An early pitching change in Game 3 of the 2023 World Series left Bruce Bochy staring at 18 outs he hadn’t planned for. Max Scherzer had held Arizona scoreless through three innings, and Texas led 3-0 at Chase Field. But the veteran right-hander’s back was locking up. After two warmup pitches before the fourth, Scherzer could barely continue. Bochy needed another pitcher, and he needed one quickly.
Jon Gray came out of the bullpen with a problem bigger than the next three hitters. Texas needed six innings of relief to protect its lead, with Game 4 scheduled for the following night. Gray had also been a potential starter for that game. Using him now meant Bochy would have to find another option tomorrow.
The Rangers eventually survived, but the emergency exposed the hidden cost of October pitching decisions. Every reliever who enters early changes who remains available later. Every extra inning places another demand on a bullpen already handling a larger share of postseason work.
Managers know that pulling a struggling starter can rescue one game. The harder question comes afterward: How much of the next game should they sacrifice to win this one?
Why October starters rarely get the same leash
Baseball has spent years moving away from the expectation that a starting pitcher should last six or seven innings. October pushes that approach further because managers have fewer reasons to tolerate a dangerous matchup.
Postseason starters averaged 4.35 innings per appearance in 2025, down from 5.19 during the regular season. Starting pitchers accounted for just 48.5% of playoff innings through the League Championship Series, compared with 58.5% in regular-season games. FanGraphs analyst Jay Jaffe documented those differences in his postseason starting-pitching analysis.
That gap means relievers have absorbed an enormous share of the postseason workload. Managers want to exploit favorable matchups, but they also want to avoid the deterioration that often accompanies a starter’s third trip through the batting order.
Take a power pitcher such as Hunter Greene. His fastball can overwhelm hitters, but velocity alone cannot guarantee success after opponents have seen his delivery and secondary pitches multiple times. A manager weighing another inning from Greene must compare his current effectiveness against the reliever waiting in the bullpen.
That decision gets harder when the starter still looks sharp. Removing him might produce a better matchup against the next hitter, but it also creates another inning that someone else must cover.
The times-through-the-order penalty gives managers a statistical reason to act. It does not tell them exactly when to make the call. A rested starter with good command can still offer more value than a reliever who has worked several times in the previous week.
The three-batter rule complicates the early hook
An early pitching change often begins with a particular hitter. Maybe a left-handed slugger has punished the starter’s breaking ball, or a dangerous right-hander has already driven two hard-hit balls into the gaps.
Managers can target those matchups, but they cannot ignore what comes next.
MLB’s three-batter minimum generally requires a new pitcher to face at least three hitters or finish the half-inning, with exceptions for qualifying injuries or illnesses. That removes much of the freedom teams once had to use a specialist against a single batter.
Picture a manager preparing to face Philadelphia. Kyle Schwarber and Bryce Harper both present obvious reasons to consider a left-handed reliever. Yet Trea Turner and other right-handed hitters can complicate that plan, depending on the batting order.
A manager cannot simply choose the ideal pitcher for Schwarber and assume the next matchup will take care of itself. He must account for the full sequence his reliever could face.
The most dangerous inning might come before the ninth
The same logic influences when managers use their best relievers.
A bases-loaded situation in the sixth inning can carry more leverage than a ninth inning that begins with a comfortable lead. Leverage index, which measures the potential impact of a game situation, helps explain why managers sometimes deploy important relievers before their traditional innings.
Suppose a closer enters with two runners aboard and one out in the seventh. He gets the critical outs, but his manager must still cover the eighth and ninth without him.
That exchange can make sense. It can also backfire if the remaining relievers struggle against the middle of the opposing lineup.
An early pitching change forces managers to address both problems together. They need the right arm for the immediate threat and enough trustworthy pitching to finish the game.
Five extra bullpen innings can wreck the next game’s plan
The workload calculation becomes especially uncomfortable when teams play on consecutive days.
Say a manager pulls his starter after three innings. The bullpen must cover six. If the next starter lasts only four innings, relievers will need another five the following night.
That’s 11 bullpen innings across two games. Had both starters completed six innings, the same bullpen would have needed just six.
Those five additional innings might not sound disastrous over a long regular season. During a short playoff series, they can change nearly every late-game assignment.
A setup reliever who throws 28 pitches tonight might need tomorrow off. Another pitcher could appear in consecutive games but lose some effectiveness after repeated high-effort outings. Managers also track warmup activity, which can add work even when a reliever never enters.
The number of pitches tells only part of the story. Recovery varies among pitchers, and some handle back-to-back appearances better than others.
This explains why a reliable long reliever can become so valuable in October. A pitcher who covers three innings gives his manager something more useful than an ordinary scoreless appearance. He protects several other arms from having to work.
For teams without that option, a short start can quickly turn into a series-wide bullpen problem. The remaining schedule determines whether the manager can recover.
Jon Gray rescued Texas and changed its World Series rotation
Scherzer’s departure against Arizona showed exactly why multi-inning relief matters.
Gray had spent nearly his entire major league career as a starter. Yet Bochy needed him to bridge the gap between Scherzer’s exit and the Rangers’ established late-game relievers.
The right-hander responded with three scoreless innings on just 30 pitches, allowing one hit and striking out three. MLB.com noted that Gray became only the second pitcher to throw at least three scoreless relief innings in a World Series game using 30 pitches or fewer.
His efficiency mattered almost as much as the zeros. Texas needed only Josh Sborz, Aroldis Chapman and José Leclerc to cover the remaining three innings, securing a 3-1 victory.
Bochy understood exactly what Gray had saved him. Speaking after the game, the Rangers manager explained how the emergency appearance had protected his options for the rest of the series.
“We were able to stay away from a lot of guys because of Jon Gray’s effort,” Bochy told MLB.com.
Gray had absorbed nine outs without forcing Bochy to empty his bullpen. The Rangers still needed to solve their Game 4 rotation problem, but they hadn’t exhausted the pitchers responsible for protecting late leads.
Gray’s emergency appearance removed a potential Game 4 starting option. With Scherzer unable to continue in the series, Bochy turned to Andrew Heaney for the following night’s start.
Heaney faced his own difficult history. In his previous postseason start, against Houston in the ALCS, he had recorded only two outs.
This time, he delivered five innings of one-run baseball. Texas won Game 4 by an 11-7 score and moved within one victory of the championship.
Gray’s work had saved Game 3 without exhausting the relief corps. Heaney then gave Bochy five valuable innings the next evening.
The Rangers handled the disruption about as well as Bochy could have hoped. One pitcher absorbed the emergency workload, another handled the next start, and the manager avoided spending his entire bullpen to survive two nights.
Texas had the personnel to make that recovery possible. Not every postseason team enjoys the same luxury.
A.J. Hinch used six pitchers to shut out Cleveland in the 2024 ALDS
The 2024 American League Division Series between Detroit and Cleveland offered another look at how early pitching changes can reshape a manager’s options.
In Game 3 on October 9, Tigers manager A.J. Hinch handed the ball to Keider Montero at Comerica Park. Detroit had already split the first two games in Cleveland, and the winner would move within one victory of reaching the ALCS.
Montero needed only six pitches to retire the first three Guardians hitters. He hadn’t allowed a baserunner, and nothing about the inning suggested trouble.
Hinch pulled him anyway.
The decision was deliberate. Rather than asking Montero to work through Cleveland’s lineup again, Hinch planned to use different pitchers against specific groups of hitters.
“He didn’t know what our strategy was before the game,” Hinch told MLB.com afterward, explaining that Montero only knew he would start.
Left-hander Brant Hurter entered for the second inning. Cleveland responded with pinch-hitters, trying to counter Detroit’s pitching choices with more favorable platoon matchups.
Hurter allowed five singles across his outing but avoided serious damage. When Cleveland threatened again in the fifth, Hinch turned to Beau Brieske.
Brieske struck out David Fry and retired José Ramírez on a fly ball to end the threat. He eventually retired all six hitters he faced, including three by strikeout.
Detroit kept changing the view from the batter’s box. Sean Guenther, Will Vest and Tyler Holton handled the remaining innings.
By the final out, six Tigers pitchers had combined for a 3-0 shutout, allowing six hits and two walks. Detroit led the series 2-1, with a chance to eliminate Cleveland at home the following afternoon.
The pitching sequence captured Hinch’s willingness to disregard conventional bullpen roles. Brieske had finished Game 2, then worked the middle innings of Game 3. Holton, who opened Game 1, recorded the final outs of Game 3.
Hinch could make those moves because his staff carried pitchers who could handle different assignments. But his success came with a question about Game 4.
Cleveland made Hinch pay for one mistake the next night
Detroit needed another victory on October 10 to advance.
This time, Hinch started Reese Olson, who delivered four innings of one-run baseball. Holton followed with two relief innings before Sean Guenther entered in the seventh.
The Tigers led 3-2 when Guenther retired two hitters. Steven Kwan then singled, prompting Cleveland manager Stephen Vogt to send David Fry to the plate as a pinch-hitter for Kyle Manzardo.
Hinch countered with Brieske.
The matchup looked favorable for Detroit. Brieske had struck out Fry in Game 2 and again in Game 3. Including their regular-season meeting, Fry had gone hitless with three strikeouts against the right-hander.
But Fry fought through an 0-2 count and drove a fastball into the left-field seats for a two-run homer.
Suddenly, Cleveland led 4-3.
Fry added a ninth-inning safety squeeze, and the Guardians survived 5-4 to force Game 5. Detroit’s pitching strategy had produced the matchup Hinch wanted, but it couldn’t guarantee the result.
The home run wasn’t proof that Brieske had become ineffective through overuse. He had beaten Fry twice earlier in the series, and one poorly located pitch changed their next confrontation.
Still, the sequence exposed the difficulty of repeatedly relying on the same important relievers. Hinch needed Brieske in different situations across three games, and Cleveland continued searching for ways to counter him.
Detroit eventually lost Game 5 by a 7-3 score, ending its season.
The Tigers had survived Game 3 through a carefully planned bullpen effort. Twenty-four hours later, another matchup-driven decision left them seven outs short of advancing.
That swing captures the risk of October bullpen management. Even when the manager gets the matchup he wants, the hitter still has a chance to win it.
Dave Roberts showed when spending the whole bullpen makes sense
Not every manager needs to worry equally about tomorrow.
The Dodgers entered Game 4 of the 2024 NLDS against San Diego facing elimination. Los Angeles trailed the series 2-1, and injuries had complicated its starting rotation.
Manager Dave Roberts chose a bullpen game, trusting his relief corps to deliver all 27 outs.
Ryan Brasier opened and recorded the first four outs. Roberts then brought in left-hander Anthony Banda as San Diego’s left-handed hitters approached.
Michael Kopech entered in the third inning, earlier than the Dodgers had used him since acquiring him at the trade deadline. Alex Vesia handled another important stretch before Roberts worked through the remaining bullpen options.
Eight Dodgers pitchers combined for a shutout.
Los Angeles won 8-0, forcing Game 5 and buying another opportunity to advance.
The approach worked because Roberts could match individual pitchers against particular hitters without asking one reliever to carry an excessive workload. He had a plan for how the game should unfold, but the sequence depended on what happened after each pitching change.
Roberts had made his priorities clear before the game.
“We’ve got to win tomorrow night to then pick up the pieces for Game 5,” he told MLB.com after the Dodgers fell behind 2-1 in the series.
That was the difference between protecting pitchers for another day and accepting the immediate cost of survival. Roberts couldn’t afford to save his best relievers for a game Los Angeles might never reach.
San Diego outfielder Jackson Merrill described the difficulty of constantly adjusting to a new arm. Each pitching change forced the Padres to recalibrate against another delivery and pitch mix.
Still, Roberts faced the same recovery questions as every other postseason manager. His advantage came from the schedule and his remaining starters.
The Dodgers had a day off before Game 5. They also had Yoshinobu Yamamoto available to start.
Yamamoto supplied five scoreless innings in the deciding game, and the Dodgers completed a 2-0 victory to win the series. The bullpen handled the remaining four innings, preserving San Diego’s shutout.
Roberts had spent eight pitchers to survive Game 4, then received enough starting pitching to finish the job in Game 5.
The strategy was aggressive without requiring every reliever to shoulder an unsustainable workload. Los Angeles also had no reason to conserve its best arms for a hypothetical next series while facing elimination.
That distinction separates smart bullpen management from simply making frequent pitching changes.
The next starter often determines whether the gamble pays off
Managers receive plenty of attention for removing starters early. Far less discussion focuses on what happens when the next game’s starter takes the mound.
That pitcher often controls whether the original decision becomes a clever adjustment or the beginning of a bullpen crisis.
Bochy needed Heaney after Gray’s emergency appearance. Hinch used Olson after Detroit’s six-pitcher shutout. Roberts relied on Yamamoto to complete a series after spending heavily on his bullpen.
Each manager faced different circumstances, but all three needed another pitcher to absorb meaningful innings afterward.
An early pitching change carries two separate costs. The first comes from the relievers needed immediately. The second comes from the pitching options a team might lose in subsequent games.
The second cost can prove more damaging because a manager cannot always repair it with another substitution.
Say a team uses its best three relievers during a narrow Game 2 victory. Its starter then exits early in Game 3. Suddenly, the manager faces another high-leverage inning without the preferred arms available.
He can ask a tired reliever to work again. Alternatively, he can trust a less-established pitcher against the opponent’s best hitters.
Neither choice necessarily means the original decision was wrong. Sometimes the opposing lineup forces a manager into uncomfortable compromises.
Bochy’s experience with Gray captured that balancing act. The right-hander was a possible starter the following night, but Texas needed his innings immediately. Once Gray delivered, Bochy could reorganize the next game without sacrificing the relievers he had protected.
The emergency worked out because Gray pitched efficiently. Another three-inning outing requiring 65 pitches, multiple jams and several inherited runners might have produced a very different bullpen situation.
Every early hook becomes part of the next game’s decision
Playoff managers rarely enjoy perfect information. A starter can look dominant through four innings before losing command in the fifth. A rested reliever might need 30 pitches to escape one jam, while another handles two innings without trouble.
The recovery schedule can change just as quickly. One extra-inning game may wipe out the bullpen plan a manager built the previous afternoon.
That uncertainty explains why an early pitching change cannot be judged only by the next hitter’s result.
A reliever might enter with two runners aboard, induce a double play and rescue the inning. The move looks brilliant until his manager needs him again the next night and discovers he isn’t available.
Conversely, a starter might surrender another run after remaining in the game. That decision could still preserve enough relief pitching to help the team win the next two contests.
The best decision for one inning isn’t always the best decision for the series.
The Rangers’ 2023 World Series offered a memorable reminder. Scherzer couldn’t continue, so Bochy needed Gray to cover unexpected innings. Gray did more than pitch effectively. His 30-pitch outing preserved enough flexibility for Texas to manage the next game, even after the rotation changed.
Detroit’s 2024 ALDS demonstrated a different calculation. Hinch deliberately pulled Montero after one perfect inning and used five relievers to finish the shutout. The following afternoon, he returned to several trusted arms, only to watch Fry beat one of his preferred matchups.
Roberts took an even more aggressive route with the Dodgers, using eight pitchers when one loss would have ended their season. With a scheduled day off and Yamamoto available, the risk made sense.
Those examples show why managers cannot rely on one formula. The right move depends on the score, available pitchers and the time remaining before the next game.
A manager protecting a one-run lead in Game 5 of a Division Series should think differently from someone protecting the same lead in Game 1. In the deciding game, there is no tomorrow to save those relievers for. In the opener, burning through the best arms could leave the team exposed for the next several nights.
There is no clean way to eliminate that trade-off.
Bochy faced the uncertainty when Scherzer’s back locked up. Hinch accepted it when he removed a starter who had retired every hitter he faced. Roberts embraced it when he decided that eight relievers offered the Dodgers their best chance to stay alive.
Each manager had to solve the immediate problem while accounting for the pitchers he might need later.
When a pitching coach heads toward the mound in the fourth inning, fans naturally focus on the struggling starter and the next dangerous hitter. The manager has to think about both, while keeping tomorrow’s bullpen and the remaining rotation in mind.
Pulling the starter might win the game in front of him. But if that decision leaves his bullpen depleted when the next close game arrives, how much did the early hook really gain?
READ ALSO: How early runs turn Division Series bullpen plans upside down in October
FAQs
Why do MLB managers pull starting pitchers early in the playoffs?
Managers often pull starters to avoid difficult matchups or a third trip through the lineup. They believe a fresh reliever gives them a better chance.
How does an early pitching change affect the next playoff game?
It forces the bullpen to cover more innings. That can leave important relievers tired or unavailable when the next game begins.
What is a bullpen game in MLB?
A bullpen game uses several pitchers to cover the innings normally handled by a starter. Managers often plan shorter outings around specific matchups.
Why did A.J. Hinch pull Keider Montero after one inning in 2024?
Hinch planned to use different pitchers against Cleveland’s hitters. Detroit used six pitchers and won Game 3 of the ALDS, 3-0.
How did the Dodgers win Game 4 of the 2024 NLDS without a traditional starter?
Dave Roberts used eight pitchers to complete nine scoreless innings against San Diego. The Dodgers won 8-0 and forced Game 5.
