Houston’s second-unit offense became impossible to dismiss when the Rockets’ season ended with a 98-78 thud against the Lakers. The shots did not simply miss. Possessions tightened, driving lanes vanished, and Houston shot 35 percent from the floor as Los Angeles closed the first-round series in six games.
That ugly finish exposed something deeper than poor shooting. When Houston lost its steadying creators, too many possessions turned into improvisation. The Rockets could rebound, defend and overwhelm opponents physically, but somebody still had to organize the offense once the first action failed.
The roster now looks much different. Fred VanVleet expects to return after missing last season with a torn ACL, while Houston added Marcus Smart and Bogdan Bogdanović to a group already featuring Reed Sheppard, Amen Thompson, Alperen Şengün and Kevin Durant. The talent has arrived, but Ime Udoka still must decide who controls the bench offense when his preferred creators sit.
Houston fixed the roster before defining the roles
The Rockets did plenty well last season. They won 52 games and finished eighth in offensive rating at 118.6 points per 100 possessions. Houston also built one of the league’s better defenses, giving Udoka a team capable of surviving ugly nights.
Those numbers explain why Houston does not need to redesign everything. Its larger concern sits inside the rotation, where injuries repeatedly disrupted the offensive hierarchy.
VanVleet missed the entire season. Steven Adams went down in January, while Durant played only once during Houston’s six-game playoff series. Without those steadying veterans, Udoka had to throw younger players into larger creation roles before the roster had built a dependable backup structure.
Rafael Stone acknowledged the issue after the season. Houston’s general manager identified ballhandling, passing and decision-making among the areas that needed improvement. The Rockets then brought in Smart and Bogdanović, giving Udoka more ways to organize reserve possessions. The shortage of capable ballhandlers has disappeared. Camp must determine how those players fit together.
Reed Sheppard has earned more control
No player makes Houston’s bench question more interesting than Reed Sheppard.
His second season delivered the leap Houston hoped for after drafting him third overall in 2024. Sheppard averaged 13.5 points and 3.4 assists while shooting 39.4 percent from three. Those numbers confirmed the jumper. His next step requires something harder: controlling the shape of an NBA possession.
Sheppard changes the floor when he attacks first
Sheppard looks different when he receives the ball with permission to create. A high screen forces defenders to respect his pull-up jumper. When the opposing big steps higher, Sheppard can reach the lane, find the roller or move the ball toward a defense already scrambling. Houston suddenly starts its second action against movement instead of five defenders standing comfortably in position.
That is where his growth matters most. Young guards often get boxed into whatever skill translates first. Sheppard shoots, so the easy solution would be parking him off the ball beside established creators. Yet Houston needs to learn whether his future extends beyond spacing the floor.
Can he eventually run this team? Stone has already discussed Sheppard as a potential future starting point guard. Training camp gives Houston an ideal setting to test that projection before injuries or playoff pressure force another emergency experiment.
The meaningful questions go beyond his scoring average. Can Sheppard reject a screen when defenders cheat over the top? Can he draw help and find the weak-side corner? After an opponent strings together eight unanswered points, can he slow the game down without surrendering his aggression? Those possessions will reveal far more than another year of catch-and-shoot threes.
Bogdanović gives the bench another layer
Bogdanović addresses a different problem. He does not need to dribble for twelve seconds to influence a possession. He can sprint off a down-screen, attack a hard closeout, make the extra swing pass or relocate when the defense collapses toward the paint.
That versatility matters because reserve offenses often die after the first action gets contained. A pick-and-roll stalls, the point guard backs out, everyone resets, and suddenly six seconds remain on the shot clock. Bogdanović can keep that sequence moving.
Beside Sheppard, he gives Houston a natural secondary decision-maker. Sheppard can bend the first defender, move the ball and trust Bogdanović to attack the next rotation instead of simply catching and waiting for another reset. That could improve second-unit scoring more than adding another player who needs high usage.
Houston does not need every reserve to become a primary creator. It needs enough connected passers and shooters to ensure one failed action does not kill the entire possession.
Marcus Smart can settle the ugly stretches
Smart brings another kind of value. Houston signed the former Defensive Player of the Year after a season in which he averaged 9.3 points and three assists with the Lakers. His 33.1 percent mark from deep creates a real spacing concern, especially when he shares the floor with limited perimeter shooters such as Thompson or Şengün.
Still, evaluating Smart only through his jumper misses why he can help this particular team.
Imagine an opponent has ripped off a 10-0 run. Houston faces full-court pressure, Sheppard committed a turnover on the previous trip, and the home crowd has suddenly found its voice. The Rockets do not necessarily need a spectacular play. They need a clean one, and Smart can get the ball across half court, call the set, deliver an entry pass and put everyone back where they belong.
He does not need to dominate possession to matter. His job can be as simple as keeping a young reserve group from playing faster than it can think. Those minutes rarely produce highlights, but they can still decide games.
Şengün can make playmaking a shared job
The cleanest solution may involve rejecting the idea that one backup guard must solve everything.
Udoka can stagger his starters, and Alperen Şengün offers perhaps the most natural bridge between units. Houston can run offense through him at the elbow or on the block while surrounding him with Sheppard, Bogdanović and active cutters. The geometry changes immediately because every defender must account for Şengün’s scoring and passing at the same time.
Sheppard no longer carries the burden of creating every advantage off the dribble. Bogdanović can curl around a handoff, while a cutter can punish any defender caught staring at Şengün. Houston already understands how to play through its center, so extending that structure into reserve-heavy stretches would create continuity without forcing the coaching staff to install an entirely different offensive identity.
It would also make the bench easier to organize. Instead of asking five reserves to manufacture points from scratch, Udoka can build mixed units around one established offensive hub. That allows Houston to preserve the principles of its starting offense while changing the personnel around them.
Amen Thompson can change the pace
Not every bench stretch needs to become a half-court puzzle.
Amen Thompson gives Houston the option to attack before an opponent gets organized. A defensive rebound can become an immediate push, with Thompson attacking the paint while Sheppard trails toward the arc and another runner fills the opposite lane. Few reserve units want to deal with that speed.
The approach also gives Udoka a useful counter against opponents that load their benches with slower veterans. Houston can turn length, rebounding and athleticism into early-clock offense before defensive matchups settle.
However, transition opportunities disappear more frequently in playoff basketball. Opponents sprint back, games slow down, and after timeouts every defender knows exactly where he belongs. That is when Houston’s reserve playmaking must hold up and produce a good shot against an organized defense.
Camp should establish a hierarchy
Houston’s offseason deserves credit because management attacked a visible weakness.
Smart adds another dependable ballhandler. Bogdanović supplies shooting and secondary creation. VanVleet’s expected return restores the veteran point guard Houston planned to build around before his knee injury erased an entire season. Meanwhile, Sheppard enters Year 3 with a genuine opportunity to claim more responsibility.
Yet depth creates problems when everybody’s role remains vague. One possession starts with Sheppard. The next belongs to Smart. Thompson walks the ball up after that, Bogdanović never touches it, and Şengün finally receives the ball with eight seconds remaining. No individual decision looks disastrous, but the lineup never develops rhythm.
Training camp can prevent that. Udoka does not need a rigid October depth chart, but he does need to establish who initiates each reserve-heavy group, who becomes the secondary creator, and which starter stays on the floor to anchor the offense. For Houston’s bench, clarity may matter almost as much as talent.
Houston cannot spend another season searching for answers
The stakes around this team have changed.
A 52-win season no longer serves as proof that the rebuild worked. Houston now has Durant, a more experienced young core and a deeper collection of guards. The Rockets enter this season with expectations built around playing deep into May, which raises the standard for their second unit.
Sheppard should receive legitimate on-ball opportunities because Houston needs to discover how much offense he can eventually control. Smart can settle possessions when pressure starts rattling the younger guards. Bogdanović keeps actions alive, while Şengün and Thompson give Udoka two completely different ways to anchor reserve-heavy lineups.
None of this requires reinventing Houston basketball. It requires definition.
Last spring, the Rockets reached their final game and scored 78 points. Los Angeles closed driving lanes, Houston’s possessions became increasingly cramped, and every difficult shot seemed to make the next trip feel even heavier. The Rockets spent the summer gathering solutions, and now Houston’s bench offense has to become something more concrete before camp ends.
Udoka has enough shooting, passing, experience and young talent to build a second unit that can create rather than merely survive. The question is no longer whether Houston has enough pieces. It is whether those pieces know exactly what to do when the starters sit.
READ ALSO: Half-Court Spacing Will Define the Rockets in 2026-27
FAQs
Who could run the Rockets bench offense this season?
Reed Sheppard could receive more creation opportunities, while Marcus Smart and Bogdan Bogdanović give Ime Udoka experienced alternatives when the starters sit.
What role could Reed Sheppard have for Houston?
Houston can give Sheppard more on-ball work and test whether his shooting, handle and passing can eventually translate into a larger point-guard role.
How can Marcus Smart help the Rockets second unit?
Smart can organize possessions, handle pressure and settle Houston when younger guards start rushing. He does not need heavy scoring volume to help.
Why could Alperen Şengün play with Houston’s reserves?
Şengün can anchor reserve-heavy lineups as a passer and scorer, reducing the pressure on Houston’s backup guards to create every half-court advantage.
How does Fred VanVleet’s return help Houston’s bench?
VanVleet restores an experienced lead guard and gives Udoka greater freedom to stagger his creators instead of asking the second unit to operate alone.
Tracking stats and settling debates. If there is a scoreboard, I am watching it.
