The pick-and-pop puts Karl-Anthony Towns and Jalen Brunson at the center of a miserable defensive choice: protect the paint or follow the shooter. Brunson snakes around the screen, keeping his defender behind him. Towns steps toward the arc, hands ready, while the opposing center tries to watch both of them.
One backward step can cause the jumper to surrender. A step toward Towns can give Brunson room to work inside.
For a defense, the frustration comes from doing something sensible and still conceding an advantage. Protecting the basket usually makes sense. Against a shooting center, that instinct can leave an open three waiting behind the play.
The most dangerous big men stretch that dilemma beyond the first pass. Some punish a late closeout with a drive. Others find the cutter slipping behind the help.
That distinction separates perimeter shooting from perimeter value. As the NBA approaches the 2026–27 season, the question reaches beyond who makes the most threes: which centers force opponents to abandon the coverage they wanted to play?
The damage starts before the catch
A shooting percentage tells you whether the ball went through the net. It cannot tell you how far the opposing center traveled to contest it, or what opened behind him.
That matters when comparing these players. Towns threatens a defense differently from Nikola Jokić, while Myles Turner and Naz Reid bring different answers to the same hurried closeout.
There is also a specific limitation in the public numbers. NBA.com’s Synergy-based analysis notes that its roll-man possessions include pick-and-pop situations, combining movements toward the basket and away from it. Full-season three-point percentages cover an even wider range of shots.
The figures below describe each player’s 2025–26 regular-season shooting, rather than establish a standalone pick-and-pop leaderboard. The basketball argument rests on what each player can do when the defense reacts.
Towns forces the center to leave home
Brunson’s patience makes the escape dangerous
The Towns–Brunson pairing puts pressure on the defender closest to the basket. Brunson can hold that defender’s attention with his dribble while Towns moves into shooting space.
According to StatMuse’s season figures for Towns, he shot 36.8% from three on 4.1 attempts per game during the 2025–26 regular season. That gives the defender a credible reason to leave the lane, even before the pass arrives.
The pick-and-pop becomes especially uncomfortable when Brunson delays the pass long enough to pull the center forward. Towns then receives the ball against a defender trying to reverse direction.
A clean catch gives him the jumper. An uncontrolled closeout offers something else: a route into the paint against an opponent whose weight already leans the wrong way.
The distinction sounds small until the help arrives. When a wing steps inside to stop Towns, the ball can move toward the shooter that wing abandoned. New York can turn one defender’s recovery into another defender’s emergency.
Switching offers an answer, but it requires execution. A smaller player taking Towns must hold his ground while the center handles Brunson outside.
Timing decides whether that exchange survives. If Towns catches and attacks before the defense resets, his size can punish the matchup immediately. Hesitate, and the opponent gains time to restore its preferred assignments.
His shooting creates the chase; his next move determines the damage.
Jokić turns the perimeter into a passing station
Murray gets more than a shooting partner
With Jokić, the defender rushing toward the arc must also watch the players moving behind him. Contesting the jumper can expose a cut. Holding position can give Jokić time to shoot.
StatMuse’s 2025–26 figures for Jokić list 38.0% three-point shooting on 4.5 attempts per game, alongside 10.7 assists per game. Those numbers capture the shooting and passing threats a defense must consider together.
A Jamal Murray–Jokić pick-and-pop can therefore continue long after the original screen. Murray draws the help and sends the ball back. Jokić catches outside, where he can shoot, deliver a pass, or bring Murray into another handoff.
The defense has barely finished its first rotation when another action begins.
Watch the recovery rather than the release. If Jokić’s defender sprints outward, a cutter can attack the space behind him. Should a wing pinch toward that cutter, Jokić can look for the perimeter opening.
These possibilities do not guarantee a basket. They do make a reckless closeout expensive.
His passing also changes the value of a shooting opportunity he declines. A center returning the ball without an advantage lets the defense breathe. Jokić can move it somewhere that forces another rotation.
For Denver, the perimeter catch can preserve the pressure Murray created. The possession keeps moving, and the opponent keeps chasing.
Turner makes leaving the lane expensive
Myles Turner joined the Bucks in July 2025 after spending his first 10 NBA seasons with Indiana. The Associated Press reported the move that summer.
During the ensuing 2025–26 regular season, Turner made 147 threes, shooting 38.3% on 5.4 attempts per game, according to StatMuse’s shooting totals. His perimeter contribution depended on volume as well as accuracy.
That willingness matters. A center who catches outside and repeatedly passes up open shots allows his defender to drift back toward the basket.
Turner’s pick-and-pop threat asks that defender to stay engaged. Both feet settle behind the line, the pass reaches his hands, and the closeout must begin.
Milwaukee’s 2025–26 pairing with Giannis Antetokounmpo illustrated the appeal. Antetokounmpo attacking the paint demands bodies near the rim. Turner moving outside gives the opposing center a reason to leave it.
The goal is simple: drag the rim protector out of the paint.
Defenses can choose to concede the jumper. Living with that choice becomes harder when Turner takes the shot without hesitation.
His value does not require every catch to become a complicated sequence. Sometimes the useful contribution is delivering exactly the punishment the coverage invited.
Reid attacks the defender who arrives late
Naz Reid offers a different response when an opponent takes away the clean jumper. Watch the closeout’s final step: a defender leaning toward Reid’s shooting hand can leave his own hip exposed.
Reid can put the ball on the floor and attack that angle.
According to StatMuse’s season figures for Reid, he made 162 threes during the 2025–26 regular season with Minnesota. He shot 36.2% on 5.8 attempts per game, carrying that workload in 26.1 minutes a night.
The volume supplies the first threat. His handle supplies the next.
In a screening action with Anthony Edwards, Reid’s movement outside can stretch a defense already concerned about Edwards reaching the rim. The recovery toward Reid then has to accomplish two jobs: contest the shot and prevent the drive.
A frantic sprint may handle the first while failing at the second. Reid can use a shot fake, attack the approaching defender, and force help from another part of the floor.
That makes his pick-and-pop value relevant even when the original attempt disappears. The possession can survive the closeout instead of dissolving into a reset.
Spacing still matters. A teammate standing in Reid’s driving path can bring help directly into the play.
Give him room, though, and stopping the jumper becomes only the beginning of the defensive assignment.
Wembanyama keeps both exits open
Victor Wembanyama presents a different kind of discomfort. Follow him toward the arc too aggressively, and the same screening action can send him toward the rim.
The defender must prepare for a jumper and a lob without surrendering either route too early.
StatMuse’s 2025–26 shooting figures record 34.9% three-point shooting on 5.5 attempts per game for Wembanyama. His accuracy trailed the other players discussed here, which makes shot selection part of the argument.
His postseason supplied a concrete example. Reuters reported 32 points from Wembanyama in San Antonio’s 115–111 victory at New York in Game 3 of the 2026 Finals. NBA.com’s John Schuhmann identified an open pick-and-pop jumper created by San Antonio’s adjusted spacing in that game.
The broader tactical lesson follows from those competing destinations. A defense cannot judge his perimeter movement independently of the threat above the basket.
For a partner such as De’Aaron Fox, that creates options. If Wembanyama’s defender steps toward the ball, the pass back outside becomes available. Crowding the perimeter exit can make a roll more attractive.
The best outcome need not involve Wembanyama taking another three. His pick-and-pop threat can help create the conditions for a better shot elsewhere.
The next season will test the second move
The revealing possession in 2026–27 may begin with a defender successfully taking away the jumper. A hand reaches the shooting window, the center holds the ball, and the offense has to answer.
That is where these players separate.
Towns can attack before the closeout regains its balance. Jokić can locate the cutter whose defender turned toward the ball. Turner needs to keep taking the available shot, while Reid can drive through a recovery that arrives too fast.
Wembanyama’s next choice may send him back toward the rim.
For coaches, the useful question concerns the entire possession. Did the screen force help? Did the pass reach the shooter before the defense recovered? When the jumper disappeared, did the offense retain an advantage?
Pick-and-pop value lives in those details. Made threes supply visible evidence, but a guard finishing against an empty lane can reveal the same pressure.
The film deserves attention to the defender without the ball. Watch the opposing center leave the paint, then follow the teammate who covers for him. Somewhere along that rotation, another offensive player gains room.
A shooting big man must do enough to keep that movement happening. Hesitation lets the defense return home; a quick shot, drive, or pass can keep it scrambling.
The next time Towns steps away from Brunson’s screen, watch the rim protector’s first step. Which scorer does he decide to leave?
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FAQs
What Is a Pick-and-Pop in Basketball?
A big man sets a screen, then moves into shooting space instead of rolling toward the basket. The ball handler can pass back for a jumper.
Why Does the Pick-and-Pop Create Space?
A shooting center can pull the rim protector away from the basket. That movement opens driving lanes and forces other defenders to help.
Which NBA Big Men Does This Article Analyze?
The article examines Karl-Anthony Towns, Nikola Jokić, Myles Turner, Naz Reid, and Victor Wembanyama. Each threatens defenses differently after setting a screen.
Do Three-Point Percentages Measure Pick-and-Pop Efficiency?
Season percentages include many kinds of three-point attempts. They establish shooting credibility but cannot isolate a player’s efficiency on pick-and-pop possessions.
What Makes Nikola Jokić Dangerous After a Pick-and-Pop?
Jokić can shoot, find a cutter, or start another handoff. His passing keeps the offense moving after defenders close toward him.
