Early-count swing rates had a soundtrack at Dodger Stadium on October 14: the crack of Jackson Chourio’s bat, followed by the sudden hush of 50,708 fans.
Blake Snell had barely settled onto the mound. His first pitch, a 97.6 mph four-seam fastball, caught the heart of the strike zone. Chourio jumped it, sending a 391-foot homer into the right-center-field seats. Milwaukee led before Los Angeles recorded an out.
Hours later, Jake Bauers faced the same pitcher under entirely different circumstances. The Dodgers had taken a 2-1 lead, and Snell needed three more outs to finish the seventh. Bauers refused to cooperate.
He fouled off one offering after another, forcing an exhausting 11-pitch confrontation. Then Snell missed his spot with another fastball. Bauers crushed it 412 feet, putting Milwaukee ahead for good.
One hitter attacked immediately. The other waited through ten pitches before delivering the decisive swing.
Both helped the Brewers win Game 3 of the National League Championship Series, 6-2.
Their performances exposed a critical distinction in postseason hitting. Plate discipline isn’t simply about taking pitches. It’s about recognizing which pitches deserve a swing.
That difference has shaped the 2026 ALCS and NLCS, where a single decision can turn a manageable inning into a season-changing rally.
Chourio and Bauers showed two ways to beat an ace
Snell entered Game 3 with Milwaukee already holding a 2-0 series advantage. Los Angeles desperately needed its veteran left-hander to slow the Brewers.
Chourio spoiled that plan immediately.
The 22-year-old outfielder saw a fastball almost perfectly centered over home plate. There was little reason to hesitate. He turned on the pitch, generating a 106.1 mph exit velocity and sending Milwaukee’s dugout into celebration.
According to MLB’s Statcast data, the homer traveled 391 feet with a 22-degree launch angle.
The timing carried historical weight.
Exactly one year earlier, Chourio had opened Game 2 of the 2025 NLCS with another first-pitch homer. MLB reported that he joined George Springer as the only players with multiple first-pitch leadoff postseason homers since pitch-count tracking began in 1988.
Chourio’s willingness to attack wasn’t an invitation to swing indiscriminately.
Snell had delivered the pitch every power hitter wants. Chourio recognized the location before the velocity overwhelmed his timing.
Waiting would have meant surrendering an excellent opportunity.
Bauers turned a long at-bat into a knockout blow
The seventh inning demanded something different.
Snell had retired 14 consecutive hitters before Andrew Vaughn opened Milwaukee’s seventh with a walk. Los Angeles held a 2-1 advantage, and the Dodgers needed their ace to protect it.
Bauers stepped in with the tying run aboard.
Snell opened with a called strike. Bauers watched the next two pitches miss the zone, then battled through a changeup, slider, curveball, and several more offerings.
The count eventually reached 3-2. Neither player blinked.
Bauers spoiled three consecutive pitches after that, refusing to chase the sort of mistake Snell wanted him to make.
On pitch eleven, Snell threw a fastball that caught too much of the plate.
Bauers hammered it into the right-field seats at 109.4 mph, according to Statcast. Milwaukee suddenly led 3-2.
Garrett Mitchell followed with another homer, driving Snell from the game.
Bauers’ blast was only the sixth postseason home run hit on the 11th pitch of an at-bat or later since MLB began tracking pitch counts in 1988.
He had already delivered a similarly stubborn performance in Game 2.
Facing Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Bauers worked a 12-pitch walk during Milwaukee’s sixth-inning rally. Christian Yelich later helped turn that pressure into a 7-4 victory.
Bauers built on that performance against Snell, making two of the Dodgers’ most accomplished starters work for virtually every strike.
Chourio and Bauers proved that raw swing data tells only half the story.
Milwaukee’s patience extended beyond two memorable swings
Milwaukee didn’t reach the World Series by relying exclusively on spectacular home runs.
The Brewers made opposing pitchers work, accepted walks, and punished mistakes when they finally arrived.
Their opening two NLCS games offered a useful statistical snapshot.
Milwaukee drew 11 walks in 75 plate appearances, producing a 14.7% walk rate. That exceeded the club’s 10.6% regular-season mark.
The numbers shifted quickly.
After Game 3, the Brewers had collected 13 walks in 112 plate appearances, lowering their series walk rate to approximately 11.6%.
That movement matters. Three postseason games provide little room for definitive judgments about changes in hitting approach.
Still, the individual plate appearances revealed how Milwaukee created pressure.
In Game 2, William Contreras homered to tie the score in the fifth inning. Bauers’ extended sixth-inning walk helped keep the Dodgers under pressure before Contreras delivered the go-ahead single.
Yelich added a two-run single in the eighth.
Milwaukee could win by punishing mistakes, extending at-bats, or combining several ordinary offensive events into one damaging inning.
The deciding game brought patience back into focus
Game 4 supplied an even stronger example.
Los Angeles built a 4-0 lead behind Shohei Ohtani’s three-run homer. With its season hanging in the balance, Milwaukee needed more than an isolated power swing.
The Brewers began grinding through plate appearances.
Brice Turang drew a fourth-inning walk before William Contreras and Bauers followed with consecutive doubles, cutting the deficit to 4-2.
Sal Frelick walked and stole second in the fifth. David Hamilton brought him home with a single.
Later that inning, Bauers stepped in with the bases loaded against Alex Vesia.
The Dodgers reliever missed with four consecutive balls.
Bauers walked, forcing home the tying run.
Mitchell then crushed a go-ahead homer in the sixth, and Hamilton added insurance with a ninth-inning shot.
Milwaukee won 6-4, completing a four-game sweep and claiming its first World Series berth since 1982.
The Associated Press reported that the Brewers became the first team to sweep a best-of-seven postseason series despite trailing in all four games. MLB also confirmed that Milwaukee became the first club to answer a postseason sweep by sweeping the same opponent the following year.
Bauers earned NLCS MVP honors after finishing the series with six RBIs.
His defining contributions included a marathon walk, an 11-pitch homer, and a bases-loaded walk that tied the clinching game.
Each required a different response to the opposing pitcher.
The numbers behind the swings
Early-count swing rates measure aggression, but they cannot independently determine whether a hitter makes good decisions.
Consider two players who swing at 40% and 25% of first pitches.
The first appears far more aggressive. Yet those numbers say nothing about whether either hitter chooses favorable pitches.
A middle-middle four-seamer deserves an entirely different response from a sweeper diving below the strike zone.
Baseball Savant provides several measurements that help separate those decisions.
First-pitch swing percentage
This measures how often a hitter swings at the opening pitch of a plate appearance.
A higher rate can indicate an aggressive approach. It can also reflect a hitter’s willingness to attack a predictable starting pitch.
Chourio’s homer against Snell offers an example of successful first-pitch aggression.
The result, however, came from a favorable location and excellent execution, not aggression alone.
Zone-swing percentage and chase rate
Zone-swing percentage tracks swings at pitches inside the strike zone. Chase rate measures swings at offerings outside it.
Together, they help distinguish controlled aggression from poor pitch selection.
A hitter who attacks hittable fastballs but refuses sliders in the dirt can post an aggressive overall swing rate without sacrificing discipline.
Another might watch early strikes, fall behind, and eventually chase a difficult breaking ball.
The second player looks more patient on the first pitch but may make worse decisions throughout the at-bat.
Contact quality and count leverage
Pitch selection matters most when it leads to productive contact or better counts.
A hitter who reaches 1-0 has more room to narrow his hitting zone. At 0-1, the pitcher can expand his options.
That doesn’t mean every 0-1 count favors the pitcher equally. The next offering still depends on repertoire, location, and the hitter’s strengths.
Analysts also need exit velocity, launch angle, and the quality of the actual pitch.
In Chourio’s case, the evidence is straightforward. He attacked a centered fastball and drove it 391 feet.
Bauers’ plate appearance reveals another benefit.
By rejecting pitches outside his preferred hitting area and surviving two-strike offerings, he forced Snell to continue the confrontation. The eventual fastball became the one he could punish.
The best swing decision isn’t always the earliest or latest. It’s the one that offers the strongest opportunity.
Why postseason scouting changes the first-pitch battle
October hitters rarely see the same pitching plan throughout an entire series.
Coaches study every plate appearance, looking for mechanical changes, timing problems, and predictable reactions to pitch sequences.
A hitter who consistently attacks opening fastballs might force the next starter to begin with breaking balls.
Someone who repeatedly takes first-pitch sliders could suddenly encounter more called strikes on the outer edge.
Early-count swing rates can reveal those adjustments, but analysts must examine the pitches behind the numbers.
Suppose a hitter swings at six of his first ten opening pitches.
During the next game, he attacks only two of ten.
That looks like a dramatic change in aggression.
However, if the pitcher started throwing sweepers outside the zone instead of centered fastballs, the hitter might have maintained exactly the same decision-making standard.
His swing percentage changed because the opportunities changed.
The opposite can also happen.
A pitcher who suddenly attacks the zone more frequently could make an aggressive hitter look unusually disciplined simply by offering more hittable pitches.
For postseason scouting departments, separating those explanations matters more than identifying a dramatic percentage change.
The calculations become especially difficult in a short series, where ten or fifteen plate appearances can produce misleading swings in the data.
Milwaukee offered a reminder during its NLCS sweep.
Its first two games produced a 14.7% walk rate. After one more game, that figure fell below 12%.
Nothing about that shift alone proves the lineup abandoned its approach.
The more useful evidence comes from individual decisions: which pitches hitters attacked, which they rejected, and how those choices affected scoring opportunities.
The same plate-discipline battle looks different in the ALCS
Milwaukee spent four games forcing Dodgers pitchers to enter uncomfortable counts. Across the American League, Drew Rasmussen showed what happens when a pitcher rarely gives hitters that luxury.
The connection runs straight through the strike zone.
Chourio punished a fastball that caught too much plate. Bauers survived long enough to get another. Cleveland’s hitters faced the opposite problem in Game 5 of the ALCS. Rasmussen kept changing speeds and locations, leaving them precious few pitches to attack.
A disciplined take can improve the count. It cannot force a pitcher to make a mistake.
That distinction has become central to the Guardians’ battle with Tampa Bay. The Rays took a 3-2 series lead on October 18, defeating Cleveland 3-1 behind Rasmussen’s dominant start.
He allowed four hits and one walk across seven innings, striking out six. Only six Cleveland batted balls reached the outfield.
According to MLB’s Statcast reporting, Rasmussen surrendered just three hard-hit balls during the outing.
His pitch selection made Cleveland’s hitting decisions particularly difficult.
Rasmussen threw 27 changeups to left-handed hitters, accounting for 28% of his 95 pitches. Those offerings produced no hits.
Guardians manager Stephen Vogt acknowledged that his hitters worked competitive counts and rejected difficult pitches. Rasmussen’s fastball variations and changeup still kept them from generating dangerous contact.
The problem extended beyond simple impatience.
Cleveland wasn’t necessarily swinging at everything. Rasmussen made it difficult to identify a pitch worth attacking, even when hitters managed the count effectively.
That is where early-count swing rates become particularly revealing.
Milwaukee demonstrated how hitters can wait for mistakes. Rasmussen showed how an elite pitcher can deny those mistakes without abandoning the strike zone.
Tampa Bay made its own early opportunities count
The Rays applied their offensive pressure before Cleveland could settle into Game 5.
Yandy Díaz opened with a double and eventually scored. Jonny DeLuca drew a bases-loaded walk to force home Tampa Bay’s first run.
Jonathan Aranda added an RBI single in the second inning. Liam Hicks followed with another run-scoring single in the third.
The Rays scored in each of the first three innings, building a lead that Rasmussen and the bullpen protected.
Their offense didn’t require a Chourio-style first-pitch homer.
Instead, Tampa Bay combined timely contact with a productive walk, finding runs while Cleveland struggled to turn its own plate appearances into scoring chances.
The contrast sharpened the central lesson.
Milwaukee exploited hittable pitches. Tampa Bay limited them. Cleveland couldn’t consistently break through.
For the Guardians, Game 6 now demands more than simply swinging earlier or taking additional pitches.
Their hitters must recognize which offerings they can drive without allowing Tampa Bay’s pitchers to control every count.
That balance could decide whether Cleveland’s season continues.
The ALCS will test what hitters learned from Milwaukee
Early-count swing rates will remain part of the scouting conversation when Cleveland and Tampa Bay meet again on October 19.
The Rays stand one victory from their third World Series appearance. Cleveland needs consecutive wins to reach the Fall Classic.
Neither team can afford to treat every plate appearance the same way.
An opening fastball over the plate might offer the best pitch a hitter sees all night. Waiting for a theoretically better count could mean surrendering the opportunity.
Against a pitcher who begins with sweepers below the zone, patience carries greater value. Attacking those offerings can turn a manageable count into a defensive battle.
That makes pitch recognition the real separator.
Cleveland’s hitters must identify which pitches they can drive and avoid allowing Rasmussen’s Game 5 dominance to define the rest of the series.
Tampa Bay, meanwhile, needs to maintain the selectivity that helped produce its early runs without allowing Guardians pitchers to steal easy strikes.
The challenge grows with every familiar matchup.
Scouting reports become more detailed. Pitchers adjust their opening sequences, and hitters search for the smallest advantage they can exploit.
For Milwaukee, the answers already produced a pennant.
Chourio’s first-pitch homer showed what happens when a hitter identifies the right offering immediately. Bauers’ marathon battle revealed the value of refusing to surrender the strike zone.
Rasmussen provided the other half of that equation, proving that disciplined hitters can still struggle when a pitcher executes his plan.
Chourio attacked the first pitch. Bauers waited until the eleventh. Snell could only turn and watch both disappear into the seats.
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FAQs
What are early-count swing rates in baseball?
Early-count swing rates show how often hitters swing early in an at-bat, especially on the first pitch. They help explain a hitter’s approach.
Does swinging at the first pitch mean poor plate discipline?
No. Smart hitters attack pitches they can drive. Jackson Chourio proved that with his first-pitch homer against Blake Snell.
Why was Jake Bauers’ 11-pitch at-bat important?
Bauers fought through ten pitches before hitting a go-ahead homer off Blake Snell. His patience helped Milwaukee take control of NLCS Game 3.
What is chase rate in MLB?
Chase rate measures how often a hitter swings at pitches outside the strike zone. A lower rate generally suggests better pitch selection.
How did Drew Rasmussen shut down Cleveland in ALCS Game 5?
Rasmussen mixed fastballs and changeups, keeping Cleveland from making hard contact. He allowed four hits and one run across seven innings.
