Stephen Curry ball screens give Golden State something close to an offensive cheat code. Bring a big man up, force two defenders to make a decision, and Curry can turn one mistake into three points before the weak-side defender even finishes his rotation.Stephen Curry ball screens give Golden State something close to an offensive cheat code. Bring a big man up, force two defenders to make a decision, and Curry can turn one mistake into three points before the weak-side defender even finishes his rotation.
Steve Kerr knows exactly how destructive that action can become. He also knows what the Warriors have spent more than a decade building.
Golden State’s best offenses never asked Curry to pound the ball for 15 seconds while everyone else watched. They made defenses chase him through screens, cuts and handoffs until assignments blurred. Curry could give the ball up, disappear behind Draymond Green, then reappear 28 feet from the basket with a defender already panicking.
Now the roster looks different, Curry is 38, and the margin for wasting good offense has shrunk. That leaves camp with one uncomfortable question: How often should the Warriors lean into Curry pick-and-rolls before their greatest weapon starts changing the offense around it?
The obvious answer is sitting in the tracking data
Golden State does not need a whiteboard argument to prove the Curry screen game works. The production already did that.
NBA.com’s John Schuhmann reported that the Warriors scored 1.13 points per chance when they set a ball screen for Curry last season, the best mark for any player who received at least 500 screens across the league’s 13-season tracking dataset. NBA.com identifies that figure as tracking data, distinct from the Synergy pick-and-roll possession metric used elsewhere in the same rankings.
That efficiency jumps off the page because the full Warriors offense was nowhere near that dominant.
Golden State finished 19th in offensive rating at 113.8 points per 100 possessions during a 37-45 season. The Warriors also led the NBA in 3-point attempt rate, launching 49.7 percent of their shots from deep. Still, all that volume failed to create an elite attack.
Curry changed the math whenever he played. The Warriors went 24-19 in his 43 appearances and scored 117.9 points per 100 possessions with him available, production comparable to a top-five offense.
The case for more Curry pick-and-rolls practically writes itself. The harder part is deciding what “more” should look like.
Curry can hunt without killing the motion
Mismatch hunting usually announces itself. A star points at a defender. A teammate walks over to screen. The defense switches, everyone clears out, and the possession becomes a one-on-one exercise.
Curry does not need that kind of stillness.
He can reject a screen and fire. He can split a trap. He can drag two defenders toward half court, give up the ball and sprint directly into another action. If opponents switch early, Golden State can immediately send Curry away from the ball and make the new matchup survive another round of movement.
That constant threat allows the Warriors to hunt a favorable defender without dragging the offense to a screeching halt. The goal should not be replacing Kerr’s motion principles with endless high pick-and-roll. It should be giving those principles a target.
Find the defender Golden State wants involved. Stress him. Then keep moving.
Porziņģis makes the mismatch harder to escape
This is where Kristaps Porziņģis changes the conversation.
Golden State acquired the 7-foot-2 center from Atlanta at the February 2026 trade deadline, sending Buddy Hield to the Hawks as part of the deal. Porziņģis then appeared in 16 of the Warriors’ final 22 games, including the Play-In.
Putting him into two-man actions with Curry gives defenses two bad answers.
Switch a smaller defender onto Porziņģis and Golden State can throw the ball over the top. Keep the center attached to him and Curry gets room to turn the corner. Blitz Curry and Porziņģis can catch against a scrambling defense with numbers behind the play.
That dual threat turns a simple mismatch into a much nastier problem. It also means Curry does not have to finish every possession himself.
Hunting mismatches can actually save his legs if the second advantage becomes dangerous enough. Porziņģis has to punish guards. Wings have to attack closeouts. The player catching the release pass cannot hesitate while Curry fights through two bodies 30 feet from the rim.
For a 38-year-old superstar, those secondary attacks are not decorative. They are part of the preservation plan.
The short roll still belongs to Draymond, but Lendeborg matters
For years, Draymond Green has given Curry an escape hatch against aggressive coverage.
Trap Curry, and Green slips into open space. Suddenly the Warriors are playing four-on-three. Green can hit the cutter, find the corner shooter or attack the rim before the defense rebuilds its shell.
That read remains essential if Golden State increases its screen-heavy Curry actions. The interesting newcomer is Yaxel Lendeborg.
Golden State selected Lendeborg with the 11th pick of the 2026 NBA Draft after he helped Michigan win the national championship. He averaged 15.1 points, 6.8 rebounds and 3.2 assists during his season with the Wolverines.
Nobody should expect a rookie to become Green in October. That is not the point.
What matters is whether Lendeborg can eventually reproduce pieces of that connective role. If Curry pulls two defenders toward him, someone else must punish the rotation. That might mean Lendeborg catching on the short roll. It might mean Green orchestrating a four-on-three. Either way, the possession needs to end with a layup, a lob or an open corner three before the defense recovers.
That is how a Curry screen becomes a team action instead of a Curry rescue mission.
Butler and Moody injuries raise the stakes immediately
Camp would be complicated enough with a healthy roster. Golden State does not have that luxury.
Jimmy Butler III, acquired at the 2025 trade deadline, tore the ACL in his right knee in January and underwent surgery the following month. His injury ended a season in which Golden State had gone 46-22 in games Butler played after joining the franchise.
Then Moses Moody tore the patellar tendon in his left knee in March, ending his 2025-26 season as well.
Those absences hit this tactical debate directly.
Without Butler’s downhill creation and Moody’s perimeter shooting, opponents can devote more attention to Curry and Porziņģis. Help defenders can squeeze the lane harder. Rotations become shorter. The release valve after a trap becomes easier to cover.
So Golden State may need more Curry pick-and-roll creation precisely when asking Curry to create more carries the greatest physical risk. That is the tightrope Kerr has to walk in October.
Overloading Curry with high-effort creation early in the season carries an obvious cost. He is 38 and managed only 43 games last year. The Warriors cannot ask him to manufacture every bucket himself.
Opponents will hunt right back
There is another problem hiding inside Golden State’s mismatch plan: other teams get to choose targets too.
If the Warriors spend one possession dragging a vulnerable defender into Curry’s orbit, opponents can come back and force Curry or Golden State’s older frontcourt players into repeated defensive actions. That trade becomes dangerous quickly.
Golden State ranked 16th defensively last season at 114.4 points allowed per 100 possessions. That was not catastrophic, but it leaves Kerr little room for one-way combinations that score beautifully and bleed points at the other end.
Imagine the pressure against downhill scorers such as Shai Gilgeous-Alexander or Anthony Edwards. A lineup featuring Curry, Porziņģis and another older big cannot casually concede straight-line drives and expect the offense to erase everything.
That makes Green’s versatility vital. It also makes the surrounding guards and wings more important than their box scores suggest. Every lineup built to maximize Curry’s screening game needs enough defense to survive the possession coming back the other way.
Otherwise, Golden State is not hunting mismatches. It is trading them.
Camp needs to build a hierarchy, not a new identity
Kerr does not have to choose between old-school Warriors basketball and becoming a conventional pick-and-roll team. The better answer sits somewhere in between.
Start with movement. Make defenders chase Curry through traffic. Force switches and communication mistakes. Once the defense reveals the weakest link, go after it immediately.
At other points, reverse the sequence. Open with a Curry-Porziņģis screen. Force the defense to show its coverage. If two defenders jump Curry, get off the ball and attack the four-on-three. If they switch, punish the matchup. If they survive the initial action, flow straight into the movement offense before everyone resets.
As the game wears on and opponents adjust, Kerr can keep changing the entry point without changing the underlying principles. That is the real opportunity.
The Warriors already know Stephen Curry ball screens can produce elite offense. What they have not proven is that the rest of this roster can consistently punish everything those screens create.
Porziņģis changes the size equation. Green still owns the short roll. Lendeborg brings another potential connector. Butler and Moody leave enormous holes while they recover. Through all of it, Curry remains the pressure point.
Golden State opens the 2026-27 season against the Lakers on October 21, so Kerr will not have months to solve the puzzle once camp begins.
The Warriors do not need to abandon the offense that helped build a dynasty. They need to make it meaner. Curry’s ball-screen game should not become Golden State’s entire identity. It should become the weapon everyone in the building knows how to use, and exactly when to use it.
READ ALSO: The Warriors’ 2026-27 Season Hinges on Fixing Their Late-Game Execution
FAQs
Why are Stephen Curry ball screens so effective?
Curry forces defenders to choose between switching, trapping or giving him space. Golden State scored 1.13 points per chance when screening for him last season.
Why could Kristaps Porziņģis help Stephen Curry?
Porziņģis can punish smaller defenders after switches while also pulling big men away from Curry. That gives Golden State more ways to attack the same coverage.
Why don’t the Warriors run Curry pick-and-roll every possession?
Too much pick-and-roll could make Golden State predictable and increase Curry’s workload. Kerr still wants movement, cutting and off-ball actions around him.
What role does Draymond Green play in Curry ball screens?
Green can catch on the short roll when defenses trap Curry. From there, he can attack a four-on-three and find cutters or open shooters.
When do the Warriors open the 2026-27 season?
Golden State opens the season against the Lakers on October 21.
Tracking stats and settling debates. If there is a scoreboard, I am watching it.
