Throwing short of the sticks can make an NFL stadium groan before the receiver even turns upfield.
It’s third-and-eight. Two safeties sit deep, daring the quarterback to test them. A linebacker drifts toward the first-down marker, taking away the crossing route. The quarterback looks left, resets his feet and fires a pass into the flat.
The receiver catches it five yards short.
Half the stadium groans. Then he plants his outside foot, slips a diving tackle and turns up the sideline. Nine yards. First down. Suddenly, the throw everyone hated looks pretty smart.
Of course, that play only works when the receiver has somewhere to run. Give a disciplined nickelback a clean angle to the football, and the same completion produces three yards before the punting unit takes the field.
That difference matters more than ever. NFL defenses have spent years building coverage schemes that discourage deep throws while forcing offenses to work through crowded underneath windows.
Quarterbacks now face a difficult question: When does taking the easy completion become the best way to beat the defense?
Patrick Mahomes spent several seasons figuring that out.
Early in his Kansas City career, Mahomes made defensive coordinators miserable with his deep passing ability.
He could roll right, throw across his body and still find Tyreek Hill streaking behind the secondary. Defenses had to account for throws that most quarterbacks wouldn’t even consider attempting.
By 2021, opponents had seen enough. Coordinators increasingly kept two safeties deep, making Kansas City earn its yards underneath. The coverage wasn’t exclusively two-high, but the approach became central to defending the Chiefs.
According to The Ringer’s October 2024 analysis, Kansas City faced more two-deep shell coverage than any other team in 2021.
Mahomes had a choice. Keep hunting deep shots against bracketed receivers, or start taking the space defenses willingly surrendered.
Pro Football Focus data cited in that analysis shows Mahomes attempted 51 checkdowns during his first three seasons as a starter, from 2018 through 2020. From 2021 through 2023, that number jumped to 122 checkdowns.
That wasn’t evidence of declining talent. Mahomes had learned another way to punish defensive coordinators.
In 2021 alone, he threw 40 checkdowns, averaging 5.6 yards per play with a 55% success rate. Those gains forced opponents to reconsider how much space they could surrender underneath.
Mahomes carried that more patient approach into another MVP season in 2022 and consecutive Super Bowl victories following the 2022 and 2023 seasons.
His arm strength hadn’t disappeared, and neither had his willingness to attack downfield. Defensive coordinators simply had another problem to solve.
Yet Mahomes also discovered the danger of becoming too patient. By October 2024, he was discussing situations where his recognition of defensive coverage sometimes discouraged him from attempting throws that were actually available.
His evolution wasn’t about replacing aggressive passing with checkdowns. It was about understanding when the defense had already won the deeper routes.
By 2025, the NFL’s commitment to split-safety coverage had become impossible to ignore.
Next Gen Stats reported that teams used split-safety concepts on 42.0% of pass plays in 2025, up from 40.4% in 2024. Every NFL defense exceeded a 30% usage rate.
Defenses want to eliminate explosive completions without leaving themselves helpless against the run or shorter passes.
Consider a quarterback facing Cover 4.
Both safeties protect deep quarters of the field, while the cornerbacks handle the outside quarters. Three underneath defenders must account for the space closer to the line of scrimmage.
If the offense sends four receivers into routes, somebody must manage a difficult coverage assignment.
Imagine a slot receiver running a shallow cross while the outside receiver pushes vertically. The cornerback gains depth to protect his quarter, and the nearest linebacker must decide whether to carry the crossing route.
A well-timed pass can reach the receiver before the linebacker closes. The throw might travel four yards, but the receiver could gain another six before a safety arrives.
Now the offense faces second-and-short instead of second-and-10.
The key isn’t simply finding an open receiver. Smart quarterbacks identify which defender will arrive first and where that defender can make the tackle.
Against an off-coverage corner, a quick hitch might offer an uncontested catch. But if the cornerback has outside leverage and can drive downhill immediately, the receiver may gain nothing after securing the football.
Change the route to a shallow cross, and the calculation changes.
The receiver can catch the ball while moving laterally across the formation. A linebacker chasing from behind must turn his hips, while a defensive back approaching from depth faces an uncomfortable tackling angle.
A receiver who catches the ball in stride can punish a retreating defender before he gets his feet underneath him.
The same concept works against certain Cover 6 looks, particularly when a quarterback recognizes which side carries quarters responsibilities and which defender must cover the flat.
Still, a two-high alignment doesn’t guarantee zone coverage. Defenses can rotate after the snap, play match-coverage principles or disguise a single-high look.
That’s why throwing short of the sticks requires an actual coverage read. Simply seeing two deep safeties and dumping the ball underneath won’t fool a prepared defense.
Here’s where the argument needs some restraint.
Short passes can win against zone coverage. That doesn’t mean throwing underneath automatically produces better outcomes, particularly on third down.
A quarterback facing third-and-five can afford a completion two yards short if his receiver has a running lane. On third-and-12, that same decision asks the receiver to make several defenders miss.
In a foundational 2019 study published by Sharp Football Analysis, Sports Info Solutions analyst Nate Weller examined how often NFL teams converted third downs based on where the quarterback targeted his receiver.
On third downs requiring four to seven yards, passes short of the marker converted roughly 41% of the time, compared with 51% for throws reaching or crossing the sticks.
Stretch the distance to eight through 12 yards, and the gap becomes much harder to ignore. Short attempts converted about 22% of the time, while throws reaching the marker converted nearly 45%.
The older research established a useful baseline. Throwing underneath can keep a play alive, but asking receivers to manufacture substantial yardage on third-and-long usually leaves the defense with the advantage.
More recent efficiency research reinforces the distinction without making the decision quite so simple.
The Ringer’s 2024 analysis of Pro Football Focus and TruMedia data found that first-down checkdowns generated plus-0.06 expected points added per dropback in its since-2021 sample. Third-down checkdowns produced minus-0.05.
Expected points added measures how much a play changes a team’s expected scoring value.
Those figures describe two different situations. A five-yard checkdown on first-and-10 sets up second-and-five, giving the offense plenty of options. The same completion on third-and-10 likely ends the possession.
But context still matters. A quarterback who checks down because every deeper receiver is covered may be choosing between a small gain, a sack and a dangerous contested throw.
The numbers cannot tell us whether a better option was available on every snap. They do reveal why a designed short route and a last-resort checkdown shouldn’t be treated as the same football decision.
One attacks a weakness the coordinator anticipated. The other gives the quarterback an escape when the primary reads fail.
Both have value. Neither guarantees a first down.
Quarterbacks can make excellent decisions and still watch short completions die immediately. Receivers determine whether those decisions pay off.
A.J. Brown provided one of the NFL’s clearest examples during the 2024 season with Philadelphia.
According to Pro Football Focus, Brown caught 45 of 57 targets traveling one to nine yards downfield, producing 492 receiving yards, fifth-most in the NFL on those throws.
His 97.1 PFF receiving grade on short-area targets ranked first among wide receivers. Brown also generated 31 first downs in that area, placing him among the league’s top five.
The numbers fit what defenders see on film.
Brown can make a five-yard completion feel like a running play. He catches through contact, keeps his legs moving and forces defensive backs to tackle a powerful receiver who already has momentum.
Imagine a cornerback sitting six yards off Brown on third-and-four. The quarterback fires a quick hitch, and Brown catches the football with his shoulders almost square to the defender.
The cornerback has to finish the tackle immediately. Give Brown half a step, and he can drive through contact for the conversion.
Other receivers create the same danger without Brown’s power.
Zay Flowers can take a screen behind the line of scrimmage, hesitate long enough to freeze a defender and explode through the opening.
PFF credited Flowers with 20 catches on 24 behind-the-line targets in 2024. Those plays produced 168 yards, six first downs and seven forced missed tackles.
He averaged 11.6 yards after the catch on those receptions.
Brown can run through a defender’s tackle attempt. Flowers would rather leave the defender reaching for empty air. Different styles, but the same problem for zone coverage.
Of course, the quarterback and intended target only account for part of the design. Sometimes the receiver who never touches the football creates the opening.
Consider a vertical threat like Tyreek Hill running a deep post from the outside. His route can occupy a safety and prevent the cornerback from immediately driving toward an underneath receiver.
Meanwhile, a slot receiver crosses behind the linebackers.
If the quarterback releases the ball on time, the shallow receiver may have room to turn upfield before the safety can rally.
That’s how an offense stretches coverage without necessarily throwing deep. The vertical route creates the room, and the underneath throw takes advantage of it.
A proper blocking angle can improve the result further, especially on screens and quick throws near the sideline.
Miss one block, though, and the entire design can collapse. The receiver catches the ball just as a defensive back arrives, leaving the offense several yards short.
That’s why yards after the catch deserve attention during film study. A box score records the completion, but the tape shows whether the offense manufactured an advantage or relied on somebody beating a difficult tackle.
NFL defensive coordinators aren’t standing still while offenses take easy completions.
They’ve spent years teaching defenders to rally downhill without abandoning their responsibilities deeper in coverage.
The best units make the underneath throw look inviting before closing the space.
A nickelback might align seven yards off the line of scrimmage, showing the slot receiver a comfortable cushion. As the quarterback begins his throwing motion, that defender drives forward.
The ball arrives just as the defender reaches the catch point. What looked like five free yards can turn into a loss.
Other defenses use a safety rotation to bait the same decision. A safety starts deep before buzzing toward an underneath zone, while another defender rotates behind him to protect the vertical route.
The quarterback sees the opening he expected before the snap. By the time he releases the football, the coverage has changed.
Philadelphia demonstrated how disruptive those variations can become under Vic Fangio.
In Super Bowl LIX, the Eagles used multiple coverage approaches to frustrate Mahomes and the Chiefs.
On one early third-down snap, Philadelphia matched Cooper DeJean against Travis Kelce while Reed Blankenship worked as a robber in Cover 1.
Mahomes couldn’t find his preferred target and nearly threw an interception, according to the NFL’s postgame analysis.
That particular snap wasn’t two-high zone coverage. It showed why quarterbacks cannot turn one successful adjustment into a predictable habit.
Kansas City’s short passing options weren’t enough to solve every defensive problem.
The speed of modern linebackers makes the challenge even harder. A defender who can drop into an intermediate window and still close quickly on a checkdown gives the quarterback less useful space.
Nickelbacks who tackle reliably create similar problems.
Defensive coordinators want those players attacking downhill under control, forcing receivers toward pursuit rather than allowing easy cutbacks.
When the defense repeatedly wins those confrontations, the offense must respond.
A coordinator might use a pump fake on the quick out, then send a receiver behind the cornerback who has started anticipating the short throw.
Another solution involves running a double move against a defender who attacks the first route break too aggressively.
The counterpunch keeps the underneath game alive. Without it, throwing short of the sticks becomes exactly what critics complain about: a predictable way to gain a few yards without threatening the defense.
The continued popularity of two-high coverage suggests quarterbacks will face these decisions for years to come.
Next Gen Stats found that offenses converted first downs on just 29.0% of dropbacks against split-safety coverage in 2025, tied for the lowest mark in its tracking sample dating to 2018.
Defenses also combined to produce minus-286.6 EPA while playing split-safety coverage that season, a sharp improvement over their combined results across the previous seven years.
Those numbers show that defenses have become better at protecting deep space without giving away easy scoring opportunities underneath.
Quarterbacks need sharper answers.
Part of that challenge involves knowing when to release the football. Hold a checkdown too long, and the linebacker gains time to recover. Throw it too early, and the quarterback might miss a better opportunity developing behind the coverage.
The best passers understand both risks.
They spot when a linebacker drops too deep or a cornerback surrenders outside leverage. More importantly, they recognize whether the receiver can accelerate before pursuit closes the gap.
That judgment separates taking the profit from wasting a down.
The next adjustment may come from coordinators designing more underneath routes that preserve the receiver’s momentum.
Shallow crosses and running back angle routes can force defenders to change direction before attempting tackles. Carefully timed flat releases can also create advantageous pursuit angles.
But these concepts still need a vertical complement.
When safeties stop respecting the deep ball, they can creep toward the line of scrimmage. Nickelbacks can tighten their cushions, while linebackers begin attacking short routes rather than retreating into coverage.
Suddenly, the quarterback has nowhere profitable to throw.
Mahomes showed how a great passer can accept shorter completions without surrendering his attacking instincts. Brown and Flowers demonstrate why the players catching those passes matter just as much.
Throwing short of the sticks works when the offense has created a genuine advantage after the catch. It fails when the quarterback merely hopes somebody will rescue the play.
The next time a quarterback checks down on third-and-eight, watch the nearest defender before judging the throw.
Does he have a clean angle to the receiver, or must he turn and chase?
That’s where the decision really gets made.
READ MORE: Why running on first down is a statistical trap for trailing NFL offenses
FAQs
Why do NFL quarterbacks throw short of the first-down marker?
Quarterbacks sometimes throw short because defenders have covered the deeper routes. A receiver with room to run can still move the chains.
What is two-high safety coverage in the NFL?
Two-high coverage keeps two safeties deep to protect against long passes. It can leave shorter throws available underneath.
Are checkdowns effective on third down?
Sometimes. A short completion works when the receiver can gain the remaining yards, but third-and-long checkdowns carry a much greater risk of failure.
Why did Patrick Mahomes start throwing more checkdowns?
Defenses increasingly used deep safety coverage to limit Kansas City’s explosive passes. Mahomes adjusted by taking more underneath completions.
How do receivers turn short passes into first downs?
They catch passes in stride, exploit defensive leverage and break tackles. Good route design also gives them room to accelerate.
