The Knicks mismatch hunting offense could look almost cruel when Jalen Brunson found the defender he wanted. One screen brought a slower big toward the perimeter. Another forced two defenders to communicate while Brunson changed gears, slipped into a seam and made the next decision before either could recover.
Last June, those possessions helped end a 53-year championship drought.
New York beat San Antonio in five games to win the 2026 NBA Finals. Brunson closed the series with 45 points in Game 5 and took home Finals MVP, while Mike Brown completed his first season as Knicks coach with a championship. NBA.com chronicled both accomplishments during a postseason that transformed New York from contender into defending champion.
Now the picture changes.
Every serious opponent has months of film showing how New York hunted switches, involved Victor Wembanyama in screening actions and punished the rotations that followed.
The weapon still works. The surprise does not.
That makes training camp less about inventing another offense and more about disguising the one that already won.
The title run revealed New York’s pressure points
Brown inherited a team that had reached the Eastern Conference finals under Tom Thibodeau. His mandate carried little ambiguity. New York had already become good enough to contend. The new coach had to push it further.
He did.
The Knicks finished 53-29, earned the East’s third seed and produced one of the NBA’s most efficient offenses. Basketball Reference lists New York with a 119.8 offensive rating while playing at a relatively slow pace of 96.8 possessions per 48 minutes.
Those numbers tell an important story.
New York did not need constant transition chaos to score. The Knicks could enter the half court, identify a vulnerable matchup and begin pulling at it.
Brunson drove that approach.
He averaged 26.0 points and 6.8 assists during the regular season, according to Basketball Reference. Karl-Anthony Towns added 20.1 points and 11.9 rebounds, giving Brown a second star capable of punishing switches in a completely different way.
One attacked space with balance and footwork.
The other changed the size of the matchup itself.
Together, they made ordinary pick-and-roll decisions uncomfortable. By June, those uncomfortable decisions had become the foundation of New York’s best offense.
Game 4 showed how vicious the hunt could become
The clearest example came with the season hanging in the balance.
New York fell behind San Antonio by 29 points during Game 4 of the Finals. The Spurs controlled the floor. Wembanyama protected the paint. Madison Square Garden had watched a championship-caliber team suddenly look trapped.
Then New York dragged him away from safety.
NBA.com’s John Schuhmann tracked how often Brunson used a screen from the player Wembanyama guarded. Through the first three games, those actions produced only 0.73 points per chance.
Game 4 turned the matchup upside down.
The Knicks generated 34 points on 23 such chances, or 1.48 points per opportunity. They kept returning to the action while scoring 32 points over their final 18 possessions.
The comeback became the largest in NBA Finals history. OG Anunoby finished it by tipping in Brunson’s miss with 1.2 seconds left for a 107-106 victory.
Yet the most revealing part was not simply that Brunson attacked Wembanyama.
It was what happened once San Antonio reacted.
The switch should start the possession, not finish it
Fans often reduce mismatch hunting to a simple command: find the weakest defender and attack.
New York’s championship version carried more layers.
During one crucial Game 4 possession, Jose Alvarado brought Wembanyama into an action with Brunson. San Antonio reacted quickly. Stephon Castle jumped toward the ball while the rest of the Spurs began shifting behind him.
Brunson did not force a shot.
He gave the ball up.
Towns moved it to Alvarado, who drove into the opening. As San Antonio collapsed toward the paint, Anunoby stood alone in the opposite corner.
The ball found him.
So did the three.
NBA.com’s Finals film study highlighted that possession while examining how Brunson’s willingness to challenge Wembanyama created openings elsewhere. The same analysis found Anunoby shot 12-for-19 from the corners during the Finals.
That sequence gets to the heart of New York’s next offensive step.
The matchup itself does not have to produce the basket. It needs to make the defense move. Once two defenders react to one player, the Knicks should already be attacking somewhere else.
Anunoby became one of the biggest beneficiaries of that chain reaction.
Anunoby made every extra rotation dangerous
Anunoby spent much of the Finals occupying the spaces Brunson created.
Leave him home and Brunson gained another route toward the lane. Help off him and the punishment could arrive immediately.
That tension reached its loudest point during the Game 4 comeback. Brunson’s long three missed in the final seconds, but Anunoby had already crashed from the weak side. He rose through the traffic and redirected the ball through the rim with 1.2 seconds remaining.
One play captured the entire idea.
Brunson commanded the defense. Anunoby attacked what that attention left behind.
His perimeter shooting made the choice even more painful. The 12 corner threes he hit during the Finals rewarded New York for keeping the floor wide while Brunson manipulated defenders near the ball.
Mikal Bridges creates a similar problem.
Turn toward Brunson and Bridges can slice behind the defense. Close out too aggressively and he can put the ball down without stopping the possession. Josh Hart adds another source of movement through baseline cuts, offensive rebounds and sudden dives into empty space.
Those actions matter because they prevent the matchup hunt from becoming a two-man exercise.
But spacing and cutting solve only part of the problem. Once opponents start taking Brunson’s preferred matchups away before they develop, New York needs someone else capable of starting the entire chain.
That is where Towns becomes crucial.
Towns can change where the pressure begins
Towns gives Brown the cleanest way to punish defenses that load up early against Brunson.
Instead of asking which defender Brunson should hunt, New York can flip the possession.
Give Towns the ball.
A smaller defender cannot comfortably handle him near the paint. Keeping a center attached to Towns leaves that big unavailable for another assignment. Sending help toward the post creates openings around the perimeter.
His passing makes the problem even harder.
Brown increasingly trusted Towns to create during the title run rather than simply screen and finish. That allows the Knicks to initiate through him at the elbow, move Brunson away from the ball and force defenders to communicate before the usual pick-and-roll even begins.
Now the geometry changes.
Brunson can curl back toward the ball. Bridges can cut behind a defender whose eyes drift toward Towns. Anunoby can stay planted in the corner. Hart can dive through the lane.
Towns can also keep it himself.
The defense no longer knows which action New York is actually trying to reach.
That uncertainty matters more now than it did last October because opponents no longer need a playoff series to discover New York’s favorite pressure points. They already know them.
Still, asking Towns to handle every alternative possession would simply replace one predictable starting point with another.
Brown has another option.
Alvarado lets Brunson enter the action late
Jose Alvarado offers something different from both stars.
New York acquired the Brooklyn native from New Orleans at the February trade deadline. After he became part of the championship rotation, the Knicks brought him back on a three-year deal during the offseason.
His fourth quarter in Game 4 showed why the fit works.
Alvarado scored eight points and handed out three assists while spending much of the comeback beside Brunson. More importantly, he gave Brown another ballhandler who could start an action, attack a tilted floor or bring a specific defender into a screen.
For a few seconds, Brunson could disappear.
That matters more than it sounds.
A defense feels comfortable when it can stare at the same creator for 15 seconds and load every decision toward him. Brunson becomes more dangerous when he receives the ball only after somebody else has already forced the defense to shift.
Towns can create that first movement with size and passing.
Alvarado can produce it with pace.
Then Brunson catches the ball against defenders trying to recover rather than defenders waiting for him.
That is the broader objective behind all three wrinkles. New York does not need to remove Brunson from the center of its offense. It needs to make his arrival less predictable.
The danger begins when perfect becomes the enemy
Mismatch hunting can become addictive.
A team finds one favorable matchup. The opponent pre-switches before the screen arrives. Another screener approaches. Then another.
Six seconds disappear.
Then ten.
By the time Brunson finally gets the defender New York wanted, the possession has turned into an isolation against the shot clock.
Brunson can survive there. He built his reputation on difficult late-possession baskets.
That does not mean the Knicks should live there.
Slow possessions can reduce Towns to a screen setter. Bridges becomes a spectator. Hart loses cutting lanes because nobody moves. Anunoby waits for a kickout that may never arrive.
The offense stops creating pressure and starts waiting for Brunson to rescue it.
Brown spent the championship run preaching something different. NBA.com’s review of New York’s title run highlighted quicker entry into actions and more immediate ball movement as central pieces of the offense.
That should remain the standard.
Find the matchup. Force the response. Then keep playing.
The best possessions may begin with Brunson, Towns or Alvarado. What matters is that they do not stall once the first advantage appears.
Training camp should make New York harder to read
The Knicks enter camp carrying something they did not possess a year ago: proof.
They know Brunson can control a Finals. Towns can create beyond scoring. Anunoby has shown how severely he can punish a defense once it begins tilting toward the ball. Alvarado gives Brown another handler, while Bridges and Hart provide the movement that can turn one defensive mistake into two.
New York also knows the Knicks mismatch hunting offense can survive the highest level of postseason pressure.
The problem is that everyone else knows it too.
Teams will pre-switch before Brunson gets the defender he wants. Some will blitz him early and trust the rotation behind the play. Others will keep their centers closer to the paint and dare another Knick to create.
Brown does not need to answer those ideas with a new playbook.
He needs uncertainty.
Sometimes Towns should initiate before Brunson touches the ball. On another possession, Alvarado can become the screener. Bridges can slip behind a defender expecting the usual action. Hart can cut through the lane before the screen arrives. Anunoby can stay frozen in the corner until one nervous helper takes a step too far.
Then comes Brunson.
That is where all these pieces connect.
The champion Knicks already know how to locate the weakest part of a defense. Their next challenge is reaching that weak point through different doors, with different players creating the first crack.
Last June, New York won by forcing teams into bad choices.
This season will test whether the Knicks can make those choices feel unfamiliar all over again.
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FAQs
Why do the Knicks hunt mismatches?
New York uses screens to force favorable defenders onto Brunson or Towns. The goal is often to create a rotation rather than force an immediate shot.
How did the Knicks attack Victor Wembanyama in Game 4?
They repeatedly brought Wembanyama into Brunson’s ball-screen actions. New York scored 34 points on 23 such chances during its historic comeback.
What can Karl-Anthony Towns add to the Knicks offense?
Towns can initiate from the elbow, punish smaller defenders and find cutters. His passing gives New York another way to start possessions.
Why is Jose Alvarado important next to Jalen Brunson?
Alvarado gives New York another ballhandler. He can start actions and let Brunson attack after the defense has already shifted.
What is the Knicks’ biggest offensive challenge this season?
They must keep their championship offense unpredictable. Faster decisions, more movement and different initiators can make familiar actions harder for defenses to anticipate.
