Runners in scoring position stood behind Tyler Matzek as he took the mound, and Atlanta’s two-run lead looked suddenly fragile. Second and third. Nobody out. The seventh inning of Game 6 of the 2021 NLCS had brought the Dodgers within one clean single of a tie. Albert Pujols came first. Matzek buried a slider, and Pujols swung over it. Steven Souza Jr. followed and struck out looking. Then Mookie Betts watched two fastballs go by.
Matzek threw another. MLB’s pitch tracking clocked the final four-seamer at 98.3 mph, and Betts swung beneath it. The ball reached Travis d’Arnaud’s glove; Matzek spun into his celebration.
Three hitters, three strikeouts, no movement on the bases. But the escape contained two different answers to the same emergency: a slider below the zone and fastballs through it. Why change weapons when the danger stayed put? That question gets closer to October relief pitching than any blanket instruction to throw more breaking balls. A runner changes the stakes. The batter still helps choose the pitch.
One empty base changes the gamble
First base sat empty throughout Matzek’s escape. He never needed it, but that unoccupied bag gave him an option: a walk would add another threat without forcing either runner home. That matters when the catcher lowers his target. With runners in scoring position and first base open, a reliever can let a slider travel beyond the edge rather than leave it within reach. A disciplined hitter might take the pitch. Depending on who waits on deck, the pitcher might accept that trade.
Load the bases, and the same miss carries a different cost. Four balls force a runner home. Now the reliever has to weigh the danger of offering a hittable strike against surrendering a run without contact. Former major leaguer Nate Freiman explored that calculation in his 2018 FanGraphs study of situational pitch selection. Across roughly 173,000 pitches from 78 pitchers, he found fewer fastballs with a runner on third and a stronger shift when another base remained open.
Freiman studied mostly starters, setting a minimum of 2,000 pitches per pitcher. His findings cannot dictate an October reliever’s slider percentage. They do illuminate the choice Matzek faced: how much room does the scoreboard leave for a pitch the hitter might refuse?
A starter encounters that question repeatedly across an evening. For a reliever, it can arrive before he has thrown a competitive pitch. The bullpen gate opens, the catcher explains the situation, and suddenly the safest place to miss has changed.
The first strike sets up the chase
A slider on the lower edge makes the hitter reach for a decision. Take it, and risk falling behind. Swing, and risk catching only the top of the ball. From there, getting that pitch across early can open space beneath the zone later. Once the hitter has seen a slider land for a strike, he cannot dismiss every similar flight. The pitcher can show him the same initial path and send the next one lower.
With runners in scoring position, that distinction matters more than the pitch’s name. A slider that threatens the zone asks the hitter to defend. One that bounces early enough to advertise its destination asks him to do the pitcher a favor.
Make the hitter commit before the ball drops
Pujols’ strikeout shows the reward at the end of that bargain. In Stephanie Apstein’s Sports Illustrated account of Matzek’s escape, the veteran slugger swung through a slider in the dirt. The runners stayed where they stood. Finishing inside the zone did not matter. Matzek needed Pujols to commit before recognizing where the ball would finish.
That does not make every low slider a good decision. A batter who keeps taking forces the reliever to adjust the target, change pitches, or accept the walk when circumstances allow. Stubbornness can look like conviction until the count reaches 3–1.
When the fastball can end the threat
Betts had already watched two fastballs when Matzek released the third. Another heater should have seemed possible. Anticipation still did not put the bat on the ball. As MLB.com’s account explains, d’Arnaud stayed with the fastball after Betts took the first one. The catcher saw a pitch worth repeating.
That choice cuts through the idea that runners in scoring position automatically demand something slower. The hitter’s reaction can justify staying with velocity, even when a breaking ball remains available. Matzek had just used one to dispatch Pujols. Against Betts, the fastball finished the job.
Pressly’s slider denied the tying run
Ryan Pressly faced a related emergency in Game 5 of the 2022 World Series. Houston led Philadelphia 3–2, with runners on first and third and one out in the eighth. A fly ball deep enough to score the runner could erase the lead. The Houston Chronicle’s reporting on Pressly’s five-out save captures his answer: three pitches to Brandon Marsh, ending with an 88 mph slider for the strikeout. The runner at third never got his chance to tag up.
Here the breaking ball supplied the out that contact might not. Both relievers trusted a weapon that beat the hitter in front of them. Their decisions turn on execution and matchup, rather than a prescribed balance of fastballs and sliders.
Different break brings different danger
Watch the ball leave the hand rather than treating every breaking pitch as interchangeable. MLB’s definition of the sweeper distinguishes its large sideways movement from a traditional slider’s tighter break. The distinction has practical consequences for runners in scoring position. A pitch moving far away from a hitter asks for a different swing than one breaking more sharply beneath the barrel. The catcher must anticipate a different miss, too.
With a runner edging off third in October, choosing between those shapes becomes a question of which pitch the battery trusts. Didier Fuentes provides a current example of that choice. In its September 2026 examination of postseason bullpen candidates, MLB.com noted that he replaced his sweeper with a gyro slider.
In turn, such a change gives the battery a different ball to command and catch. It does not automatically make that pitch the right answer with a runner on third. The useful question remains whether this hitter will swing, where the ball will finish, and what happens if he takes.
One missed block can erase the lead
On replay, the camera follows the hitter’s empty swing. Behind him, the catcher still has to deal with the ball. With runners in scoring position, a breaking pitch in the dirt tests two players at once. The reliever must get the hitter to chase. His catcher must keep the miss from becoming an advance, or a run.
Picture a slider headed toward the back foot of a left-handed batter. The catcher cannot simply receive it with his glove. He may need to drop, close the space between his knees, and turn his chest toward the bounce. Let the ball glance sideways, and the runner has something to read.
That physical work belongs inside pitch selection. A pitcher who trusts his catcher can use a low target without pretending the ball will always arrive cleanly. Trouble containing that particular miss gives a catcher another reason to reconsider the call.
The alternative carries risk as well. Raise the slider too far, and the hitter may drive it into the gap. Keeping the ball off the dirt can put it onto the barrel. October pitching lives inside that tradeoff. The battery needs a pitch with a chance to win the confrontation and a miss it can reasonably handle.
The next escape starts with the target
When the next October reliever inherits runners in scoring position, watch his catcher before checking the velocity. Where does the glove settle? Does the target invite a strike at the knees, a chase below them, or a fastball above the barrel?
Then watch what the hitter does. A swing over a slider gives the pitcher useful evidence. An easy take on the same pitch asks a harder question. Two foul balls against high velocity might mean the batter has caught up, or merely survived long enough to see something else.
The count changes the gamble
The count keeps changing the available choices. So does the next hitter waiting outside the box. A walk with first base open can be acceptable against one part of the order and dangerous against another. No pitch percentage can settle that decision by itself.
That is what makes a bullpen escape worth watching closely. The relief comes from the out, but the work happens before release: choosing a target, reading a swing, and trusting another player to contain the ball.
Runners in scoring position turn those small decisions into visible consequences. Matzek left two Dodgers standing on their bases. Pressly denied Philadelphia the contact it needed. Different pitches produced the same precious pause: nobody crossed home plate. The next catcher lowers his glove. A runner edges farther off third. Will the ball finish in leather, dirt, or the gap?
READ MORE: The rematch game: How hitters and pitchers adjust when facing off twice in five days
FAQs
Why do runners in scoring position change pitch selection?
Relievers weigh the hitter, count and open bases. A pitch that misses the bat can still cost a run if the catcher cannot contain it.
Should relievers throw more sliders with a runner on third?
Not automatically. Matzek used a slider against Pujols and fastballs against Betts. The hitter’s reaction and the pitcher’s execution help determine the call.
Why does an open first base matter?
With first base open, a walk can add a runner without forcing anyone home. That gives the pitcher more room to work outside the zone.
What did Tyler Matzek throw to strike out Mookie Betts?
Matzek threw three fastballs to Betts in Game 6 of the 2021 NLCS. His final four-seamer reached 98.3 mph.
How does the catcher affect pitch selection?
A catcher who contains pitches in the dirt lets the reliever attack below the zone. One missed block can turn a chase pitch into a run.
