Facing the same starting pitcher twice in a week changes a hitter’s timing, and few October rematches illustrated the stakes better than Pete Alonso against Jack Flaherty.
On October 13, 2024, Flaherty shut down the Mets for seven scoreless innings in Game 1 of the National League Championship Series. Five days later, Alonso stepped into the box at Citi Field with New York facing elimination.
Same pitcher. Same repertoire. A very different result.
Flaherty threw a first-inning slider that dropped to just 1.12 feet above the ground. Alonso reached down, got the barrel underneath it and drove the ball 432 feet into the seats. The three-run homer left his bat at 113.2 mph.
The crowd erupted. Flaherty suddenly faced a different problem than the one he had controlled in Los Angeles.
By the third inning, the Mets had scored eight runs against him. His night ended after three innings, a stunning reversal from his earlier dominance.
But the rematch wasn’t simply proof that hitters improve with familiarity. Flaherty also lacked his previous velocity and command.
That distinction gets at baseball’s oldest struggle between pitcher and hitter. Does a second look help the batter find his timing, or give the pitcher another chance to exploit what he already knows?
Five days can change the view from the batter’s box
A major league hitter doesn’t need five days to remember a fastball that beat him.
The pitch stays with him. So does the swing that missed it.
If a hitter kept swinging beneath Tuesday’s four-seamer, he knows his barrel arrived too late or traveled along the wrong path. The question becomes how to fix the problem without making himself vulnerable to something slower.
By Sunday, he has another chance.
Scouting reports already provide the numbers. A hitter knows the pitcher’s average velocity, breaking-ball movement and preferred locations. Statcast can show precisely where he releases each pitch.
Yet video cannot fully reproduce the view from home plate.
A fastball that looks manageable on a screen can appear to jump from a pitcher’s hand. A slider may follow the same initial path before breaking beneath the barrel. The delivery itself can create problems if a pitcher pauses, accelerates or hides the baseball unusually well.
That first game supplies something valuable: firsthand experience.
The hitter remembers how quickly the ball reached him. He knows whether the pitcher worked faster with runners aboard or attacked differently when ahead in the count.
His next round of preparation begins with those details.
The real advantage isn’t knowing what the pitcher throws. It’s recognizing what he’s throwing early enough to do something about it.
That sounds straightforward until a 97 mph fastball leaves the hand. The hitter has roughly four-tenths of a second before it reaches the plate, with even less time to commit to a swing.
Baseball Prospectus researchers studying pitch tunneling have examined how pitchers make different offerings appear similar until a hitter approaches his decision point.
The practical problem is brutal. A batter can recognize the correct pitch and still recognize it too late.
The mechanics of the rematch
The most meaningful change between starts may happen before the hitter begins swinging.
Timing starts with the load.
A batter must move into his hitting position, transfer weight and get his front foot down while keeping enough balance to react. Those movements have to match the pitcher’s delivery.
Get the timing wrong and everything suffers.
A front foot that lands late can leave the hands rushing to catch up. Commit too early, and a changeup may pull the hitter onto his front side before the baseball arrives.
Even a small adjustment can change the result.
Finding the right moment to start
Consider a hitter facing a starter with a deliberate leg lift.
During the first meeting, he begins his own leg kick too early. By the time the pitcher releases the ball, the hitter has already started drifting forward.
He might still reach the fastball, but the breaking ball becomes a serious problem.
In the rematch, the batter could delay his leg kick, shorten his stride or use a toe tap to establish a more consistent rhythm.
The goal isn’t necessarily to swing faster. It’s to arrive in a position where the swing can work.
Former Yankees outfielder Clint Frazier offered a revealing example in July 2017.
Facing Tampa Bay starter Austin Pruitt, Frazier struggled with a hesitation in the pitcher’s delivery. His first two plate appearances produced a strikeout and a popup.
Between at-bats, he reviewed video and worked on his loading mechanism in the cage.
Frazier returned for his third appearance and launched a 455-foot, three-run homer.
“I call it dancing with the pitcher,” Frazier told MLB.com. “He makes a move, then I make a move.”
Frazier corrected his timing during one game, rather than between separate starts. Still, the mechanical problem carries directly into a five-day rematch. A hitter who struggled to synchronize his movements has more time to identify the problem and rehearse a correction.
That doesn’t guarantee the correction works.
A hitter might feel comfortable during batting practice, only to discover that the pitcher’s actual delivery still throws off his rhythm.
Knowing what went wrong on Tuesday is one thing. Fixing it against live pitching on Sunday takes considerably more skill.
The eyes have to catch up too
Better timing doesn’t always begin with moving the feet.
Sometimes the hitter needs to recognize a pitch sooner.
Suppose a starter attacked him with elevated fastballs and sliders that finished below the zone. During the first meeting, the hitter repeatedly committed to pitches he couldn’t drive.
The second start gives him a chance to identify those shapes earlier.
He might look for a particular release pattern or focus on taking the slider until the pitcher proves he can land it for a strike.
For a hitter, that adjustment changes more than the swing. It changes which pitches he chooses to attack.
Against a pitcher with effective tunneling, though, the task remains difficult. A fastball and slider can appear nearly identical during the early portion of their flight.
By the time the slider separates, the batter may have already committed.
The hitter therefore needs a plan that allows him to attack one offering without becoming helpless against another.
Sometimes, the smartest adjustment is remarkably small. A slightly earlier toe tap or a quieter leg kick can leave the hitter in a better position to recognize the pitch.
The difference might never appear in the box score.
The pitcher has five days to prepare too
The batter isn’t the only player studying video.
A starter knows which pitches produced uncomfortable swings. He remembers whether a hitter chased the slider, struggled against inside velocity or leaned over the plate looking for something away.
The rematch gives him another opportunity to attack those weaknesses.
But repeating the same sequence presents its own danger.
A pitcher who lived on the outside corner in Game 1 might bust the hitter inside with a sinker in Game 2. Someone who established his fastball early could begin the next meeting with breaking balls.
Those changes disrupt the hitter’s internal clock.
A batter expecting another high fastball may load early and start his swing aggressively. If the pitcher instead throws a changeup, the hitter must stay back long enough to avoid rolling over.
The pitcher’s advantage comes from making that decision uncomfortable.
Why repeating the same sequence can backfire
Max Scherzer and Alex Avila offered a useful example during their years together in Detroit.
In May 2013, Scherzer retired 22 consecutive Cleveland hitters during a Tigers victory. Afterward, the pitcher credited his work with Avila, who was catching him, for keeping the opposing lineup uncertain.
Avila explained to MLB.com that a catcher cannot assume the sequence that retired a hitter earlier will work again.
The hitter remembers it and may begin looking for the same approach.
His job behind the plate was to help Scherzer change those expectations.
That insight matters even more when the opposing lineup has several days to prepare.
If a pitcher retired a batter with three consecutive sliders in the first game, he shouldn’t automatically expect the hitter to chase the same sequence again.
Instead, he might show a fastball early, establish a different location or use the slider only after changing the batter’s eye level.
The battle becomes especially interesting when the hitter believes he has solved the original problem.
He may enter the box ready to handle that slider, only to find the pitcher attacking with an entirely different combination.
The best hitters adjust to pitches. The best pitchers adjust to those adjustments.
The count can undo a good plan
Even a perfectly prepared hitter can lose control of an at-bat.
Imagine a batter entering the rematch determined to stop chasing breaking balls outside the strike zone.
The pitcher throws a first-pitch fastball for a strike. Another catches the outer edge.
Now the count stands at 0-2.
The hitter wanted to wait for a favorable pitch, but the pitcher has forced him into protection mode. A slider below the zone suddenly becomes more tempting.
That is how pitch sequencing influences timing without requiring a dramatic change in velocity.
A hitter can know the pitcher’s tendencies and still find himself swinging under unfavorable conditions.
In that situation, controlling the strike zone may matter more than making a mechanical change.
What the numbers say about second looks
The numbers support the idea that familiarity helps hitters, but they also expose an important complication.
Major League Baseball’s statistical glossary tracks what happens as starters work through opposing lineups.
From 2016 through 2025, MLB starting pitchers allowed progressively more offensive production each time they faced the batting order.
| Trip through the order | Opponent OPS |
|---|---|
| First time | .713 |
| Second time | .747 |
| Third time | .780 |
Those figures explain why managers worry about leaving starters in too long.
A hitter who struggled in the first inning may look considerably more comfortable during his third plate appearance.
But a third look during one game isn’t the same as facing a rested starter five days later.
Pitchers can lose velocity or command as their pitch counts rise. During the next start, they generally return with their normal recovery period behind them.
That fresh arm throws a wrench into the assumption that hitters automatically own the rematch.
What modern research adds
A study published in SABR’s Fall 2025 Baseball Research Journal offered a closer look at how hitters adapt.
Researchers Charles Steinhardt and Zach Borowiak examined more than 3.5 million Statcast pitches from 2019 through 2024.
They found that hitters near the top of batting orders showed substantial improvement during repeated encounters. Lower-order hitters displayed much less improvement.
Their analysis also identified some decline in pitch quality as starters worked deeper into games, but hitter performance accounted for a larger share of the pattern they measured.
The findings suggest something scouts have long considered: good hitters often make productive adjustments faster than weaker ones.
Baseball Prospectus researcher Stephen Sutton-Brown found a related pattern while analyzing individual hitters’ 2024 results.
Francisco Lindor led his sample in improvement from the first to the third encounter with a starting pitcher. His expected weighted on-base average increased by .027, after accounting for other factors in the model.
Shohei Ohtani and Juan Soto also ranked near the top.
Lindor provided a particularly vivid example against Washington’s Mitchell Parker on July 3, 2024.
He struck out in his first appearance, whiffing three times on splitters. By their third meeting that afternoon, Lindor had seen enough of Parker’s repertoire to work the count full before driving a curveball for a two-run homer.
That sequence took place within one game, so it cannot establish what would happen five days later. The larger research still illustrates how quickly certain hitters process information.
Does the pitcher sometimes win the rematch?
An older ESPN analysis raises an inconvenient question for the familiarity argument.
In April 2014, Tristan H. Cockcroft examined short-turnaround starts using results from 2011 through 2013.
His sample included 50 consistently effective pitchers. When they faced the same opponents again within ten days, their collective ERA improved by more than half a run, while WHIP fell by approximately .05.
That suggests hitters don’t necessarily gain a measurable edge simply because they’ve recently seen the same starter.
The limitations matter.
Those numbers came from a different pitching era, before today’s widespread use of sweepers, extensive pitch-design programs and increasingly common six-man rotations.
Cockcroft also focused on established pitchers, rather than every starter in baseball. His findings don’t prove a universal pitcher advantage in modern rematches.
Still, the underlying point remains relevant.
Facing a pitcher again supplies information. It doesn’t guarantee that the hitter can use it.
The next meeting reveals what really changed
That brings the discussion back to Pete Alonso and Jack Flaherty.
Their October 2024 rematch gives us a dramatic example, but it also warns against easy explanations.
Flaherty had dominated the Mets over seven scoreless innings in Game 1. Five days later, Alonso hammered a low slider for one of the biggest hits of New York’s postseason.
The Mets clearly produced a better offensive response.
After the game, Flaherty acknowledged their adjustments and admitted he hadn’t made the necessary changes himself.
Yet the physical difference between his two starts also mattered.
According to MLB.com’s Game 5 reporting, Flaherty averaged just 91.4 mph with his four-seam fastball, one of the lowest marks of his career. Dodgers manager Dave Roberts noted that the pitcher had been feeling under the weather.
New York benefited from both its improved execution and an opponent who lacked his previous sharpness.
One home run cannot tell us exactly how much Alonso altered his timing. The swing itself shows what happened, but not precisely why it happened.
That distinction should guide how teams evaluate these matchups.
The most revealing evidence comes from the hitter’s decisions and movements across both starts.
Did he get his front foot down earlier against the fastball? Did he recognize the slider before committing? Was he taking pitches he chased the first time?
Statcast can help teams examine swing decisions, exit velocity, launch angle and contact quality. Video can reveal changes in the hitter’s load and stride.
The box score provides the outcome. Those details help explain the process.
And the pitcher gets another vote.
He might recover his missing velocity, change his pitch mix or attack a different part of the strike zone. A hitter who prepared for Tuesday’s fastball could discover that Sunday’s game requires an entirely different approach.
Hitter timing changes when facing the same starting pitcher twice in a week because the first meeting gives the batter information he can carry into the second.
What he does with that information depends on his mechanics, pitch recognition and ability to adjust when the pitcher changes the plan.
Five days of video study can help a hitter recognize a delivery. It cannot slow the next pitch down.
When the starter raises his front leg and the batter begins his load, both players carry the previous game into that moment.
The hitter remembers what beat him. The pitcher remembers how he did it.
Only one of them gets the timing right on the next swing.
READ MORE: The October Strike Zone: Tracking Called Pitches Across the Division Series
FAQs
Do MLB hitters perform better when facing the same pitcher again?
Often, yes. Familiarity can help hitters recognize pitches earlier, but a rested starter can change his approach and erase that advantage.
Why does a hitter’s timing improve after seeing a pitcher?
Hitters learn the pitcher’s release point, delivery rhythm and pitch movement. That experience helps them adjust their stride, load and swing decisions.
What is the third-time-through-the-order penalty in MLB?
Starting pitchers generally allow more offense each time they face a lineup. From 2016 through 2025, opponent OPS rose from .713 to .780 between the first and third trips.
How do pitchers adjust when facing the same lineup twice?
They change pitch sequences, locations and speeds. A pitcher might attack inside after relying heavily on outside pitches during the first game.
Why did Pete Alonso hit a home run off Jack Flaherty in their NLCS rematch?
Alonso drove a low slider for a three-run homer in Game 5. Flaherty also lacked his earlier velocity and command, making the rematch different.
