The third time through the order was approaching, and Blake Snell had given the Dodgers almost nothing to hit. His fastball beat their swings. The curveball dropped beneath their barrels. Through five innings, Mookie Betts, Corey Seager and Justin Turner had struck out twice apiece. Tampa Bay led Game 6 of the 2020 World Series, 1–0, with its season riding on the left-hander.
Then Austin Barnes singled with one out in the sixth. Kevin Cash left the dugout. Snell looked toward his manager, registered what was happening, and surrendered the ball after 73 pitches. Nine strikeouts. Two hits. No chance to finish the inning.
Betts stepped toward the plate against Nick Anderson instead. The Dodgers finally had somebody else to face. Writing for FanGraphs, Jay Jaffe captured how thoroughly Snell had controlled them: their contact averaged just 78.4 mph off the bat.
Cash feared what another look might give Los Angeles. But pulling Snell demanded an equally difficult judgment: did Anderson actually offer Tampa Bay a better chance?
Betts Was Back and Cash Had Seen Enough
Barnes stood at first. Behind Betts waited Seager and Turner, the same three hitters Snell had spent the evening embarrassing.
Cash’s concern had a sound baseball foundation. Hitters generally fare better as a start progresses and they collect more looks at the pitcher. The dispute concerns how managers should translate that pattern into a pitching change.
The third time through the order offers an appealingly clear boundary. Get through eighteen hitters, check the bullpen, prepare for the top again. A manager can explain that plan before the game and execute it without waiting for a crooked number.
But the lineup does not return in identical circumstances every night. One starter reaches Betts with his fastball still jumping. Another gets there after fighting through long counts and losing his release point.
Nor does the bullpen supply an interchangeable fresh arm. Cash needed Anderson to handle the trouble Barnes had started. Removing Snell only solved anything if the pitcher entering could improve that situation.
That comparison should have driven the decision.
Batter No. 19 Does Not Flip a Switch
Snell’s exit became the opening example in research by Ryan Brill, Sameer Deshpande and Abraham Wyner, published in the Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports.
Their central finding cuts deeper than saying managers should exercise caution. After accounting for pitcher quality, hitter quality, handedness, and other factors, their model showed offensive expectations climbing gradually through a game. It did not identify a sudden cliff between one trip through the lineup and the next.
Think slow bleed across the start, rather than a switch flipping at batter No. 19. The researchers specifically argued against treating the start of the third trip as a special cutoff. Their model supports that conclusion; it does not prove every pitcher declines at the same pace.
Applied to Snell, the distinction matters. Betts returning for the third time through the order should have prompted a fresh assessment. His arrival alone could not establish that Anderson had become the better pitcher.
The study also offers no guarantee that Snell would keep dominating. Gradual deterioration still counts. A manager must detect enough of it to justify the replacement, rather than assume the batting order has made that judgment for him.
Four Pitches Put Snell Under Suspicion
The sixth inning supplied Cash with something more specific than a lineup card.
Snell opened against AJ Pollock with a curveball over the middle. Pollock popped it up. Barnes then saw a fastball, a changeup, and the slider he lined into center.
In his FanGraphs analysis, Craig Edwards identified possible warning signs. The curve to Pollock registered 78 mph, about three miles below Snell’s game average. His fastball to Barnes reached 94 mph, roughly two miles below his average that night.
Earlier, Betts had swung through a 98 mph fastball. Seager and Turner had missed curves above 80 mph. Cash had reason to ask whether Snell could still summon those pitches.
Still, four pitches make a narrow window. A slower curve and a missed slider warrant attention; they cannot establish precisely how much effectiveness a pitcher has lost.
The slider to Barnes also illustrates why results alone mislead. A single can expose poor execution without announcing the end of a starter’s useful night. Pollock’s popup can hide a mistake without proving everything remains fine.
Navigating the third time through the order means sorting those signals while the next hitter adjusts his gloves. Cash could reasonably worry about Snell. He still needed a persuasive answer about Anderson.
Two Batters Turned the World Series
FanGraphs’ play log puts numbers on the danger.
After Barnes singled, its win-expectancy model gave Los Angeles a 39.5 percent chance to win. Betts doubled against Anderson, pushing that figure to 54.6 percent. A wild pitch brought Barnes home and moved Betts to third; the Dodgers’ chances reached 65.7 percent. Seager’s grounder then scored Betts, lifting Los Angeles to 74.5 percent.
Two plate appearances and a wild pitch had produced a swing of approximately 35 percentage points.
The same play log shows how quickly the inning changed. When Anderson entered, a runner at first with one out carried an expectation of 0.52 runs before the inning ended. Betts’ double created second and third with one out, raising that expectation to 1.40 runs.
Those figures measure how the game changed. They do not mean Cash’s substitution itself cost Tampa Bay 35 percentage points. Betts still had to hit the double. Anderson still had to bounce the curveball.
WPA Cannot Throw Snell’s Next Pitch
Win probability added records the movement caused by completed plays. It cannot replay Betts’ at-bat against Snell.
A standard win-expectancy chart describes the score, inning, runners, and outs. It does not supply a personalized verdict on Snell’s curveball against Anderson’s fastball.
That leaves an essential gap between explaining the damage and evaluating the decision. The third time through the order helps inform a forecast. The actual forecast must compare the pitchers before anybody knows where Betts will hit the ball.
Cash needed Anderson’s expected advantage over Snell—not merely evidence that Snell might fade.
The Fresh Arm Had Warning Signs Too
Anderson entered with his own warning signs. MLB’s reporting noted that he had allowed runs in six consecutive postseason appearances before Game 6.
That streak alone could not settle his condition, either. Relievers can surrender runs on weak contact, inherit difficult situations, or suffer through a small sample.
But the standard had to remain consistent. If Snell’s recent pitches justified concern about fatigue, Anderson’s recent execution deserved scrutiny before Cash handed him the season.
The comparison required more than a fresh arm against a tiring one. Could Anderson locate his fastball against Betts? Would his curveball draw a chase from Seager? How much confidence should Tampa Bay place in his established ability after his recent struggles?
The third time through the order says something about the starter’s circumstances. It says nothing by itself about the reliever’s readiness.
Cash removed a pitcher whose stuff might have begun slipping. He replaced him with another pitcher who also carried reasons for concern. Any defense of the move must confront both halves.
The Next Decision Starts Before Barnes Reaches First
The lasting lesson begins before Cash climbs the dugout steps.
A pitching staff should identify where the starter and its available relievers might trade places in the matchup. Betts, Seager and Turner demanded that preparation well before Barnes singled.
The manager then needs room to revise the plan. A starter maintaining his command deserves a different evaluation from one repeatedly missing the catcher’s target. The reliever warming behind him must undergo the same examination.
For the third time through the order, the mathematical breaking point comes when the replacement plan offers the better chance to win. That calculation includes the next hitters and the innings still requiring outs. It cannot emerge from the starter’s exposure count alone.
Nobody can recover the pitches Snell never threw. Perhaps Betts catches up to his next fastball. Perhaps another curveball takes Seager below the zone. Pretending either outcome was certain only replaces one rigid belief with another.
What survives from Game 6 is a sharper question for the next manager holding the bullpen phone. How much has the starter lost, and what can the replacement actually give?
The third time through the order should make that question urgent. It should never answer it automatically.
Snell handed Cash the ball with Tampa Bay still ahead. Before making that walk, a manager needs to know why taking it improves his team’s chances.
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FAQs
What does third time through the order mean?
It means hitters face the same starting pitcher for their third plate appearance of the game.
Why did Kevin Cash pull Blake Snell in Game 6?
Cash wanted to avoid another matchup with the top of the Dodgers’ lineup. Snell left after 73 pitches with Tampa Bay leading 1–0.
Should managers always pull starters before the third time through?
No. Managers should compare the starter’s remaining effectiveness with the available reliever, while considering the upcoming hitters and remaining innings.
What happened after Nick Anderson replaced Blake Snell?
Mookie Betts doubled, Austin Barnes scored on a wild pitch, and Corey Seager’s grounder brought Betts home. The Dodgers took a 2–1 lead.
Does WPA prove removing Snell was the wrong decision?
No. WPA measures how completed plays changed a team’s chances. It cannot show what Snell would have done if he stayed.
