The two-point conversion chart could offer Brian Kelly a recommendation, but it could not make the throw toward Tiger Stadiumâs right pylon. On November 5, 2022, LSU trailed Alabama 31â30 in the first overtime. Jayden Daniels had just scrambled 25 yards for a touchdown. A successful extra point would keep the game alive. Kelly kept his offense on the field.
Daniels fired into the right flat, where freshman tight end Mason Taylor caught the ball at the 1-yard line. LSUâs game report describes Taylor falling just inside the pylon. The Tigers won 32â31, turning a few feet of grass into the difference between another overtime and an immediate celebration.
But that finish does not make going for two the correct answer every Saturday. Another quarterback might struggle to deliver that quick throw with a defender closing. A coach with a rested defense might prefer another exchange of possessions.
Kelly had to choose between his offenseâs next snap and everything that could happen afterward. That is the real question behind the chart: do you trust one play more than you trust more football?
What Kelly could choose and what the rules would require
Kelly still had a choice because LSU scored in the first overtime. The National Football Foundationâs explanation of the NCAAâs 2021 changes makes the distinction clear: teams can kick after first-overtime touchdowns. In the second overtime, they must attempt two. From the third onward, they trade two-point attempts instead of full possession series.
So Kelly could try to end the game with Daniels and Taylor, or kick to earn another round. Choosing another overtime would also mean preparing for a mandatory conversion if LSU scored a touchdown.
College teams normally snap their tries from the 3-yard line, as NCAA Rule 8 specifies. Those three yards leave little space for a receiver to separate or a quarterback to recover from a missed block. A coach needs a call his players can execute against the defense in front of them.
The NCAAâs April 2025 update changed another part of that preparation. Beginning with the third overtime, each team gets one timeout for the rest of the game, rather than one per period. Spend it to escape a bad matchup, and you cannot expect another timeout before the next attempt.
That makes formation changes and clear instructions more valuable during repeated tries. It does not explain Kellyâs 2022 choice. Instead, it shows why coaches preparing for todayâs overtime format need several usable calls and players who can adjust without another sideline conference.
A tying kick carries its own gamble
Imagine a team scores as regulation expires and trails by one. Convert the try, and it wins. Fail, and it loses. A successful kick buys overtime, where the team still has to beat the opponent.
The two-point conversion chart should help a coach compare those routes, rather than treat the kick as an escape from risk.
Suppose a staff believes its extra-point unit will make the kick 98 percent of the time. It also estimates a 45 percent chance of winning overtime. Those hypothetical estimates give the kick-and-overtime route a 44.1 percent chance of victory.
Now suppose the coordinator believes his best conversion play works 48 percent of the time. Leaving the offense out offers the better chance, even though that play fails more often than it succeeds. This simplified comparison sets aside unusual defensive scoring on the try.
Change the overtime estimate, and the recommendation changes. A team with a 60 percent chance of winning overtime would have a 58.8 percent chance through the same kicking route. That staff should prefer the kick over the 48 percent conversion play.
The arithmetic takes seconds. Estimating those chances takes judgment. Coaches must weigh a quarterbackâs available throws, the protection, and the opponent they would face in another period.
A two-point conversion chart helps organize that judgment. It cannot tell the coordinator whether his left tackle can hold his block.
Boise State chose a play it trusted
At the 2007 Fiesta Bowl, Chris Petersen saw tired players and a two-point play he liked. He had already decided to use it when Boise State answered Oklahomaâs overtime touchdown.
âWe liked the play we had for a 2-point conversion,â Petersen told the Associated Press afterward.
That play was the Statue of Liberty. Boise State aligned three receivers to the right. Jared Zabransky faked a throw toward them, then handed the ball behind his back to Ian Johnson. Johnson ran left into the end zone, giving the Broncos a 43â42 victory.
Calling Petersen fearless tells only part of the story. He worried about extending the game with exhausted players, and he trusted a specific way to beat Oklahomaâs defense. The famous handoff supplied the answer.
For anyone building a two-point conversion chart, that distinction matters. A general conversion estimate might suggest a close decision. Against a favorable defensive look, a practiced call might give the coach a stronger reason to go.
Fans remember the deception. Coaches studying the finish should also remember the preparation: the fake had to draw defenders right while the handoff sent Johnson left. Courage could not substitute for timing.
Forty seconds changes the decision
A touchdown with forty seconds remaining can leave the same one-point deficit as a touchdown at the final horn. The coach faces a different problem, though. Even after a successful conversion, the opponent might drive into field-goal range and win.
Coaches cannot follow the chart without considering the kickoff, remaining timeouts, and their defenseâs ability to protect a lead. A one-point advantage matters less if the opposing quarterback can reach scoring range before the clock expires.
The chart also helps earlier in a comeback. Start fourteen points behind, score a touchdown, and the deficit drops to eight before the try. Go for two successfully, and a second touchdown plus an extra point can win, provided the opponent does not score.
Miss that first conversion, and a later touchdown still leaves a two-point attempt to tie. Taking the first chance gives the staff information while time remains to respond.
But the comeback still needs another touchdown. Can the defense get the ball back? Does the offense have a second conversion call if it needs one?
Those questions keep the strategy grounded in the players on the field. A useful sideline guide helps coaches plan the next possession as well as the next snap.
A missed pass does not settle the argument
Getting the chance does not guarantee the finish. In the 1984 Orange Bowl, Nebraska stood one point behind Miami after a late touchdown. Tom Osborne sent his offense back out. The two-point pass fell incomplete, leaving the Huskers with a 31â30 loss.
There would be no overtime waiting behind a tying kick. Nebraska athleticsâ retrospective explains what Osborne could have protected: a tie would have left the Huskers as the seasonâs only unbeaten team. He chose the chance to win outright, putting that unbeaten season on the next snap.
That history prevents an easy comparison with Kelly or Petersen. Different rules and championship circumstances changed what the coaches could gain by kicking. The failed pass also poses a question that successful highlights tend to hide.
Would Osborneâs reasoning have improved if the ball had reached its target?
Coaches can make bad decisions and win. They can also choose the better chance and lose. Evaluating the call means examining the available play, the opponent, and the alternatives before the snap.
The chart should help coaches examine those choices. Turning every successful attempt into genius and every failure into recklessness teaches nothing about the next close game.
The decision starts before the touchdown
During the week, a coordinator can watch a defender bite on motion without a stadium roaring in his ears. He can test the protection, rehearse a second call, and ask the quarterback what he sees against pressure. Those conversations give the head coach something concrete to trust when the touchdown comes.
The conversion plan should form part of that preparation. Staffs need to discuss when they favor one decisive snap, when they prefer overtime, and how remaining time changes both options. A recommendation means more when everyone understands the play behind it.
Game night can still force an adjustment. An injured blocker might weaken the preferred call. A defensive substitution might create a matchup the coordinator wants. Moving the ball after a penalty could change the choice again.
The coach must recognize those details without allowing the previous touchdownâs excitement to make the decision for him. Scoring on a long run does not guarantee that the offense can gain three yards against a compressed defense.
Then comes the snap. Linemen fight to hold their blocks. A receiver turns toward the quarterback, with a defender reaching into the passing lane.
The next Taylor might catch the ball and fall short of the pylon. Before anyone judges the coach by those missing inches, the better question remains: what gave his players their strongest chance to win?
READ MORE: Target Share in the SEC Shows Who Carries the Passing Game
FAQs
Q1. What does a two-point conversion chart tell a coach?
A. It helps a coach decide whether to kick or attempt two. Coaches still weigh the clock, opponent and available play before choosing.
Q2. Do college teams have to go for two in overtime?
A. Teams can kick after first-overtime touchdowns. They must attempt two after second-overtime touchdowns, then alternate two-point plays from the third overtime.
Q3. Where do college teams attempt a two-point conversion?
A. College teams normally snap the ball from the opponentâs 3-yard line. Penalties can change the distance.
Q4. Does going for two need a better than 50 percent chance?
A. No. A conversion below 50 percent can still offer the better chance if making the kick and winning overtime is less likely.
Q5. What play did Boise State use to beat Oklahoma?
A. Boise State used the Statue of Liberty. Jared Zabransky hid a handoff to Ian Johnson, who ran left for the winning conversion.
