The Seattle Mariners two-strike approach has become a problem because too many at-bats end on pitches that never needed to be hit. Baseball Savant has Seattle chasing 32.1 percent of pitches outside the strike zone, above MLB’s 30.4 percent rate. However, the Mariners also own an 81.6 percent zone-contact rate, compared with the league’s 83.9 percent mark. Their 26.4 percent whiff rate, however, sits above the 25.1 percent MLB average.
Those gaps look manageable until a pitcher reaches 0-2. In that moment, the count changes the geometry of an at-bat. A starter who knows Seattle will expand can bury a slider below the knees or elevate a fastball above the hands, and he no longer needs the middle.
Los Angeles supplied the clearest warning from July 28 through July 30. Seattle won the opener 7-6 behind five home runs, then scored only four runs across the final two games. At the time, the contrast was obvious: the Mariners punished mistakes in Game 1, then struggled when Dodgers pitchers controlled the edges. If Seattle sees Los Angeles again in October, the Seattle Mariners two-strike approach has to look different.
Why the Seattle Mariners Two-Strike Approach Breaks Under Leverage
Yet still, Seattle does not need to preach patience for patience’s sake. The offense, however, needs a sharper plan after strike two.
Julio Rodríguez shows why. His 39.8 percent chase rate sits more than 11 percentage points above the MLB figure on his Baseball Savant page, putting him in the sixth percentile for chase rate. Despite the pressure, his 26.8 percent whiff rate remains much closer to league average because his bat-to-ball ability can rescue bad decisions.
Rodríguez, then, does not have a pure contact problem; he has a selection problem. However, Seattle should not turn him into a contact-first hitter once he reaches two strikes. That would blunt the bat speed and barrel control that make him dangerous. Instead, the coaching target should be pitch depth, especially on sliders beneath the zone and fastballs above his hands.
In that moment, taking one chase pitch can reset the plate appearance. A 1-2 count becomes 2-2, and another miss forces a full count. Before long, the pitcher must choose between challenging Rodríguez and putting him on base.
That is the point of a better Seattle Mariners two-strike approach. Make the pitcher return to a hittable area instead of helping him avoid it.
Rodríguez and Raleigh Need a Different Plan Than Naylor and Young
The roster does not need one swing fix. However, Cal Raleigh owns a different version of the same problem. Baseball Savant lists his 36.5 percent chase rate in the 15th percentile, his 31.3 percent whiff rate in the 14th percentile and his strikeout rate in the fifth percentile. Yet still, Raleigh carries a 13.1 percent barrel rate, so the power remains when he gets a pitch he can drive.
That contact loss gives Seattle a clear instruction: do not shrink the swing, shrink the target. Four-seam fastballs have been especially difficult, with Raleigh hitting .110 against them in 2026. His 30.9 percent whiff rate and 33.1 percent strikeout rate against the pitch explain why. However, a four-seamer that leaks over the plate can still become damage because his barrel rate remains strong.
Rodríguez presents the inverse. Through 466 plate appearances, he has 18 home runs, a .258 average and a .424 slugging percentage. His .351 expected wOBA, however, also sits above his actual .326 mark. Yet still, the 39.8 percent chase rate remains the obvious leak in an otherwise dangerous profile.
On the other hand, Josh Naylor and Cole Young offer useful internal models. Naylor owns an 89.3 percent zone-contact rate with only a 17.7 percent whiff rate, while Young sits at 86.8 percent zone contact and 18.6 percent whiffs. Both beat Seattle’s team marks by a wide margin. Consequently, the Seattle Mariners two-strike approach should give each hitter a specific plan rather than a generic order to protect.
How the Dodgers Exposed the Mariners’ Two-Strike Approach
Seattle opened the July series by doing exactly what this lineup wants. The Mariners hit five home runs in a 7-6 victory, including two from Dominic Canzone and one from Rodríguez. At the time, power covered almost everything.
One night later, Eric Lauer changed the terms with six scoreless innings in a 4-2 Dodgers win. Suddenly, Seattle had to win plate appearances without waiting for another mistake in the middle. Sasaki made the lesson even sharper in the finale, when MLB credited him with 18 swings and misses, including nine on his splitter. Four of his seven strikeouts came on that pitch as Los Angeles won 6-2.
Despite the pressure Seattle tried to create, Sasaki’s splitter kept starting in a hittable window before falling below the barrels. That is exactly where poor two-strike decisions get punished. Pitchers, however, thrive when hitters swing defensively at fringe pitches without recognizing spin.
Finally, Edwin Díaz struck out Rodríguez to close the game. Díaz’s appearance fits the 2026 roster: MLB lists both him and Sasaki on the Dodgers’ current 40-man roster. Since the Seattle series, Los Angeles has also added Tarik Skubal, who joined the club in an August trade. However, that finale turned the Dodgers from a hypothetical warning into a completed scouting report.
Seattle’s four-game losing streak in early August made the warning harder to dismiss. Reuters reported that the Mariners scored just four total runs during the skid, which ended with a 4-1 loss to Tampa Bay on August 9. However, the useful connection is not the opponent; it is what happens when home runs stop carrying the offense.
In those games, Seattle needs eight-pitch walks, hard fouls on quality strikes and enough discipline to reach middle relief by the fifth or sixth inning. Before long, those extra pitches can turn a comfortable starter into a bullpen decision. That is where the Seattle Mariners two-strike approach can create runs without asking the roster to become something it is not.
Seattle Needs a Tactical Fix Before October
The Seattle Mariners two-strike approach has to become more specific, not more cautious. Before each game, hitters should know an opponent’s preferred putaway pitch, its usual location and the count that most often produces it. For Sasaki, the July answer was the splitter. However, another starter may lean on a slider off the plate or a four-seamer above the zone.
Despite the pressure, no hitter can cover every finish equally well. Seattle should therefore build smaller two-strike targets. Rodríguez can guard the upper fastball without chasing the slider beneath the zone, while Raleigh can hunt the pitch he can lift. On the other hand, Naylor can use his superior contact skills to spoil pitches that would finish other hitters.
None of this means surrendering power. Yet still, Seattle should attack mistakes with intent while refusing to donate outs on pitches outside the strike zone. If these teams meet again in October, Los Angeles could bring a deeper staff than the one Seattle saw in July. Sasaki, Skubal, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Shohei Ohtani and Díaz can all end at-bats with different shapes and speeds.
Seattle cannot make that collection less talented. However, it can force those arms to throw another strike. In that moment, a slider taken beneath the knees can turn 1-2 into 2-2, and one hard foul can reveal the next pitch. Before long, the home run becomes possible because the hitter refused to donate the previous out.
The Seattle Mariners two-strike approach does not need a new identity before October. It needs better decisions after strike two. Finally, Seattle already knows it can punish mistakes; the harder question is whether the Mariners can force elite pitchers to make them.
READ MORE: Left-Handed Pitching Is Key to Seattle Mariners vs Los Angeles Dodgers
FAQ’s
What is wrong with the Seattle Mariners two-strike approach?
Seattle batters chase too many pitches outside the strike zone. They swing at bad pitches and let elite pitchers escape tough innings.
Why is Julio Rodríguez chasing so many pitches out of the zone?
Pitchers attack Rodríguez outside the strike zone when he falls behind. He needs to recognize spin earlier and take fringe sliders.
How does Cal Raleigh perform with two strikes?
Raleigh hits for high power, but he strikes out often. Four-seam fastballs give him trouble when he swings at elevated pitches.
Why do Josh Naylor and Cole Young serve as models for Seattle?
Both hitters make contact inside the strike zone. They limit whiffs and extend plate appearances better than the team average.
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