Pitchers and catchers can lose an October game before the baseball reaches home plate. Philadelphia learned that lesson the hard way on October 24, 2023, when Corbin Carroll helped turn Game 7 of the National League Championship Series into a nightmare for the Phillies.
The fifth inning changed everything.
Carroll punched a game-tying single off Ranger Suárez. Jeff Hoffman entered to face Gabriel Moreno, and Carroll wasted no time. He stole second on Hoffman’s first pitch, then raced home when Moreno singled into right field.
Just like that, Arizona led 3-2.
Philadelphia had J.T. Realmuto, one of baseball’s quickest-throwing catchers. It didn’t matter. Carroll had already forced the defense into a race it couldn’t win.
The Diamondbacks stole eight bases across the final two games of that series. After making just one stolen-base attempt through the first five games, Arizona suddenly couldn’t stop running.
The Phillies couldn’t keep the Diamondbacks anchored.
That’s the cruel arithmetic of October. One delivery takes a fraction too long. One runner gets the perfect jump. A season that took six months to build starts slipping away between first and second.
And the most unsettling part? The catcher might never have a realistic chance.
How Arizona Stole the Series Philadelphia Thought It Controlled
For much of the 2023 NLCS, Philadelphia had Arizona’s running game trapped.
Zack Wheeler held runners close. Aaron Nola shortened his delivery, leaving the Diamondbacks little time to accelerate. Even Carroll, who stole 54 bases during the regular season, struggled to find an opening.
Arizona manager Torey Lovullo wanted aggression. His players wanted to run.
Philadelphia simply wouldn’t let them.
MLB’s October 18, 2023, reporting highlighted Wheeler’s exceptional record at preventing steals. He had allowed only three stolen bases during the regular season, the fewest among qualified National League starters.
Nola presented a different problem. His slide step got the ball home quickly, forcing Arizona’s runners to reconsider their leads.
At the time, everything worked. The Phillies entered Game 6 holding a 3-2 series lead, and Arizona had attempted only one stolen base.
Then Philadelphia’s control vanished.
The Diamondbacks stole four bases during their 5-1 victory in Game 6. Another four followed during Game 7.
Carroll delivered the decisive sequence, but his teammates had already helped change the series’ tempo. Philadelphia’s relievers suddenly faced runners willing to challenge every hesitation.
Arizona didn’t win solely because of its speed. The Diamondbacks pitched well, delivered timely hits, and capitalized on Philadelphia’s mistakes.
Still, the steals created pressure that hadn’t existed earlier.
A runner on first became a threat to score on a single. Every extended lead forced another glance from the mound. Instead of concentrating entirely on the hitter, Philadelphia’s pitchers had to worry about the man creeping toward second.
That’s how pitchers and catchers lose their grip on October’s running game. They don’t necessarily make one spectacular mistake. Sometimes, they surrender just enough time for an opponent to notice.
Aaron Nola Found a Way to Steal Time Back
Nola’s success earlier in that series carried its own fascinating backstory.
For years, holding runners had been one of his weaknesses. He relied heavily on changing his timing and throwing to first. Baseball’s newer rules made that approach harder.
Then, in August 2023, he returned to an old weapon.
The slide step.
Instead of raising his front knee through a full delivery, Nola drove toward home plate with a shorter movement. The ball reached Realmuto faster, giving runners less time to cover ground.
That sounds simple. The numbers show why it mattered.
According to MLB’s November 2023 Statcast analysis, runners gained an average of 5.6 feet between Nola’s first movement and pitch release before his adjustment.
After he reintroduced the slide step, that figure fell to 4.8 feet.
Less than one foot separated those measurements.
But on a stolen-base attempt, that distance can change everything.
The same analysis found that Nola faced 22 stolen-base attempts across his first 25 starts of 2023. Over his final 11 starts, including the postseason, opponents tried just six times.
He hadn’t become a different pitcher. He had changed how much time runners could steal from him.
The Slide Step Has Its Own Price
A pitcher can’t simply rush toward home plate on every delivery.
The slide step changes his mechanics. A shortened leg lift can affect balance, command, and sometimes velocity.
Against an ordinary hitter, a poorly located pitch might produce a harmless single. Against someone like Bryce Harper, the same mistake could disappear into the seats.
That’s the trade-off.
A pitcher wants to protect second base without compromising the pitch that keeps the hitter from reaching first.
Nola understood that problem. His adjustment worked because he could repeat the shortened delivery while maintaining enough control to attack hitters.
Runners still took their leads. They simply gained less ground once he started moving.
For pitchers and catchers, that’s often the ideal result. They don’t need to throw out every runner. They need to make stealing look like a bad investment.
Nola showed how one mechanical adjustment could change that calculation.
Two Pickoff Throws Can Trap the Pitcher Instead
Now picture Carroll standing at first against a pitcher who doesn’t trust his slide step.
The runner inches away from the bag. The pitcher turns and throws.
Safe.
Carroll dusts off his jersey and takes another lead. The pitcher throws over again.
Safe.
Now the advantage shifts toward the runner.
Since MLB changed its rules in 2023, pitchers have generally had two disengagements per plate appearance without penalty. That includes pickoff throws and stepping off the rubber.
A third unsuccessful pickoff attempt produces a balk. The runner advances automatically.
The rule gives an aggressive baserunner a useful weapon. He can force the pitcher to spend those disengagements, then challenge him to risk another throw.
But the pitcher still has a choice. If he believes the runner has strayed too far, he can attempt the third pickoff and record an out.
That’s where the confrontation gets interesting.
A runner wants the pitcher to hesitate. The pitcher wants the runner uncertain about whether another throw is coming.
Neither can afford to reveal his intentions too early.
Eighteen Seconds Leaves Little Room for Guesswork
The pitch clock adds another problem.
MLB shortened the timer with runners aboard from 20 seconds to 18 seconds beginning in 2024.
A pitcher can no longer hold the baseball indefinitely, searching for the perfect moment to deliver.
Someone like Elly De La Cruz can study that countdown while watching the pitcher’s shoulders and front leg. A predictable hold gives him another clue about when the ball will move toward home plate.
The defense needs to disrupt that rhythm.
One delivery begins quickly. Another comes after a longer pause. Sometimes, the pitcher turns toward first just long enough to make the runner reconsider his lead.
But every second spent watching the runner leaves less time to attack the hitter.
That’s what makes the current running game so uncomfortable.
The pitcher must work quickly enough to avoid a violation but unpredictably enough to discourage the steal.
By October 2026, teams have spent four regular seasons learning that balance. The rules no longer surprise anybody.
Execution still separates an out from ninety feet of trouble.
J.T. Realmuto Can Erase a Runner’s Head Start
On September 24, 2026, Milwaukee’s Luis Lara tried stealing second against Philadelphia.
Rookie pitcher Andrew Painter delivered an 82.6 mph sweeper to Sal Frelick. Lara broke for second, betting he could beat the throw.
Realmuto had other ideas.
He received the pitch and fired toward the bag. Trea Turner caught the ball and applied the tag, recording the second out of the fourth inning.
Another runner erased.
The play looked almost routine, but nothing about Realmuto’s throwing mechanics is ordinary. By the time most catchers finish transferring the ball, Realmuto has already turned his body toward second.
His release comes quickly. The throw stays on line.
Baseball Savant’s pop-time measurements help explain what opponents face. The typical major league catcher needs approximately 2.0 seconds to get the baseball from his mitt to the projected receiving point at second.
Realmuto averaged just 1.85 seconds in 2026.
That difference gives a runner roughly a seventh of a second less to reach safety.
It’s a tiny window. On a close play, it’s enormous.
The Numbers Behind Realmuto’s Quick Release
Realmuto has maintained that speed deep into his career.
In 2025, he averaged 1.86 seconds, sharing the major league lead with Patrick Bailey and Endy Rodríguez. One season later, at 35, he shaved another hundredth of a second off that mark.
Only Garrett Stubbs finished ahead of him on Baseball Savant’s 2026 pop-time leaderboard. Realmuto matched Bailey at 1.85 seconds, while Stubbs averaged 1.84 across a smaller sample of attempts.
Those figures reveal more than arm strength.
Realmuto moves efficiently from his receiving position into his throwing motion. His feet work together, allowing him to release the baseball without an unnecessary step.
The velocity follows.
Yet his performance against Lara also illustrated something that raw pop time cannot measure. Turner needed to receive the throw cleanly and finish the tag.
A baseball that arrives on the wrong side of second can waste everything Realmuto gains through his release.
Even a perfect throw accomplishes nothing without a middle infielder ready to finish the play.
And despite Realmuto’s exceptional ability, the Phillies still watched Carroll steal second during Game 7 of the 2023 NLCS.
That contradiction explains the relationship between pitchers and catchers better than any leaderboard.
The catcher might have baseball’s quickest hands. If the pitcher gives the runner too much time, the defense can still lose.
But Realmuto’s explosive arm isn’t the only way to steal that time back. In Toronto, Alejandro Kirk has built his throwing game around a different weapon: getting the baseball out of his glove before the runner expects it.
Alejandro Kirk Shows Why Quick Hands Can Beat a Strong Arm
The Blue Jays held a one-run lead over Boston on August 11, 2026, when Jarren Duran decided to challenge Alejandro Kirk.
With two outs in the eighth inning, Duran took off for second.
One successful steal would have put Boston’s potential tying run in scoring position. A single might have changed the game.
Kirk received an 87.9 mph slider from Braydon Fisher and threw to shortstop Andrés Giménez.
Duran was out.
The inning ended right there. Toronto added an insurance run in the bottom half and eventually won 5-3.
It wasn’t a towering home run or a strikeout with the bases loaded. Kirk simply prevented a dangerous runner from creating another scoring chance.
That’s the kind of play that defines his value.
Unlike Realmuto, Kirk doesn’t overwhelm opponents with exceptional arm strength. His throws rely on efficient movement, quick transfers, and accuracy.
Watch how little time he wastes getting the baseball out of his glove.
The motion looks compact. There is no dramatic windup or exaggerated effort. He catches, turns, and releases.
During the 2026 regular season, Baseball Savant measured Kirk’s average exchange at 0.63 seconds. That represented a slight improvement over his 0.64-second average in 2025.
In practical terms, Kirk spent roughly six-tenths of a second moving the baseball from his glove into the air.
Those quick hands helped him erase Duran at a crucial moment.
Kirk’s 2026 Season Exposed the Limits of Technique
The throw against Duran showed Kirk at his sharpest. His season-long numbers, however, revealed how difficult it can be to preserve that precision.
His average pop time slowed from 1.95 seconds in 2025 to 2.00 seconds in 2026, even as his exchange improved.
Kirk still moved the ball out of his glove quickly. Yet the complete trip to second took longer, and Statcast also recorded a decline in average arm strength.
A runner doesn’t care where those extra hundredths disappear. He only needs them to reach the bag.
Kirk had another obstacle to overcome.
In April, a foul tip fractured and dislocated his left thumb. Surgery followed, keeping him out until June 12.
For a catcher, the hands take punishment every night. Receiving a fastball, securing a breaking pitch, and transferring the baseball all demand strength and precision.
Kirk returned to those demands after more than two months away. The available statistics don’t establish how much his injury affected his throws, but the setback makes his defensive work more revealing.
He couldn’t simply overpower runners. He needed clean mechanics.
Against Duran, those mechanics held up. The ball reached Giménez in time, and Boston lost its chance to put the tying run on second.
Realmuto and Kirk arrive at those moments differently. One pairs a lightning-fast release with elite arm strength. The other leans more heavily on compact movements and accuracy.
Both can erase a runner’s advantage.
Still, neither controls the entire race. Before either catcher touches the baseball, the pitcher has already decided how much time remains.
And the pitch he chooses can make that job even harder.
The Wrong Pitch Can Give the Runner Everything He Needs
Imagine the eighth inning of a one-run playoff game.
Harper stands at the plate with two strikes. A dangerous runner waits on first, looking for an opportunity to reach second.
The catcher knows a fastball near the upper portion of the strike zone could make his throw easier.
But what if Harper expects it?
One misplaced fastball could do far more damage than a stolen base.
The pitcher might prefer a breaking ball below the zone. That gives him a better chance to finish the at-bat, but it could also complicate the catcher’s throw.
A pitch in the dirt forces the catcher to secure or block the ball first. That extra movement can destroy his chance of catching the runner.
There is no perfect answer.
The Batter Still Comes First
A catcher must protect the bases without turning his pitcher predictable.
With two strikes, the best pitch against the hitter might create an awkward throwing opportunity.
Earlier in the count, the battery has more freedom. It can choose a pitch that helps contain the runner without sacrificing too much against the batter.
The situation changes the calculation.
With two outs, a steal of second places a runner in position to score on a single. With nobody out, reaching third can open several ways to manufacture a run.
Now the catcher must weigh two different threats.
Should he call the pitch most likely to retire the hitter? Or choose one that gives him a better chance to throw out the runner?
That decision can change during the same plate appearance.
A pitchout might catch an aggressive runner, but it also gives the hitter a ball and can worsen the count. A well-placed breaking ball might secure a strikeout while giving the runner second base.
Sometimes, accepting the stolen base is the smarter defensive choice.
The real mistake comes when the pitcher loses focus on the hitter while worrying about the man at first.
The Most Valuable Caught Stealing Might Never Happen
Think back to Nola facing Arizona in the 2023 NLCS.
For much of that series, the Diamondbacks simply stayed put.
They hadn’t forgotten how to run. Their opponents had made the gamble less attractive.
That’s the kind of defensive achievement that rarely appears in a box score.
A catcher gets credit for throwing out a runner. A pitcher earns recognition for a successful pickoff.
But who gets credit when an elite baserunner never attempts to steal?
Statcast’s advanced running-game measurements help answer that question. They examine how pitchers discourage attempts and how catchers perform relative to the opportunities they receive.
Those distinctions matter.
A pitcher who prevents an attempt might save his catcher from a difficult throw. A catcher with a reputation for quick releases might discourage an aggressive runner before the pitch even starts.
The defense wins without producing a highlight.
That doesn’t mean every runner should stay anchored. Arizona proved the opposite when it finally attacked Philadelphia’s relievers.
But the best pitchers and catchers make opponents work for every advantage.
They study the runner’s tendencies. They recognize when he wants to break on first movement. Their timing changes just enough to make him hesitate.
No dramatic tag follows.
The runner simply retreats toward first, and the pitcher returns his attention to the plate.
That’s a small victory. October is full of them.
The Next Ninety Feet Could Decide October 2026
The 2026 postseason has no shortage of pitchers capable of overpowering hitters. High-velocity fastballs and vicious breaking pitches can turn an inning into a parade of strikeouts.
Yet none of those weapons guarantees control over a runner standing at first.
A fastball loses some of its value when the pitcher takes too long to deliver it. An elite catcher can’t always repair that damage. Even a perfect throw needs an infielder ready to apply the tag.
The pieces must fit together.
That’s why pitchers and catchers spend so much time studying details that casual viewers barely notice. They examine leads, delivery times, pickoff habits, and how particular runners react to different movements.
Those details become more valuable when the season reaches its final games.
One stolen base can put the tying run in scoring position. Another can change the pitches a catcher feels comfortable calling.
And when the runner reaches third, a sacrifice fly or a ball in the dirt suddenly carries consequences that didn’t exist moments earlier.
Arizona understood that during its 2023 championship series comeback. Philadelphia controlled the running game until it couldn’t.
The Diamondbacks didn’t need eight spectacular slides to make their point. They needed eight successful steals, each one forcing the defense to confront another scoring threat.
Three years later, the challenge remains.
Somewhere this October, a runner inches away from first. The pitcher checks his lead. Behind the plate, the catcher shifts his feet and waits for the next pitch. The crowd watches the hitter. Nobody sees the runner lean forward.
Then he breaks. The pitcher’s leg rises, the baseball flies’ home, and the catcher explodes out of his crouch. Ninety feet. One throw. No time to recover.
In October, a season can disappear before the ball ever leaves the mound.
READ MORE: Stealing Bases in October: How the Padres Are Pressuring Brewers Catchers
FAQs
Q1. How do pitchers and catchers stop stolen bases in MLB?
Pitchers shorten their deliveries and vary their timing. Catchers rely on quick transfers, accurate throws, and strong teamwork with their infielders.
Q2. What is pop time for an MLB catcher?
Pop time measures how quickly a catcher gets the ball from his mitt to second base. The major league average sits around 2.0 seconds.
Q3. How fast was J.T. Realmuto’s pop time in 2026?
Realmuto averaged 1.85 seconds in 2026, tying Patrick Bailey for second on Baseball Savant’s leaderboard.
Q4. How many pickoff attempts can an MLB pitcher make?
Pitchers generally get two disengagements per plate appearance without penalty. A third unsuccessful attempt results in a balk.
Q5. Why are stolen bases so dangerous during the MLB playoffs?
One steal can put the tying or winning run in scoring position. Arizona showed that danger with eight steals across the final two games of the 2023 NLCS.
