International signing periods can turn a teenager’s swing into a nearly $5 million gamble. On January 15, 2026, Venezuelan shortstop Luis Hernández signed with the San Francisco Giants at their Dominican Republic academy. His bonus reached $4,997,500, according to MLB.com’s official international signing tracker. San Francisco entered the window with $5.44 million in available pool money. One 17-year-old had just consumed almost 92% of it.
Hernández wasn’t an ordinary batting-practice sensation. At 15, he hit .346 against older competition in Venezuela’s Liga Mayor. MLB’s scouting coverage documented his success against pitchers with major league and Triple-A experience. Those at-bats gave the Giants something more convincing than showcase footage, but they couldn’t guarantee that his bat would survive professional development.
Across Latin America, scouts face variations of that same wager. They watch teenage hitters handle fastballs, chase breaking pitches, and adjust after ugly swings. Some project power that hasn’t developed yet. Others see shortstops whose bodies may eventually force them across the diamond.
By January 15, those evaluations become financial commitments. The international signing calendar determines when clubs can act, but the decisions behind those contracts often begin years earlier. How much of a teenager’s prospect ranking reflects his actual talent, and how much depends on when baseball allows him to sign?
January 15 comes after years of scouting and quiet commitments
The international signing period officially opens on January 15 and closes December 15. Players must satisfy MLB’s age and registration requirements before signing. For the 2026 class, the primary eligibility window covered players born between September 1, 2008, and August 31, 2009, alongside eligible older amateurs.
Those dates create an artificial boundary between players developing on the same baseball fields. One teenager can attract serious contract discussions while another, born months later, must remain outside the market until the following signing class. Their baseball development doesn’t follow MLB’s calendar, but their financial opportunities do.
Baseball America’s coverage of the 2026 international class described how highly regarded players sometimes reach informal agreements with organizations at 13 or 14 years old, occasionally even younger. These commitments carry uncertainty because they precede official signing eligibility. A teenager might gain considerable strength before his contract becomes official, while another could lose the athletic advantage that attracted scouts.
The pressure has troubled even experienced evaluators. In a 2019 Baseball America investigation into early international commitments, one anonymous international scouting director admitted, “And we’re all making mistakes. All of us.” Another director put the financial stakes even more plainly: “We’re gambling millions of dollars on kids.” Their frustration came from an arms race in which waiting until a teenager developed could mean losing him to another organization. Scouts knew they were making enormous decisions before they had enough evidence to trust their own projections.
For evaluators, that creates an uncomfortable scouting challenge. Watching a young hitter square up batting-practice fastballs tells them something about bat speed. Seeing him recognize a breaking ball, adjust his timing, and protect the plate against experienced competition reveals much more. Neither exercise fully predicts what happens when professional pitchers begin exploiting his weaknesses.
International signing periods bring those uncertainties into public view. MLB Pipeline grades teenagers against others in their signing class, often before anyone has an affiliated minor league record. Unlike college draft prospects, who may carry seasons of statistical evidence, international amateurs can arrive with comparatively little standardized competitive data.
The resulting rankings contain real scouting knowledge, but they also contain enormous projection.
Luis Hernández gave the Giants almost five million reasons to believe
San Francisco’s investment in Hernández reveals how far a team will go when its scouts agree on a teenager’s future.
The Giants pursued a right-handed hitter with quick hands, advanced bat control, and considerable offensive projection. As MLB.com reported in March 2026, Hernández had gone 16-for-49 against pitchers with major league or Triple-A experience during his earlier stint in Venezuela. That competition offered stronger evidence than a typical showcase against similarly aged amateurs.
His defensive evaluation came with more uncertainty. Hernández showed an impressive first step and smooth actions at shortstop, but MLB Pipeline graded his throwing arm closer to average. Physical development could alter his eventual position, placing greater pressure on his bat to justify the investment.
San Francisco’s senior director of international scouting, Joe Salermo, explained the organization’s approach to MLB.com in January 2026. His department worked alongside medical, education, strength and conditioning, data, and player development personnel. The goal involved identifying players early and becoming the “first on the spot with these players.”
That kind of scouting demands conviction. A team can spend years tracking a teenager, studying his body and swing, before committing a substantial portion of its international budget. Even then, opposing pitchers will eventually test assumptions that looked convincing during workouts.
One prospect ranking can hide a disagreement between scouts
MLB Pipeline ranked Hernández first among the 2026 international prospects. His bonus was also the largest in the class, as confirmed by MLB’s signing tracker and the Associated Press.
FanGraphs saw the same talent differently. In rankings published January 15, 2026, Eric Longenhagen placed Wandy Asigen first and Hernández second, assigning them future-value grades of 45+ and 45, respectively.
The discrepancy didn’t make either evaluation meaningless. It showed how experienced scouts could study the same prospects and reach different conclusions about future impact.
Hernández offered a comparatively polished offensive profile, while Asigen’s evaluation emphasized another combination of skills and projection. Neither ranking could settle which teenager would handle professional competition better.
For Giants scouts, the disagreement changed nothing. Their organization had already made its financial decision.
The bonus pool forces scouts to walk away from talented players
International signing periods operate under spending limits that can make a scouting director’s job particularly frustrating. A club might identify several promising shortstops and outfielders, yet lack the money to sign them all.
MLB assigned teams initial 2026 international bonus pools ranging from $5.44 million to $8,034,900. Arizona, Baltimore, Cleveland, Colorado, Kansas City, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis received the largest allocations. Houston, the Yankees, Mets, and Giants entered with the smallest.
The limits reflect MLB’s allocation rules, including market size, revenue, and certain major league free-agent signings. Clubs can trade bonus-pool space, but they cannot exceed their adjusted spending limits. Small deals worth $10,000 or less fall outside those calculations.
For San Francisco, Hernández’s $4,997,500 bonus left $442,500 from its original pool before other signings or adjustments. The club could still pursue lower-cost players, but it had sacrificed much of its flexibility to secure one highly rated shortstop.
Other organizations approached the class differently. The Athletics committed $4 million to Dominican infielder Johenssy Colome, while the Mets signed Asigen for $3.9 million. Both figures appeared in MLB’s international signing tracker.
Each payment represented a choice about talent and risk. A scouting department might prefer one expensive player with superstar potential or several prospects whose development offers multiple opportunities for success. The calendar forces those decisions into a narrow financial window.
Juan Soto showed why the biggest bonus isn’t always the smartest bet
In July 2015, the Washington Nationals signed Juan Soto for $1.5 million. At the time, MLB Pipeline ranked him 22nd among international prospects, even though scouts admired his unusual feel for hitting.
MLB.com’s original signing report described a teenager who wasn’t known for overwhelming raw power. His strengths were cleaner contact, an advanced swing, and the ability to consistently square up pitches. Washington’s scouting department believed those abilities deserved a significant investment.
Then-Nationals international scouting director Johnny DiPuglia told MLB.com that Soto possessed advanced hitting ability and projected additional power. Washington placed greater weight on the quality of his at-bats than on spectacular batting-practice displays.
Soto eventually developed into one of baseball’s premier offensive players. His rise demonstrated why projected power and mature plate discipline can outweigh louder athletic tools in a teenager’s scouting report.
The signing also provides an important calendar comparison. MLB’s international market opened in July when Soto signed; the league later moved the signing window to January. The underlying gamble remained the same even as the dates changed.
Soto’s career doesn’t prove that scouts should ignore signing bonuses or physical tools. It shows how easily a ranking can underestimate a hitter whose strongest quality appears in the decisions he makes before swinging.
Jesús Made turned a modest signing bonus into an elite prospect ranking
For every expensive international signing, another player arrives with considerably less attention and changes the conversation through his performance.
Milwaukee signed Dominican shortstop Jesús Made for $950,000 on January 15, 2024. MLB Pipeline had ranked him 22nd in his international class. His athleticism and switch-hitting ability intrigued scouts, but his bonus didn’t place him among the market’s biggest acquisitions.
That changed when he began playing professional games.
Made hit .331/.458/.554 in 51 Dominican Summer League appearances during 2024. According to MLB’s minor league statistics, he recorded 39 walks, 28 strikeouts, and 28 stolen bases. His production revealed a hitter who could control the strike zone without sacrificing aggression.
The following season brought a much tougher assignment. Milwaukee sent Made through three minor league levels, finishing 2025 at Double-A while he was still 18. He batted .285, collected 40 extra-base hits, and stole 47 bases across 115 games.
By 2026, he was no longer an intriguing bargain from an older international class. MLB Pipeline ranked him among baseball’s very best prospects. His Double-A season added 14 home runs, 91 RBIs, and 37 stolen bases in 122 games, according to official minor league records.
Made’s development exposed a weakness in early international signing rankings. His original position reflected what evaluators believed at signing time. His later standing reflected performance against increasingly advanced competition.
The Brewers hadn’t purchased a finished star for $950,000. They identified a talented teenager, then watched him improve enough to outperform his initial ranking.
The first professional season can expose what scouts missed
The transition from amateur showcases to affiliated baseball gives scouts their first extended opportunity to test their projections. Pitchers attack weaknesses repeatedly, defensive assignments become more demanding, and hitters must adjust without abandoning their natural strengths.
Hernández experienced both sides of that transition in 2026. The Giants sent him directly to the Arizona Complex League, bypassing the Dominican Summer League. He hit .298 with six home runs and a .917 OPS in 54 games, according to MLB’s minor league statistics.
His promotion to Single-A San Jose brought more resistance. Across 20 games, Hernández batted .231 with a .595 OPS and struck out 29 times in 98 plate appearances. The numbers didn’t erase his earlier success, but they provided a sharper picture of his development needs.
That contrast gives the Giants something their January evaluation couldn’t provide: evidence of how their prized teenager responds when professional competition becomes less forgiving.
Emanuel Luna’s explosive debut showed the danger of tiny samples
The St. Louis Cardinals faced another kind of evaluation problem with Emanuel Luna, their $2.3 million international signing.
On June 6, 2026, MLB.com reported that Luna had homered three times in his first three Dominican Summer League games. Two came during an 11-5 victory against the DSL Nationals. The 17-year-old had also driven in seven runs through those three appearances.
His power attracted understandable attention. Two of those home runs traveled to the opposite field, suggesting he could drive pitches without pulling everything. But three games provide almost no reliable evidence about a hitter’s long-term consistency.
Luna finished the 2026 minor league season with just nine games and 24 official at-bats, according to MLB’s statistics. His .417 average and three home runs looked impressive, but the limited playing time prevented a meaningful evaluation across a full season.
For prospect rankings, that distinction carries real consequences. A spectacular opening week can validate a scouting report without proving that the player is ready for a promotion. Evaluators still need to see how he adjusts after pitchers identify exploitable weaknesses.
Hernández, Made, and Luna illustrate why teams struggle to price potential. Each signed before professional baseball could fully test his abilities. But in 2025, the same international rules created the opposite problem. They governed the signing of a pitcher who had already spent years proving himself against professionals in Japan.
Roki Sasaki was the exception that exposed baseball’s calendar problem
Roki Sasaki entered the 2025 international signing market at 23, carrying a résumé that most teenage prospects could only imagine. He had thrown a perfect game in Nippon Professional Baseball, overwhelmed hitters with his splitter, and demonstrated elite velocity against advanced competition.
His experience separated him from the typical 16- or 17-year-old international signee. MLB’s rules, however, still classified him as an international amateur because he had not reached the necessary age and foreign professional service thresholds for unrestricted free agency.
Sasaki announced his decision to join the Los Angeles Dodgers on January 17, 2025. The club formally completed and announced his contract on January 22. His signing bonus totaled $6.5 million, a figure initially reported by The Athletic and subsequently confirmed in MLB.com’s coverage.
The Dodgers had to create sufficient international bonus-pool room to complete the deal. According to reports on the signing, Los Angeles acquired additional space through trades with Cincinnati and Philadelphia.
Sasaki’s circumstances exposed an unusual feature of the international system. A pitcher with years of elite professional experience could enter through the same spending mechanism as teenagers who had never played affiliated baseball.
His case was exceptional, but it reinforced the power of the signing calendar. Teams weren’t simply ranking talent; they were working within rules that determined when and how they could acquire it.
The next January gamble starts before the scouts can know the answer
International signing periods will keep producing enormous expectations around players who are still growing into their bodies. Every January brings a fresh group of teenage shortstops, outfielders, catchers, and pitchers carrying projections that no professional season has tested.
The challenge goes beyond deciding who possesses the strongest throwing arm or fastest bat. Scouts must determine which teenagers can adjust when pitchers exploit their weaknesses, physical development changes their defensive positions, and the pressure surrounding a large signing bonus becomes part of everyday life.
Those judgments have consequences for the players and their families. A multimillion-dollar contract can create immediate financial security, but it also introduces expectations before a teenager has played a full professional season.
MLB acknowledged broader problems in June 2026 when it proposed an international amateur draft during collective bargaining discussions. The league argued that early informal agreements could pressure young players to leave school and train full-time away from home. Its proposal sought to change how teams acquire international talent, although the league’s position did not resolve every concern about scouting access and player development.
The debate revealed how deeply the international calendar shapes baseball’s future. Signing rules influence which players attract attention, how early organizations pursue them, and how much money teams can commit before obtaining reliable professional evidence.
For the Giants, Hernández’s first season offered a promising but incomplete return on their investment. His early success in Arizona demonstrated why scouts believed in his swing. The tougher stretch at San Jose reminded everyone how much development remained.
Made’s emergence provided another lesson. A player who arrived without the largest bonus eventually climbed to the top of prospect rankings through sustained production. His career shows why the most valuable international signing isn’t necessarily the teenager who commands the most money on January 15.
When the next signing window opens, scouts will again compare swings, defensive actions, and projected ceilings. Teams will commit millions before knowing whether those evaluations can survive the grind of professional baseball.
And somewhere in Latin America, another teenager will step into a batting cage, take a pitch, and drive the next one into the outfield. A scout will record the swing. Someone else will see a future major leaguer.
The money might follow years before anyone knows who’s right.
January determines when teams can buy the promise. Baseball determines what that promise was worth.
FAQs
Q1. When does the MLB international signing period start?
MLB’s international signing window opens January 15 and closes December 15. Eligible players can sign professional contracts during that period.
Q2. Why do MLB teams spend millions on teenage prospects?
Teams pay for future potential, not guaranteed production. Scouts evaluate hitting, defense, athleticism, and physical growth before committing large bonuses.
Q3. How much did the Giants pay Luis Hernández?
San Francisco signed Luis Hernández for $4,997,500 in January 2026. That accounted for nearly 92% of the Giants’ initial international bonus pool.
Q4. Can a lower-ranked international prospect become an MLB star?
Absolutely. Juan Soto ranked 22nd in his international signing class. Jesús Made also started outside the top 20 before climbing baseball’s prospect rankings.
Q5. Why did Roki Sasaki count as an international amateur?
Sasaki hadn’t met MLB’s age and foreign professional service requirements for unrestricted free agency. The Dodgers therefore had to use international bonus-pool money.
