Stealing bases in October has become San Diego’s emergency lever. Two losses in Milwaukee have pushed the Padres to the edge of elimination, yet one of their defining regular-season weapons has barely surfaced. The team that swiped 160 bases, fourth-most in baseball, has not stolen one through the first two games of this NLDS. Milwaukee has stolen three.
The sharpest snapshot came in the fifth inning of Game 1. The score sat 2-2. San Diego had one out, Dustin Harris on first and Manny Machado at the plate. Harris broke for second. William Contreras came out of his crouch and delivered the ball to Brice Turang in time. Out. However, the damage stretched beyond one erased runner. Machado eventually walked, Ty France singled, and San Diego still failed to score. One clean throw had removed a piece from an inning the Padres desperately needed.
Now they return to Petco Park down 0-2. San Diego can still change this series with its legs, but Milwaukee has already shown exactly how dangerous a bad gamble can become.
The weapon Milwaukee has taken away
San Diego spent six months turning the basepaths into a stress test. Fernando Tatis Jr. swiped 38 bases. Jackson Merrill stole 27, while Xander Bogaerts went 22-for-23. Together, those three accounted for 87 steals and gave the Padres three very different ways to attack a pitcher.
Tatis creates noise. His lead grows, the first baseman talks, and the pitcher starts checking the runner instead of staring through the catcher. Opposing catchers gunned him down 13 times, so the aggression carried real risk. Still, few Padres can disturb an at-bat without swinging quite like Tatis.
Merrill works differently. His 27 steals in 31 attempts produced a far cleaner success rate. Put him on first in a breaking-ball count and the defense must account for more than the hitter. A pitch in the dirt can become 90 feet. One slow transfer can turn into third base. Bogaerts supplied the selectivity. Going 22-for-23 meant he rarely ran simply because the green light existed. Instead, he picked his spots and punished lapses.
Because of that contrast, San Diego cannot treat postseason baserunning as a volume contest. The value comes from making one pitcher solve three different problems. Tatis can force repeated looks, Merrill can hunt the right count, and Bogaerts can wait for a slow delivery. Even when Tatis stays glued to the bag, his presence alone reshapes the at-bat.
Contreras wins with more than arm strength
William Contreras presents a more interesting problem than raw pop time suggests. Baseball Savant clocks his average throw to second at 1.92 seconds, compared with the 2.00-second major-league average. Among catchers with at least five measured attempts, that ranked 30th on the 2026 Statcast leaderboard. His exchange measured 0.62 seconds, while his arm averaged 81.7 mph.
Those numbers make his production more revealing, not less. Contreras threw out 25 attempted base stealers, second-most among major-league catchers. He did not erase runners through elite arm strength alone. Quick transfers, accurate placement and Milwaukee’s ability to control leads helped close the gap.
In Game 1, that entire system worked. At the time Harris broke, Contreras received a 92.6 mph cutter from Antonio Senzatela. He popped upright, transferred cleanly and put the throw where Turang could finish the tag without reaching across the bag. The execution looked routine. The consequence was not. Had Harris reached second, Machado’s eventual walk would have given San Diego two runners aboard with one out. Instead, the Padres lost Harris before Machado reached first. That is where October changes the math. A gamble in July disappears into a 162-game season. A gamble in a five-game series can erase a scoring chance that never comes back.
Freezing every runner would create a different problem. If Contreras never has to throw, Milwaukee can funnel all its attention toward the hitter. San Diego still has to make the Brewers feel its speed.
Three runners can attack one defense three ways
The Padres should attack the pitcher-catcher partnership rather than treating Contreras as the only obstacle. A clean steal begins well before the pitch reaches home plate. Tatis should hunt pitchers who settle into predictable holds. His first assignment does not have to involve running. Extend the lead, draw another pickoff attempt, make the pitcher shorten his leg kick, then see what changes at the plate.
Merrill can press a different weakness. With a favorable breaking-ball count, he can hunt the extra fraction created by a slower pitch. Bogaerts offers perhaps the most useful postseason model. His 22-for-23 mark shows how effectively he separated aggression from recklessness.
Despite the pressure, San Diego cannot start sending runners simply because the series stands at 0-2. The Padres need high-quality attempts. A reliever pausing a beat too long in his set can provide one. A catcher receiving a slider below the knees can provide another. Suddenly, those 90 feet open. That is where San Diego’s coaching staff can find an edge: spotting the pitcher whose hold stretches, whose front shoulder gives away the slide step, or whose delivery slows with an off-speed pitch.
Milwaukee has flipped the running-game script
The contrast across Games 1 and 2 could hardly look cleaner. San Diego stole 160 regular-season bases. Milwaukee stole 159. The clubs finished fourth and fifth in the majors, separated by one steal across 162 games. Both teams brought elite running games into October, but only Milwaukee has executed one so far.
In Game 1, Brice Turang stole second against Robbie Ray and Ethan Salas. Garrett Mitchell later took second against Jason Adam and Salas. San Diego’s lone attempt ended when Contreras cut down Harris. The Brewers finished with two steals; the Padres finished with zero. Game 2 made the difference hurt even more. San Diego carried a 3-2 lead into the ninth. Mason Miller retired Garrett Mitchell, leaving the Padres two outs from evening the series. Then Christian Yelich walked.
During Sal Frelick’s plate appearance, Yelich took off and stole second. In one burst, Milwaukee moved the tying run into scoring position and removed the force at second. Frelick walked. Andrew Vaughn flied out. Gary Sánchez followed with another walk, loading the bases.
Finally, Jackson Chourio punched Miller’s 101.3 mph fastball through the middle. Yelich scored from third, Frelick followed, and Milwaukee walked off with a 4-3 victory.
That sequence captured what San Diego has lacked. Milwaukee did not steal for decoration. Yelich’s jump changed the geometry of the inning, moving the tying run 90 feet closer and changing what every following plate appearance could produce. San Diego uses speed to create anxiety. So far, Milwaukee has used it to create runs.
Game 3 gives San Diego a place to push
Petco Park now becomes an elimination-game laboratory. MLB lists Dustin May as Milwaukee’s Game 3 starter opposite Nick Pivetta for San Diego. May finished the regular season 7-9 with a 4.70 ERA after Milwaukee acquired him from St. Louis in August. Pivetta enters for the Padres after posting a 2.86 ERA in his five regular-season starts for San Diego. May also gives the Padres a reason to test the running game instead of shelving it. Opponents recorded nine stolen bases while he was on the mound in 2026, and he did not record a pickoff. However, that number should not become an automatic green light.
San Diego’s first baserunner can become an information-gathering weapon. Watch May’s hold, measure his move, force another look, and see whether Contreras shifts early or the middle infield starts cheating toward second. If Tatis reaches, his threat alone can split May’s attention. Should Merrill get aboard, the Padres can wait for a breaking-ball count rather than challenging Contreras at the first opportunity. With Bogaerts on first, patience may create the cleanest opening of all.
Because of this loss in Game 2, postseason baserunning no longer represents a stylistic bonus. It offers San Diego a way to manufacture offense before Milwaukee’s bullpen can squeeze the final innings again.
The Padres do not need four steals. They might need one perfect one. A runner moving from first to second can break up a double play. Taking third can turn a medium-depth fly ball into a run. An aggressive secondary lead can make a shallow single score somebody who otherwise stops at third. Harris experienced one side of that margin in Game 1; Yelich demonstrated the other in Game 2. San Diego built a 160-steal offense by refusing to treat 90 feet as fixed territory. Now its season depends on rediscovering that instinct without letting urgency become recklessness.
The Padres spent six months proving they could run. Stealing bases in October demands something harder: knowing exactly when to go.
READ MORE: The High-Leverage Out Is Deciding the ALDS Before the Ninth
FAQs
How many bases did the Padres steal in 2026?
San Diego stole 160 bases during the regular season, fourth-most in MLB.
How many bases did Fernando Tatis Jr. steal?
Fernando Tatis Jr. stole 38 bases during the 2026 regular season while getting caught 13 times.
How fast is William Contreras’ pop time?
Statcast measured William Contreras at an average 1.92-second pop time to second base in 2026.
Did the Padres steal a base in the first two NLDS games?
No. San Diego went without a successful steal through Games 1 and 2, while Milwaukee recorded three.
Why does baserunning matter so much for the Padres?
Speed can move runners into scoring position, disrupt pitchers and prevent double plays. In October, one successful steal can change an entire inning.
