The designated hitter rule gave Stephen Vogt one more option as Cleveland’s season hung by a thread. Two outs. Seventh inning. A crowd of 44,923 packed Comerica Park on October 10, 2024, with the Guardians trailing Detroit 3-2 in Game 4 of the American League Division Series.
Seven outs separated the Tigers from the ALCS.
Steven Kwan had just singled against left-hander Sean Guenther. Kyle Manzardo, Cleveland’s left-handed designated hitter, stood next in the order. Vogt looked down his bench and called for David Fry.
Detroit manager A.J. Hinch responded immediately. He summoned Beau Brieske, a right-hander who had already struck out Fry twice during the series.
The matchup favored Detroit’s recent history. However, Fry had other plans.
He drove Brieske’s fastball beyond the left-field wall, turning a one-run deficit into a 4-3 Cleveland lead. The blast stunned the Detroit crowd and gave the Guardians another chance to fight for their season.
For decades, National League managers had agonized over whether to pinch-hit for their pitchers. The universal DH eliminated that particular dilemma in 2022.
Yet Vogt’s gamble proved that the modern game still demands ruthless decisions about when to use a bench hitter and what a team might sacrifice afterward.
The pitcher is gone but the pressure remains
Before 2022, National League playoff managers faced a familiar problem whenever the pitcher’s spot approached.
A starter might have five strong innings behind him, but his place in the order could arrive with runners in scoring position. Pinch-hitting meant sacrificing the pitcher for a potentially better offensive opportunity.
Sometimes the gamble worked. Other times, an overworked bullpen inherited four innings it could barely survive.
The American League had avoided that dilemma since adopting the DH in 1973. When MLB made the rule universal in 2022, National League clubs gained the same flexibility.
However, removing the pitcher from the batting order didn’t eliminate the need for pinch-hitters. It changed whom managers replaced and when they made the move.
Today’s postseason teams carry 26 players. A club with 13 pitchers has 13 position players, leaving just four reserves behind its nine starting hitters.
Those four players must cover everything from emergency catching duties to defensive replacements and favorable offensive matchups.
A manager might need a power bat against a struggling reliever. Two innings later, he could desperately want that same player available again.
Consequently, the designated hitter rule has shifted much of the late-game calculation toward bench management.
The DH protects pitchers from offensive substitutions, but every pinch-hitter still replaces someone who cannot return.
One substitution can create several problems
Imagine a manager who uses his backup catcher to pinch-hit for a struggling designated hitter.
He might gain a stronger matchup immediately. However, an injury to the starting catcher could leave the club scrambling to find another player capable of handling the position.
The manager could move his new DH behind the plate if that player can catch, but the decision would cost the team its designated hitter.
From that point forward, the pitcher would need a place in the batting order.
Such complications rarely dominate the pregame conversation. Yet in October, with every roster spot carrying a specific purpose, one substitution can narrow a manager’s choices for the rest of the night.
Cleveland learned that lesson the hard way before Fry’s Game 4 heroics.
Cleveland paid the price for using its bench too early in Game 3
On October 9, 2024, one day before Fry’s dramatic home run, the Guardians entered Game 3 against Detroit with the ALDS tied 1-1.
Vogt wanted to attack favorable matchups before the Tigers could settle into their pitching plan.
Detroit opened with right-hander Keider Montero, then handed the ball to left-hander Brant Hurter after one inning.
Vogt responded aggressively.
In the second inning, he replaced left-handed outfielder Will Brennan with right-handed slugger Jhonkensy Noel. Brennan hadn’t even taken his first plate appearance.
The numbers explained the temptation.
Brennan had managed a .372 OPS against left-handers during the regular season. Noel carried a .969 OPS against them, making him a far more dangerous option on paper.
But Noel flew out, and Cleveland failed to score.
An inning later, Vogt made another early move. He replaced Manzardo with Fry after a runner reached second base.
Again, the matchup offered an obvious reason to act. Manzardo had struggled in limited opportunities against lefties, while Fry had punished them throughout the season.
This time, Hurter froze Fry with a backdoor sweeper for strike three.
Vogt had spent two important bench bats before the fourth inning.
The cost arrived later
Detroit took advantage of Cleveland’s reduced flexibility.
In the fifth, the Guardians put two runners aboard with one out. Fry returned to the plate, but Hinch called for Brieske rather than allowing him to face Hurter again.
Brieske struck him out on a slider.
The matchup that had persuaded Vogt to introduce Fry in the third inning no longer existed.
Cleveland still had other opportunities. However, its early substitutions had already limited the choices available to counter Detroit’s bullpen.
The clearest consequence arrived in the seventh.
Vogt sent Angel Martínez to pinch-hit for catcher Bo Naylor. Austin Hedges then took over behind the plate, leaving Cleveland with a defensive specialist in the lineup.
Hedges had hit just .152 during the regular season.
With Cleveland still trailing 3-0 in the ninth, his spot came around for the final out. The Guardians had no better offensive substitute available.
The early moves didn’t single-handedly cost Cleveland the game. Detroit pitched effectively, and the Guardians failed to capitalize on several scoring chances.
Still, the contrast was painful.
Vogt had chased favorable matchups in the second and third innings. By the ninth, he couldn’t make another offensive adjustment when his team desperately needed a hit.
Detroit’s 3-0 victory pushed Cleveland to the brink of elimination.
The next afternoon, Vogt faced another difficult choice involving the same designated hitter, the same pinch-hitter, and the same Detroit reliever.
This time, he waited until the seventh.
David Fry delivered the swing Cleveland needed in Game 4
Twenty-four hours after watching his early substitutions backfire, Vogt confronted another left-handed pitching matchup with Cleveland’s season on the line.
Manzardo was again in the designated hitter spot. Fry was again waiting on the bench.
But the circumstances had changed.
Instead of spending his best right-handed option during the opening innings, Vogt preserved Fry until Cleveland needed one swing to change the game.
Kwan’s two-out single in the seventh brought the decision forward. Guenther, a left-hander, stood on the mound.
Fry offered the stronger matchup, particularly given his regular-season performance against left-handed pitching.
He had produced a .996 OPS against left-handers, compared with a .676 mark against right-handers.
Vogt called him into the game.
Hinch recognized the danger and immediately turned to Brieske, the same pitcher who had struck out Fry during the previous afternoon’s defeat.
Suddenly, Cleveland’s preferred lefty-righty advantage disappeared.
The Tigers had reversed the matchup again. Unlike Game 3, though, Fry made the adjustment that mattered.
He survived the count and launched the two-run homer. He became just the fourth player in MLB postseason history to hit a go-ahead pinch-hit home run while trailing in the seventh inning or later.
The other three were Kirk Gibson in 1988, Ed Sprague in 1992, and Eric Hinske in 2010.
Each swing arrived when a team needed immediate offense. Fry’s came with Cleveland facing elimination.
Why Vogt could keep his hero in the lineup
Here is where the designated hitter rule gave Cleveland another advantage.
Fry had replaced Manzardo in the DH spot. Under MLB’s rules, a pinch-hitter who replaces the designated hitter automatically assumes that role.
Vogt didn’t need to find Fry a defensive position. Nor did he have to remove another starter to keep his bat available.
That flexibility became critical in the ninth.
With Cleveland ahead 4-3 and Brayan Rocchio standing at third, Vogt asked Fry to execute a safety squeeze.
Fry dropped the bunt toward reliever Will Vest. Rocchio charged home, diving headfirst to beat the flip to the plate.
The Guardians stretched their lead to 5-3. Detroit scored once in the bottom of the inning, but Cleveland survived 5-4.
Fry finished with three RBIs from two completely different offensive plays.
His home run showed why a manager might favor power. The squeeze demonstrated the value of keeping a versatile hitter in the game.
Vogt had used one substitution to influence two decisive innings without disturbing his defensive alignment.
The contrast with Game 3 could hardly have been sharper.
On Wednesday, Fry entered in the third inning and faced a difficult right-handed reliever with Cleveland already running short of bench options. On Thursday, Vogt saved him until the seventh, then watched him deliver the biggest swing of the series.
The same manager made two aggressive decisions. The timing, opposing response, and execution produced completely different results.
That is the gamble behind modern postseason pinch-hitting. A manager can identify the matchup he wants, but the opponent still gets a say.
The three-batter minimum changed the bullpen battle
Cleveland’s Game 4 showdown exposed another wrinkle in modern bullpen strategy.
Since 2020, MLB pitchers have generally had to face at least three batters or finish the half-inning before leaving the game, barring limited exceptions.
That rule made the timing of Vogt’s move particularly important.
Guenther retired Cleveland’s first two hitters in the seventh before Kwan singled. Having faced three batters, he could now leave the game.
When Vogt announced Fry, Hinch immediately summoned Brieske.
Had Kwan been Guenther’s second batter rather than his third, Hinch generally couldn’t have made that pitching change yet.
Instead, Detroit countered Fry with a right-hander who had already beaten him.
The designated hitter rule let Vogt change hitters without removing a fielder. The three-batter minimum determined when Hinch could answer.
Neither manager controlled what happened next.
Fry punished Brieske’s fastball and won the matchup Detroit wanted.
That’s the danger of treating statistical splits like guarantees. Scouting reports guide substitutions, but opposing managers can change the pitcher, and hitters still have to execute.
Cleveland used the DH to introduce a dangerous reserve. Two years earlier, Philadelphia had used the same position for an entirely different purpose: keeping its most important hitter in the lineup.
Bryce Harper showed the other value of keeping a star at DH
While Cleveland used the DH to maximize its bench flexibility, Philadelphia demonstrated how the position can protect a franchise cornerstone.
During the 2022 season, Bryce Harper suffered an injury to his throwing elbow.
Doctors initially identified a flexor tendon strain in April. In May 2022, further evaluation confirmed a small tear in his right ulnar collateral ligament.
Harper could still hit, but throwing from right field presented a problem.
Before the universal DH, the Phillies would have faced a far more difficult lineup decision. Keeping Harper’s bat active could have required him to play defense despite his elbow trouble.
Instead, he continued contributing as Philadelphia’s designated hitter.
That decision became particularly valuable during the National League Championship Series against San Diego.
On October 23, 2022, the Phillies trailed the Padres 3-2 in the eighth inning of Game 5.
Rain had soaked Citizens Bank Park, and Robert Suarez stood on the mound with J.T. Realmuto aboard.
Harper battled through the plate appearance before driving a sinker over the left-center-field wall.
Philadelphia took a 4-3 lead and held on to capture its first National League pennant since 2009.
Harper finished the series batting .400 with two home runs and five RBIs, earning NLCS MVP honors.
The Phillies didn’t need a late-inning pinch-hitter to replace their injured superstar. The DH position had already solved their most pressing offensive problem.
The designated hitter rule provided a different kind of flexibility here.
For Cleveland, it allowed a manager to introduce the right hitter at the right time. For Philadelphia, it kept the right hitter available throughout the postseason.
Both approaches helped produce memorable October home runs.
The best pinch-hitter might be the one a manager saves
Cleveland’s October 2024 run offered one more reminder of how much timing matters.
On October 17, a week after Fry saved the Guardians against Detroit, Cleveland faced another late-inning deficit in Game 3 of the American League Championship Series.
The Yankees led 5-3 in the ninth.
New York closer Luke Weaver stood one out from victory. Lane Thomas had doubled, giving Cleveland a final chance to extend the game.
Vogt called on Jhonkensy Noel to pinch-hit for Daniel Schneemann.
This time, Noel delivered.
The rookie crushed an 88.2 mph changeup into the left-field seats, tying the game 5-5 and sending Progressive Field into a frenzy.
The drive traveled approximately 404 feet.
Cleveland had held Noel until the moment when one swing could erase New York’s lead.
An inning later, Fry completed the comeback with a walk-off two-run homer against Clay Holmes.
The Guardians won 7-5 in ten innings.
The sequence reinforced a lesson from the Detroit series: a manager cannot treat every scoring opportunity as equally valuable.
Vogt had deployed Noel in the second inning of ALDS Game 3 and gained nothing. Eight days later, he saved the same slugger for a ninth-inning confrontation and watched him rescue another game.
Different opponents and situations influenced both decisions. Neither result meant the earlier strategy was automatically wrong.
However, the contrast highlighted the potential value of patience.
Extra innings raise the stakes
Postseason baseball also creates another problem for managers who spend their reserves too quickly.
Unlike the regular season, playoff extra innings begin without an automatic runner on second base.
Teams must build their rallies from scratch, and the game continues until someone wins.
A manager who empties his bench in the seventh may enter the 11th with almost no flexibility.
The designated hitter rule reduces the need to pinch-hit for pitchers, but it doesn’t eliminate the danger of running out of useful substitutions.
That makes bench depth particularly valuable for teams expecting long postseason games.
A reserve who can hit left-handed pitching, play multiple defensive positions, and run effectively gives his manager options that a one-dimensional slugger cannot provide.
Such versatility might not decide a game through one spectacular swing.
Sometimes it simply keeps a team from reaching its final at-bat with the wrong hitter at the plate.
October will always reward the manager who knows when to wait
The designated hitter rule has transformed the mechanics of postseason substitutions, but the pressure on managers remains as severe as ever.
Modern scouting departments provide detailed information about velocity, pitch movement, release points, and hitter tendencies. Managers know which bench players handle high fastballs and which struggle against sweeping breaking balls.
Those reports help shape decisions before the first pitch.
However, the postseason rarely follows a comfortable script.
A starter might exit two innings earlier than expected. An opposing manager could switch relievers after a single baserunner reaches. Meanwhile, a struggling hitter might suddenly produce the hardest contact of his series.
Every unexpected development changes the value of a bench player.
The strongest teams prepare for those possibilities by carrying versatile reserves and studying opposing bullpen usage. They also understand that statistical advantages mean little if the hitter fails to execute.
Cleveland’s 2024 postseason provided a remarkable demonstration.
Vogt watched aggressive substitutions fail against Detroit in Game 3. The next afternoon, he trusted Fry in the seventh and received a season-saving home run. A week later, Noel produced another extraordinary pinch-hit blast against New York.
Those moments carried different tactical lessons, but they shared one constant: the manager had to choose before the hitter delivered.
As teams continue refining their offensive matchups, the designated hitter rule will keep influencing how they distribute their limited bench resources.
The pitcher no longer forces managers into automatic late-inning decisions. Every substitution now reflects a deliberate choice about the player, the matchup, and what might happen next.
And that may be the cruelest part of October managing.
Sometimes the right decision brings a home run that saves the season. Other times, it leaves a .152 hitter taking the final swing while the better options sit unavailable.
The difference can be one inning, one pitching change, or one fastball that catches too much of the plate.
READ ALSO: Outfield Defensive Positioning Can Decide Playoff Games Before the Ball Is Hit
FAQs
When did MLB introduce the universal designated hitter rule?
MLB introduced the universal DH in 2022. The American League had used the rule since 1973, but National League pitchers previously had to bat.
Can a manager pinch-hit for the designated hitter?
Yes. A manager can replace the DH with a pinch-hitter, who then becomes the team’s designated hitter for the remainder of his time in the lineup.
Why did David Fry pinch-hit against the Tigers in 2024?
Stephen Vogt wanted Fry’s bat against a left-handed reliever. Detroit changed pitchers, but Fry still hit a go-ahead two-run homer.
What happens if a designated hitter takes the field?
The team loses its DH for the rest of the game. The pitcher must then occupy a spot in the batting order.
Do MLB playoff games use the automatic runner in extra innings?
No. Unlike regular-season games, playoff extra innings start with the bases empty. Teams must earn every baserunner.
