushing threat, Vitale looked like a lead blocker, and Rodgers made the football disappear long enough to exploit the mistake. Every part of that play supported the same lie.
Modern shotgun offenses can manufacture equally convincing deception, but they must build it around the running game they actually use. The shotgun isn’t killing play action. It’s killing the assumption that any handoff fake will fool a defense. The formation matters. The footwork matters. But the decisive question comes before the quarterback ever pulls the ball away. Does the defense believe the run is real?
If the answer is no, the fake has already failed.
READ MORE: When defensive backs pass off crossers in match-quarters coverage
FAQs
Why does running out of the shotgun make play action harder?
Shotgun formations often create a sideways handoff angle. That can help linebackers recognize the exchange earlier than they would against a traditional downhill fake.
Is play action more effective under center or in shotgun?
Under-center formations naturally support traditional downhill fakes. However, well-designed shotgun plays can work just as effectively when they resemble the offense’s actual running game.
Why did Sean McVay use so much under-center play action?
McVay paired Todd Gurley’s outside-zone runs with similar-looking passing plays. Defenders had to respect Gurley’s rushing threat before dropping into coverage.
How did the Packers make shotgun play action work?
Matt LaFleur paired shotgun runs with matching motion and blocking. Against Detroit in 2024, that approach helped Tucker Kraft gain 21 yards.
What is the difference between play action and an RPO?
Play action uses a run fake before a planned pass. An RPO lets the quarterback choose between handing off and throwing based on a defensive read.
