Nestor Cortes stared down Freddie Freeman in the 10th inning of Game 1 of the 2024 World Series. Dodger Stadium shook beneath the noise of 52,394 fans. The Yankees held a one-run lead, the bases were loaded, and Aaron Boone had already placed his faith in a left-handed pitcher who hadn’t appeared in a major league game since September 18.
Freeman needed one pitch. Cortes delivered a 92.5 mph fastball, and the Dodgers’ first baseman launched it into the right-field seats for the first walk-off grand slam in World Series history.
Suddenly, an entire night of strategy collapsed into one unforgettable swing.
The postgame argument centered on Cortes’ rust, Boone’s trust, and whether the Yankees had chosen the right matchup. Nobody questioned how the pitching change might affect New York’s batting order.
That absence explains how thoroughly the designated hitter rule has changed baseball’s late innings.
For decades, National League managers had to balance pitching performance against the approaching pitcher’s spot. Now every substitution invites a more uncomfortable question: when does the promise of a fresh arm outweigh the danger of abandoning the pitcher already getting outs?
The Death of the Double Switch Changed Everything
Baseball once forced National League managers to solve two problems with every pitching change. They needed the right arm on the mound and a workable batting order for the innings ahead.
Picture a pitcher carrying a one-run lead through seven innings. His pitch count has climbed, but his breaking ball still bites. Unfortunately, his spot comes up with two runners aboard in the bottom half.
The manager faces an ugly choice. Send up a pinch-hitter and surrender a reliable pitcher, or let an overmatched batter waste a scoring opportunity.
For years, the double switch helped managers escape those traps.
By swapping a position player alongside the pitcher, they could bury the new pitcher’s batting spot deeper in the lineup. The move bought additional innings without forcing another offensive substitution.
However, each double switch carried consequences. A manager could lose a strong defensive player, exhaust his bench, or create an unfavorable matchup later.
The American League had already escaped this particular headache when it introduced the DH in 1973. National League managers lived with it for nearly another half-century, apart from the temporary universal DH in 2020.
Then the 2022 collective bargaining agreement brought the designated hitter to both leagues permanently.
The designated hitter rule removed the pitcher’s routine plate appearance from the equation. A manager could now chase the best pitching matchup without worrying about sacrificing an upcoming turn at bat.
One old complication disappeared. Several others became harder to ignore.
The Shohei Ohtani Exception
Baseball’s 2022 adjustments also gave Shohei Ohtani an unusual advantage.
Under the provision commonly called the Ohtani rule, a starting pitcher who also occupies the DH spot can leave the mound without leaving the batting order.
That means a manager can pull Ohtani after six demanding innings and still keep his bat available for the ninth.
The designated hitter rule therefore offers two-way stars a freedom earlier generations never enjoyed. Their pitching workload no longer has to dictate their offensive availability.
For most clubs, though, the larger change concerns ordinary pitchers.
There is no longer a lineup problem to hide behind.
The Three Batter Minimum Makes Every Matchup a Gamble
Removing pitchers from the batting order did not give managers unlimited control over bullpen matchups.
Another regulation closed off one of baseball’s most familiar late-inning tactics.
Since 2020, Major League Baseball has required an incoming pitcher to face at least three batters or finish the half-inning, barring qualifying injury or illness exceptions.
Before that restriction, managers could burn a left-handed specialist against one dangerous left-handed hitter, then immediately return to the bullpen.
Now they must consider the next several hitters.
Imagine a left-handed slugger approaching with two right-handed power threats behind him. A manager has an excellent left-handed reliever available, but the opposing lineup presents a trap.
The reliever offers an advantage against the first hitter. However, if he fails to finish the inning, he could face two batters who handle his best pitches comfortably.
Suddenly, the preferred individual matchup might create a worse overall situation.
Why the Fresh Arm Isn’t Always the Right Arm
Relievers rarely possess equally effective weapons against hitters from both sides of the plate.
Some rely on sweeping sliders that disappear from same-handed batters. Others throw splitters or changeups that neutralize the opposite side.
Consider José Alvarado’s devastating sinker against left-handed hitters. The pitch can attack their hands at nearly 100 mph, leaving little time to react.
Yet even that weapon carries risk against someone like Yordan Alvarez, who can punish velocity without needing the pitcher to make a glaring mistake.
The three-batter minimum forces managers to examine those risks across a sequence rather than a single showdown.
Here the designated hitter rule adds another layer. With no pitcher waiting to bat at the bottom of the order, opposing lineups can keep dangerous hitters coming.
A fresh reliever might face the opponent’s eighth hitter, then a productive ninth hitter, before reaching the leadoff star.
That sequence can turn a seemingly routine seventh inning into a bullpen emergency.
The modern manager must read the entire inning before making the first move.
The Third Trip Through the Order Still Haunts Starting Pitchers
A starter can spend five innings making hitters look helpless. His fastball explodes above their barrels, and his slider forces desperate swings at pitches heading toward the dirt.
Then the lineup comes around again.
Hitters have watched the movement. They have measured the velocity and studied the release point. By their third plate appearance, they know which pitches the starter trusts when he falls behind.
Sometimes that familiarity makes the difference.
League-wide MLB data from 2016 through 2025 shows how steadily offensive production increased when hitters faced the same starting pitcher multiple times. On their first trip through the order, batters hit .243 with a .713 OPS. Their average climbed to .255 with a .747 OPS the second time around.
By the third look, those numbers reached .265 and .780.
That 67-point jump in OPS between the first and third trips gives managers a meaningful reason to reconsider how long a starter should remain on the mound.
Those averages don’t condemn every pitcher to an early exit. Elite starters can maintain their effectiveness deep into games, and struggling pitchers often leave before facing the lineup a third time.
Still, the pattern carries weight.
The designated hitter rule frees managers to act on that data without worrying about the pitcher’s next plate appearance.
But the statistics cannot tell a manager whether his specific starter has actually begun to fade.
When the Pitch Count Lies
Pitch counts provide useful information, but they don’t reveal everything.
A starter might reach 95 pitches with his command intact. Another could lose the feel for his release point after only 70.
Velocity, movement, fatigue, and opposing hitters all matter. So does the quality of the reliever waiting beyond the outfield wall.
Consider Zack Wheeler in Game 6 of the 2022 World Series.
His fastball still had plenty of life. Philadelphia’s ace had shut out Houston through five innings, and his velocity had rebounded after earlier concerns about arm fatigue.
Wheeler appeared capable of handling more work.
His manager saw a different problem.
What happened next became one of the most heavily scrutinized pitching changes of that postseason.
Two World Series Decisions Show the Price of Trust
The 2022 World Series supplied two strikingly different answers to the same question.
How much longer should a manager trust a dominant starting pitcher?
One decision helped produce history. The other helped decide a championship.
Dusty Baker Pulls Cristian Javier During a No Hitter
On November 2, Cristian Javier walked off the mound at Citizens Bank Park without allowing a hit.
Philadelphia had spent six innings chasing his elevated fastball. The pitch repeatedly beat hitters above their swings, while Javier’s slider kept them uncomfortable whenever they tried to adjust.
He had struck out nine, walked two, and thrown 97 pitches.
An individual World Series no-hitter remained within reach. Dusty Baker took the baseball anyway.
Houston had placed Javier under a 100-pitch limit after ten days of rest. Baker also had a formidable bullpen available, and the Astros needed to even the series.
Despite the temptation of history, he chose Bryan Abreu for the seventh inning.
Abreu handled his assignment. Rafael Montero followed with another hitless inning, and Ryan Pressly finished the job.
Houston won 5-0 and completed the first combined no-hitter in World Series history.
Not even a zero in the hit column guaranteed Javier the seventh inning.
The designated hitter rule had removed any need to consider his place in Houston’s batting order. Baker could concentrate on Javier’s workload and the relievers he trusted to finish the game.
More importantly, his bullpen rewarded that trust.
Three nights later, Philadelphia would discover how devastating the same kind of decision could become.
Rob Thomson Trusts the Matchup and Pays for It
Wheeler had kept Houston scoreless through five innings of Game 6. His fastball reached the upper 90s, and the Astros struggled to generate clean contact.
Philadelphia led 1-0.
Then Martín Maldonado reached on a hit-by-pitch to open the sixth. Houston eventually put runners at the corners after Jeremy Peña singled through the middle.
Wheeler had thrown only 70 pitches.
Rob Thomson nevertheless emerged from the dugout. He wanted left-hander José Alvarado against the dangerous left-handed Alvarez.
Philadelphia had targeted that matchup throughout the series. Alvarado possessed the velocity and movement to challenge Alvarez directly.
Wheeler wanted to stay.
The manager took the ball.
Alvarado fouled Alvarez off with his first sinker, then missed with a cutter and another sinker. The count reached 2-1.
His next offering came in at 98.9 mph.
Alvarez recognized the sinker and drove it 450 feet over the center-field wall. Statcast measured the blast at 112.5 mph off his bat.
Minute Maid Park erupted.
Houston turned a one-run deficit into a 3-1 lead and eventually captured the championship with a 4-1 victory.
Thomson had made the pitching matchup he wanted. Alvarez simply destroyed the pitch.
The designated hitter rule didn’t force Thomson’s hand. It just removed the lineup card from his list of complications.
In this case, the fresh reliever could not outperform the starter who already had Houston under control.
That’s the uncomfortable truth behind modern bullpen management. A sensible pitching decision can still produce a disastrous result.
And the danger doesn’t always begin with the opposing team’s biggest star. Sometimes it starts with the last name on the lineup card. Two Octobers after Alvarez punished Philadelphia’s bullpen decision, a dangerous ninth hitter at Dodger Stadium helped set the stage for another World Series nightmare.
Dangerous Ninth Hitters Have Erased the Easy Escape
The universal DH also changed what managers expect from the bottom of a batting order.
Pitchers historically provided weaker offensive production than everyday position players. Before 2022, National League clubs often looked toward the pitcher’s spot as an opportunity to escape an inning.
That luxury has largely disappeared.
During Game 1 of the 2024 World Series, the Dodgers placed Tommy Edman ninth in their batting order.
Edman wasn’t a disposable hitter. He had just earned National League Championship Series MVP honors after driving in 11 runs against the Mets.
With Los Angeles trailing in the bottom of the 10th against New York, Gavin Lux drew a walk. Edman followed with a single that helped bring Shohei Ohtani to the plate.
Without that hit, the inning might never have reached Freeman’s historic confrontation with Cortes.
Instead, the ninth hitter extended the rally, and the top of the Dodgers’ order eventually finished it.
The designated hitter rule helps make such lineups possible by replacing a routine pitcher batting slot with another position player or dedicated hitter.
That doesn’t mean every ninth hitter presents a major threat. Some teams still carry offensive weaknesses near the bottom.
However, managers can no longer assume that the ninth spot belongs to someone whose primary responsibility begins on the mound.
One extra base runner can bring the opposition’s most dangerous hitter into the inning.
Edman proved exactly that before Freeman stole the headlines.
What the Next October Bullpen Decision Will Reveal
The designated hitter rule has made pitching substitutions cleaner on paper and more revealing in practice.
Without the pitcher’s batting spot forcing an occasional move, managers can focus on matchups, fatigue, and the arms available for the next inning.
Yet that freedom creates its own pressure.
A manager who leaves a starter in too long risks giving familiar hitters another look at his arsenal. Pull him too early, and he may spend six outs watching an inferior reliever struggle with the very lineup he had controlled.
Neither choice offers immunity from criticism.
The three-batter minimum complicates matters further. Every bullpen call carries consequences beyond the hitter standing at the plate.
And then comes October, when bullpen availability can change overnight.
A reliever who throws 25 pitches in Game 3 might have limited availability the following evening. A manager chasing every favorable matchup can find himself short of dependable arms before the series reaches its decisive game.
This is where modern bullpen strategy demands more than an impressive collection of statistics.
The best managers must recognize when the numbers describe a real vulnerability and when their pitcher still possesses enough command to survive it.
They must also understand the human cost of taking the baseball.
Wheeler’s reaction in 2022 revealed that tension. His manager saw a better matchup. The pitcher saw a championship opportunity slipping from his hands.
Both understood the stakes. Only one controlled the decision.
The designated hitter rule has stripped away much of the old lineup arithmetic, but baseball hasn’t replaced it with an exact formula for winning.
Somewhere in the next World Series, a starter will carry a slim lead into the seventh inning. His pitch count will climb, a dangerous hitter will approach, and a reliever will begin throwing behind the bullpen fence.
The manager will glance at the matchup information, then back toward the mound.
For decades, the pitcher’s spot offered National League managers one more reason to make that walk.
Now they must confront the decision on its own.
Is the pitcher struggling, or has the manager simply run out of patience?
READ MORE: Playoff Bullpen Management Means Knowing When to Go Early
FAQs
Q1. How did the designated hitter rule change pitching decisions?
The rule removed pitchers from the batting order. Managers can now make pitching changes without sacrificing a pitcher’s upcoming plate appearance.
Q2. Why did MLB introduce the universal designated hitter?
MLB adopted the DH in both leagues permanently in 2022, ending the National League’s long tradition of making pitchers bat.
Q3. What is the three-batter minimum rule in MLB?
Pitchers must face at least three batters or finish the half-inning before leaving, except in qualifying injury or illness situations.
Q4. Why do managers remove starting pitchers before the seventh inning?
Hitters often improve against a pitcher after seeing him repeatedly. Managers also consider fatigue, pitch count and available bullpen matchups.
Q5. Why did Rob Thomson remove Zack Wheeler in the 2022 World Series?
Thomson wanted left-hander José Alvarado against Yordan Alvarez in Game 6. Alvarez punished the move with a 450-foot, three-run homer.
